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Dissertation Abstract 
 
 
We take ourselves to have some knowledge aboutwhat’s right andwrong to do. But how easy                                 
is this knowledge to get? In t​he first two chapters of this dissertation I argue for the novel conclusion                                     
that it is harder to havemoral knowledge than non-moral knowledge due to the fact thatmoral beliefs                                   
have more practically at stake. More specifically, in chapter 1 I argue thatmoral beliefs are subject to a                                     
higher epistemic standard than non-moral beliefs. Roughly, epistemic standardsmark howgood of an                           
epistemic position an agent needs to be in in order for her beliefs to receive epistemic credit like                                   
knowledge. The higher epistemic standard of moral beliefs offers the only unified explanation to date                             
of long-standing puzzling asymmetries between moral and non-moral epistemology, like howmoral                       
testimony, unlike non-moral testimony, is problematic and moral expertise, unlike non-moral                     
expertise, is non-existent.  
Even so, one may wonder whymoral beliefs have such a higher epistemic standard. In chapter                               
2 I argue that the best account of what fixes the higher epistemic standard for moral beliefs is a                                     
practical-stakes account wherein the practical upshots of holding a belief affect how demanding the                           
standard is. Importantly, my account differs from traditional practical-stakes accounts of epistemic                       
standards. First, it locates features of morality as a subject matter, like being subject to the reactive                                 
attitudes and the way that moral beliefs typically motivate whereas non-moral beliefs don’t, as that                             
which functions to raise the standard. Second, the stakes that are relevant outrun those stemming                             
from the interests of the individual person whose belief is under assessment, and include the practical                               
interests of other agents. This last feature makes the picture of moral knowledge I offer essentially                               
social, as whether or not one has moral knowledge depends in part on the interests of others. In the                                     
end, the view I offer in these chapters presents a perhaps surprising picture of moral epistemology as                                 
systematically different from non-moral epistemology. 
In chapter 3 I investigate inmore detail the social basis ofmoral knowledge by considering one                                 
particular view of the nature of moral facts, constructivism. According to this view, moral facts are                               
determined by what would be the result of a hypothetical choice procedure amongst an idealized                             
group of agents. Here I argue that the best moral epistemology on offer for the constructivist requires                                 
an agent to be able to respond to the objections that relevant otherswould have to the content of one’s                                       
belief in order for that belief to count as knowledge. In this way,moral knowledge for constructivists                                 
requires the ability to reason together with others about morality. 
After considering social constraints on moral knowledge, in chapter 4 I turn to consider                           
whether normativity may likewise have a social basis. Here, I consider social-based views of                           
normativity wherein an agent’s reasons for action are determined by the social institutions, practices,                           
and relations (IPRs) she takes part in. I argue that existing views have trouble ensuring that certain                                 
intuitively bad social practices--namely, oppressive ones--aren’t a source of reasons. In light of this, I                             
develop a novel positive view, Looping Social Constructivism, according to which an agent’s reasons                           
are a function of the IPRs she takes part in, after they are idealized. Specifically, they are idealized such                                     
that each role in the IPR has the same ability to determine how rights, responsibilities, and power are                                   
distributed across the IPR. Looping Social Constructivism is able to avoid issues of oppressive IPRs                             
given its unique use of idealization on the social level: instead of idealizing the individual agents taking                                 
part in an IPR, we idealize structural features of the IPR itself.  
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0.  Introduction 
Moral epistemology might seem useless. Not because there is nothing valuable to be learned                           
by investigating the epistemology of moral beliefs, but rather because all that we can hope to learn                                 
about the epistemology of moral beliefs can be learnt by doing standard non-moral epistemology.                           
Pessimistically, one might think, there is nothing special about moral beliefs, and they deserve no                             
further attention than that properly paid to their non-moral analogues. The real epistemic battles to                             
be fought are those in classic debates in traditional epistemology: whether internalism or                         
externalism about justification is true, whether knowledge requires safety or sensitivity, whether                       
the  threat  of  skepticism  destroys  the  possibility  of  knowledge,  and  so  on.   
Yet when we look to certain areas within moral epistemology, this is the minority view.                             
Rather, many have thought that moral beliefs are epistemically special in some ways, and that there                               
are noteworthy asymmetries between certain areas in our moral and non-moral epistemology.                       
These differences are often viewed as obstacles or hurdles moral beliefs face on their way to moral                                 
knowledge that non-moral beliefs don’t face. For example, while non-moral knowledge is thought                         
to be easily achieved via testimony, non-moral testimony is thought to be epistemically problematic,                           
morally  problematic,  or  both.  1
1  While  some  seek  to  undermine  or  debunk  this  claim,  this  is  the  starting  judgment  or  “datum”  concerning  moral 
testimony  that  authors  both  for  and  against  it  address.  See  Crisp  (2014);  Hills  (2009);  Hopkins  (2007);  Howell  (2014); 
McGrath  (2009);  Mogensen  (2015);  and  Nickel  (2001)  for  explicit  arguments  in  favor  of  the  asymmetrically  problematic 
nature  of  moral  testimony. 
1 
In this paper, I, too, will argue that moral beliefs are epistemically special and hence require                               
a special epistemology. However, instead of focusing on isolated issues in moral epistemology such                           
as testimony, my investigation will concern broader differences between moral and non-moral                       
epistemology. I’ll seek to give a unifying explanation of the differences others have sought to explain                               
in isolation. The way in which moral beliefs are distinct, I will argue, is that their epistemic standard                                   
is typically higher. Generally speaking, this means that one typically needs to be in a better epistemic                                 
position for one’s moral belief to receive the relevant kind of epistemic credit (for example,                             
justification or knowledge) than that needed for one’s non-moral belief to receive the same kind of                               
epistemic credit (justification, knowledge). For instance, on an evidentialist model this amounts to                         
saying that one generally needs stronger evidence to have a justified moral belief than to have a                                 
justified  non-moral  belief.   
To be clear, I am not arguing for a universal claim: that for every single moral belief it will                                     
have a higher epistemic standard compared to that for any other non-moral belief. Such a universal                               
claim is too strong to be plausible. Rather, my claim is that this is  typically  the case, and as such it is a                                             
characteristic and noteworthy feature of moral epistemology as such. Importantly, one need not                         
endorse such a universal claim to adequately explain the asymmetries between particular areas of                           
moral and non-moral epistemology, since, as will be covered in section 1, these concern  general                             
issues with particular aspects of moral epistemology. For example, the noted asymmetry is not that                             
for every single possible instance of testimony, any instance of moral testimony will be more                             
problematic than any instance of non-moral testimony, for that would be quite implausible; rather,                           
it  is  that  moral  testimony  in  general  is  (more)  problematic.  2
2  The  same  can  be  said  for  the  other  aspects  of  moral  epistemology  that  have  received  widespread  attention,  namely 
expertise,  and  the  effect  disagreement  has  in  undermining  knowledge  or  leading  to  skepticism.  Expertise  by  definition 
concerns  a  general  ability,  or  knowledge  of  a  range  of  facts  about  a  particular  topic,  not  perfect  ability  or  knowledge  of 
2 
The paper will proceed by first considering three areas that many people have found                           
puzzling for moral beliefs as opposed to non-moral beliefs: testimony, expertise, and disagreement.                         
Although others have attempted solutions to these puzzles, they have done so in an isolated way,                               
seeking to solve the puzzles individually rather than collectively. In this paper, I will put forth the                                 
only unified solution to these issues currently on offer. After providing my unifying account--an                           
account I call the Higher Standards account--and showing how it explains moral testimony, moral                           
expertise, and moral disagreement, I consider two competing unifying accounts and argue that both                           
are  unacceptable.  Finally,  I  consider  and  respond  to  two  objections  to  my  own  account.   
 
1.  The  Oddity  of  Moral  Epistemology 
One area of moral epistemology that has recently received a great deal of attention is moral                               
testimony. One reason this topic has garnered so much attention is the noteworthy asymmetry in                             
our judgments regarding instances of moral and non-moral testimony: while we think it’s perfectly                           
acceptable to form non-moral beliefs solely on the basis of others’ reports, we balk at instances of                                 
forming moral beliefs solely on another person’s say-so. For example, consider the following                         3
instances  of  moral  testimony: 
Eleanor has always enjoyed eating meat but has recently realized that it raises some                           
moral issues. Rather than thinking further about these, however, she talks to a                         
friend, who tells her that eating meat is wrong. Eleanor knows that her friend is                             
normally trustworthy and reliable, so she believes her and accepts that eating meat is                           
wrong.    4
every  single  fact  about  a  particular  topic.  Likewise,  the  phenomenon  regarding  moral  disagreement  concerns  how  it  in 
general  leads  to  skepticism,  not  how  every  single  instance  of  moral  disagreement  undermines  the  status  of  knowledge 
for  every  single  moral  belief  every  single  person  has.  I  further  explain  how  my  account  of  there  typically  being  a  higher 
epistemic  standard  for  moral  beliefs  explains  puzzling  asymmetries  in  moral  epistemology  in  section  2.2. 
3  For  defenses  of  this  asymmetry  see  Crisp  (2014);  Hills  (2009);  Hopkins  (2007);  Howell  (2014);  McGrath  (2009); 
Mogensen  (2015);  and  Nickel  (2001).   
4  Hills  (2009),  p.  94. 
3 
Danielle hears about an upcoming demonstration protesting Israel's war in Gaza.                     
Although she knows the causes of the war and knows that civilians are dying from                             
IDF bombing, Danielle is unsure whether the war is just. She doesn’t try to think                             
through the matter for herself. Instead, she asks a reliable and trustworthy friend,                         
who says the war is immoral. Danielle accepts her friend's claim and joins the                           
protest. Asked by a journalist why she is demonstrating, Danielle says she knows the                           
war  is  wrong  because  her  friend  told  her  so.  5
 
Here, many object to Eleanor’s and Danielle’s reliance on their friends in forming their moral                             
beliefs: there is something prima facie wrong about Eleanor and Danielle forming their moral                           
beliefs just on the basis of their friends’ say-so. Importantly, these judgments don’t seem to be                               
confined to the specific moral subject matter (e.g. eating meat) or sporadic; as Sarah McGrath notes,                               
“the attitude that pure moral deference is more problematic than non-moral deference is                         
widespread,  even  if  not  universal,  in  our  culture.”    6
Moral testimony isn’t the only area in moral epistemology that presents unique epistemic                         
challenges. Expertise is another area where there seem to be deep differences between the moral                             
and non-moral epistemic domains. While it’s undoubtedly the case that there are experts on all                             
kinds of non-moral subjects, moral experts are thought to be at best few and far between, and at                                   
worst entirely non-existent. Moreover, while it’s usually clear what’s required for expertise in                         7
various non-moral subjects, there’s quite general confusion and disagreement over what would                       
even be required for moral expertise. To put it most pessimistically: if, contrary to appearances,                             
there  even  were  any  moral  experts,  we  would  be  seriously  hard  pressed  to  find  them.  8
And, if moral testimony and expertise weren’t enough, moral disagreement poses its own                         
unique challenges. Unlike disagreement in non-moral domains, moral disagreement is thought to                       
5  Mogensen  (2015),  p.1. 
6  McGrath  (2009),  p.  323. 
7  McGrath  (2011)  and  (2007);  Ryle  (1958). 
8  Cholbi  (2007). 
4 
be especially intractable, as it persists even when both parties appear to share the same (non-moral)                               
evidence. Likewise, moral disagreement seems to be a much more widespread phenomenon than                         
non-moral disagreement. Because of its intractability and persistence, the mere fact of moral                         
disagreement is sometimes thought to lead directly to moral skepticism. Note that no such route to                               9
non-moral skepticism (about the existence of global warming, say) is generally thought to be                           
available. 
This way in which moral disagreement is thought to lead to moral skepticism will be my                               
focus here regarding the epistemic asymmetry of moral and non-moral disagreement. Of course,                         
there two closely related issues regarding moral disagreement about which I say nothing here. They                             
concern (a) why moral disagreement is so widespread and intractable, and (b) whether we should be                               
steadfast and retain our moral beliefs when faced with such disagreement. I choose to set these                               
related issues aside and focus on the question of how moral disagreement can lead to moral                               
skepticism for present purposes because unlike the issue of skepticism, (a) and (b) do not directly                               
concern notable  epistemic asymmetries in  moral  epistemology. I take (a) to be a metaphysical                           
metaethical concern, as the widespread and persistent nature of moral disagreement typically takes                         
metaphysical explanations, like that moral relativism or expressivism is true. Although (b) is an                           10
epistemic issue, I take it to be a question on the topic of peer disagreement in general, and not a                                       
noted asymmetry in moral epistemology in particular (that is, it is not widely thought that the                               
correct response to peer disagreement about morality (e.g. steadfastness) differs from what is widely                           
9  For  example,  Tolhurst  (1987)  argues  that  it  makes  our  moral  beliefs  never  justified,  while  McGrath  (2009)  and  Vavova 
(2014)  both  argue  that  disagreement  leads  to  skepticism  about  a  certain  subset  of  our  moral  beliefs. 
10  For  views  that  take  the  widespread  and  persistent  nature  of  moral  disagreement  as  support  for  moral  relativism  see 
Harman  (1996),  Prinz  (2007),  and  Wong  (2006). 
5 
thought as the correct response to peer disagreement about non-moral matters (e.g.                       
conciliationism)). 
While moral epistemologists have offered explanations of these issues, what is striking is                         
that all of the approaches have been piecemeal in nature: such accounts aim to explain why moral                                 
testimony is especially problematic, or why moral expertise is especially difficult, or why moral                           
disagreement is especially bad for moral knowledge. For example, proposals to explain moral                         
testimony appeal to problems it creates for moral agency, or moral understanding (the true “aim” of                               
moral beliefs), or that we can’t reliably identify reliable testifiers. Likewise, explanations of the                           11
puzzle of moral expertise have pointed to difficulties in identifying them or to the widespread                             
presence of disagreement as undermining the possibility of moral experts. Lastly, accounts of                         12
moral disagreement have proposed that the explanation of why moral disagreement leads to                         
skepticism lies in the acceptance of an epistemic position on disagreement in general,                         
Conciliationism. But when each of the issues of moral testimony, moral expertise, and moral                           13
disagreement are taken together as a whole, the phenomenon to be explained changes its tone and                               
becomes quite striking: it seems that there’s not some special problem with moral testimony or                             
expertise  or  disagreement,  but,  rather,  some  special  problem  with  moral  epistemology  as  a  whole . 
Of course, there have been those who hold that our judgments concerning the oddity of                             
moral testimony, expertise, and disagreement are illusory, preferring instead to offer debunking                       
explanations of these judgements and arguing that there is nothing distinctly problematic about                         
11  For  accounts  which  point  to  issues  with  moral  agency,  see  Crisp  (2014);  Hills  (2009);  Hopkins  (2007);  Howell  (2014); 
Mogensen  (2015);  and  Nickel  (2001).  See  Hills  (2009)  for  the  claim  that  moral  testimony  excludes  moral  understanding. 
See  McGrath  (2009)  for  the  claim  that  there  are  issues  with  identifying  reliable  testifiers  in  the  moral  domain. 
12  For  issues  with  identification,  see  Cholbi  (2007);  and  Driver  (2006).  For  the  claim  that  there  are  no  experts,  see  Cross 
(2016).  Perhaps  the  oldest  argument  against  moral  experts  is  given  by  Ryle  (1958),  but,  unlike  more  contemporary 
work,  it  assumes  non-cognitivism. 
13  Vavova  (2014).  See  Christensen  (2007)  for  an  argument  for  and  articulation  of  Conciliationism. 
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them. My purposes in this paper is not to take issue with the asymmetry claim itself. Rather,                                 14
what’s notable is that all approaches to these puzzles and apparent asymmetries between moral and                             
non-moral beliefs have been disuniÚied . Supposing that there are these puzzling differences, my aim                           
in this paper is to give a unifying account that can explain these apparent puzzles with moral                                 
testimony,  moral  expertise,  and  moral  disagreement. 
In the next section, I will provide such a unifying account. My unifying model appeals to a                                 
single mechanism: epistemic standards and how they shift. This means, roughly, that the standard                           
agents must meet in order to receive the relevant positive epistemic credit (e.g., knowledge or                             
justification) is typically more stringent for moral beliefs than the corresponding standard is for                           
non-moral beliefs. In order to assess this account, we should first turn to the concept of an                                 
epistemic  standard. 
 
2.  The  Higher  Standards  Account 
2.1.  Epistemic  Standards 
In very basic terms, we can think of an epistemic standard as marking how good of an                                 
epistemic position an agent needs to be in to count as knowing or as having a justified belief. The                                     
notion of an epistemic standard captures the intuitive idea that in order to determine whether an                               
agent’s belief is justified or counts as knowledge, we need to know not just how much evidence she                                   
has , but how much she  needs . This concept of an epistemic standard allows us to capture the thought                                   
that for some areas of inquiry or in some contexts, what’s required for knowledge or justification                               
14  For  arguments  against  the  asymmetry  of  moral  testimony,  see  Groll  and  Decker  (2014);  Jones  (1999);  Reisner  and 
Van  Weelden  (2015);  and  Sliwa  (2012).  For  defenses  of  moral  expertise,  see  Driver  (2013);  Jones  and  Schroeter  (2012); 
and  Singer  (1972).  Against  the  significance  of  moral  disagreement,  see  Decker  and  Groll  (2013). 
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changes : it’s not that knowledge of every kind of fact requires the exact same strength of evidence.                                 
This  is  just  to  say  that  sometimes,  we  think  the  epistemic  standard  shifts .  15
This shiftiness of epistemic standards has been utilized by contextualists in epistemology to                         
explain the fluctuation of our knowledge attributions. For it seems that, while we may want to deny                                 
large-scale skepticism wherein agents always know little to nothing at all, we may also want to                               
endorse small-scale skepticism, wherein agents fail to know particular things in particularly                       
demanding circumstances. For example, while it seems perfectly innocuous to say that I know that I                               
have hands when I am walking to class, once I find myself embedded in a classroom discussion                                 
about skepticism it seems right to deny that I know I have hands. Contextualists will explain these                                 
shifty judgments by appealing to epistemic standards: from the walk to the classroom to the                             
discussion of skepticism within the classroom the epistemic standard has changed (more specifically                         
it has gotten more strict). In this case, while my perception of my appearing to have hands was                                   16
good enough to make my belief that I have hands knowledge outside of the classroom, it is no                                   
longer  sufficient  to  get  me  knowledge  once  inside  the  classroom’s  skeptical  walls. 
That is the intuitive idea. But we can give an even more fine-grained account of epistemic                               
standards than this. Looking closer at the way contextualists utilize talk of standards, we can say                               
that an epistemic standard specifies a range of epistemic possibilities that an agent may ignore or fail                                 
to rule out while still counting as knowing or having a justified belief. These possibilities would                               17
15  I  use  an  evidentialist  model  of  standards  here  for  the  sake  of  simplicity.  Nothing  in  my  argument  hangs  on  this 
assumption. 
16  See  Cohen  (1986). 
17  Strictly  speaking,  this  is  actually  where  contextualists  and  fallibilists--who  also  appeal  to  epistemic  standards--part 
ways  in  their  understanding  of  what  a  standard  specifies.  Fallibilists  will  say  that  an  agent  does  not  need  to  rule  out 
every  possibility,  while  contextualists  will  say  that  they  do;  the  difference  is  how  each  is  quantifying  over  ‘every’.  For  the 
fallibilist,  ‘every’  really  does  pick  out  every  single  possibility,  while  for  the  contextualist  ‘every’  picks  out  a  certain  subset 
of  every  single  possibility,  for  example  every  salient  possibility.   This  is  perhaps  why  some  contextualists  hold  that 
contextualism  is  an  infallibilist  position  (see  Lewis  (1996)),  while  others  hold  it  to  be  fallibilist  in  nature  (see  Heller 
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specify ways the world could be in which not-p is true (when one’s belief is p). Importantly, this                                   
means that for any given belief, there is more than one epistemic possibility: we are not to divide up                                     
the epistemic possible worlds simply into two worlds, p and not-p, where one of these is the actual                                   
world. Rather, epistemic possibilities are individuated by  ways  in which your belief could be false.                             
For example,  there are many possible worlds in which your belief that you have hands is false: you                                   
could be hallucinating, you could be dreaming, etc.. But only some of the ways the world could                                 
be--only some of these possible worlds--are relevant to the epistemic status of your beliefs in the                               
actual world because of some relation they bear to you, and that you bear to them: they are salient,                                     
or relevant, etc. Provided you are able to rule out that set of worlds where your belief would be                                     
false, you receive the relevant positive epistemic status for your belief (e.g. knowledge, justification).                           
Overall, the rigor of an epistemic standard can be specified in one of two ways: sometimes, a more                                   
rigorous standard specifies  more  possibilities that one must be able to rule out, while other times it                                 
specifies possibilities that are simply  harder to rule out. My account allows for both of these                               
interpretations  of  rigor. 
Like rigor, the notion of “ruling out” possibilities can be understood in a number of ways.                               
On a probabilistic model, this could mean either that one makes some possibilities  more improbable ,                             
or that one makes  more possibilities improbable. My claim is just that for moral beliefs, the epistemic                                 
standard shifts, becoming more rigorous and thus requiring more in one of these two ways.                             
Importantly, this view of standards is also compatible with both internalist and externalist theories                           
of justification and knowledge. For example, if one were a reliabilist, the upwards shift in the rigor                                 
of the standard would require one to have more safety or sensitivity. If one were an evidentialist,                                 
(1999)).  In  the  end,  though,  each  camp  seems  to  agree  on  this  general  statement:  out  of  all  the  total  possibilities,  in  order 
to  know  an  agent  must  be  able  to  rule  out  only  all  of  those  possibilities  in  a  subset  of  these  total  possibilities. 
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one would be required to possess stronger evidence that rules out more possibilities. What’s                           
important for my claim is that what it takes to have an epistemic state (justification, knowledge)                               
depends  on  the  rigor  of  the  standard,  and  that  morality  makes  this  rigor  increase.   
Additionally, my account is neutral along specific competing accounts of how standards are                         
fixed, which determine the range of the worlds one is required to rule out. For example, some                                 18
hold that this range is flexible, picking out different worlds in different contexts (contextualists,                           
subject sensitive invariantists), while others hold that the same range of worlds is picked out in all                                 
contexts (invariantists). Fully addressing what can cause the shiftiness of the standard in general,                           
and the shiftiness of standards for moral beliefs in particular, is unfortunately a question outside the                               
scope of the current paper. However, to preserve the credibility of my claim that moral beliefs                               
typically have a higher standard it is important that there at least be  some  prima facie plausible                                 
models  available,  so  I  will  briefly  address  this  issue  here.   
One possible model of how standards are fixed is the well-known stakes-model, wherein an                           
epistemic standard is determined by the practical stakes, or costs of one’s belief turning out to be                                 
false. I defend such a standards-fixing model elsewhere. I argue that there are certain practical                             19
stakes that are unique to moral beliefs (for example, the costs of being the target of certain reactive                                   
attitudes) such that when we account for these stakes, such a model does a good job of tracking how                                     
most moral beliefs have a higher epistemic standard and how the ones that intuitively don’t, don’t.                               
Although further details of this model are too complicated to adequately address here, I hope that it                                 
seems initially plausible. Of course, if this particular model does not sound appealing, one need not                               
18  To  be  clear:  my  account  of  what  an  epistemic  standard  is  is  neutral  along  these  lines;  however,  invariantism  regarding 
epistemic  standards  (that  is,  standards  for  any  and  all  kinds  of  beliefs)  is  incompatible  with  my  argument  for  the  higher 
standard  for  moral  beliefs. 
19  See  Stanley  (2005)  and  Fantl  and  McGrath  (2009)  for  accounts  which  have  the  standard  sensitive  to  the  subject’s 
interests,  and  McKenna  (2011)  for  an  account  which  has  the  standard  sensitive  to  the  assessor’s  interests. 
10 
reject my claim that moral beliefs typically have a higher standard. The claim that moral beliefs have                                 
a higher epistemic standard does not depend on the success of this particular standards-fixing                           
model, for one could always adopt a different standards-fixing model. For example, one could                           
instead adopt a kind of Relevant Alternatives Contextualist view, where the possibilities that one                           
must be able to rule out are those that are presupposed or otherwise entered into the conversational                                 
score, coupled with a view that moral beliefs presuppose more or more difficult to rule out                               
possibilities. Again, although I lack the space here to adequately address which standards-fixing                         20
models are most plausible as accounts of the typical higher standard for moral beliefs, such plausible                               
models are available, and so the credibility of the claim I make here that moral beliefs have such a                                     
higher  standard  should  remain  intact. 
2.2.  A  Unifying  Explanation 
With this conception of both epistemic standards and the idea that the epistemic standard                           
for justification is typically stricter for moral than for non-moral beliefs in hand, we can approach                               
our original problem. I’ll now briefly explain how my Higher Standards account resolves the three                             
puzzling  featured  in  moral  epistemology  with  which  we  began. 
First, consider moral testimony and the default judgment that it is an illegitimate way to                             
gain moral knowledge. According to my account, in order to have moral knowledge the                           
requirement for an agent to rule out possible worlds in pretty stringent: an agent either needs to                                 
rule out a significant number of possible worlds or a set of worlds that are harder to rule out. The                                       
reason why agents are unable to gain moral knowledge from testimony is because merely forming                             
one’s belief on the basis of another’s report does not provide one with the ability to rule out all of                                       
20  See,  for  example,  Blome-Tillman  (2009)  for  such  a  view  regarding  non-moral  epistemic  standards. 
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the possibilities that one would need to in order to have knowledge. Although testimony may equip                               
one with true moral beliefs, it does not equip one with the ability to rule out the demanding set of                                       
possible  worlds  that  one  needs  to  in  order  to  have  moral  knowledge.  21
Next, consider the apparent lack of moral expertise. According to my account, the standard                           
for moral expertise is stricter than the standard for expertise in other, non-moral domains. This                             
means that the kind of epistemic credentials one would need to have in order to count as an expert                                     
are greater for moral expertise. For example, one would need to be able to rule out a comparatively                                   
large amount of possibilities for a comparatively large amount of moral beliefs to count as an expert.                                 
The reason why moral experts are few or entirely non-existent is because few or perhaps none of us                                   
have  the  ability  to  do  this.   
Lastly, my model can explain how disagreement may, after all, lead to skepticism. One way                             
it could do this is by functioning to make relevant new possibilities. For example, it may function to                                   
make relevant possibilities like my making a mistake in reasoning, or succumbing to a bias. The                               
more widespread the disagreement, the more possibilities require ruling out in order to qualify as                             
having knowledge. Provided that I cannot rule these out, I fail to secure knowledge. Since standards                               
are understood in terms of possibilities that must be ruled out, moral disagreement leads to                             
21  One  may  wonder  how  far  my  Higher  Standards  account  goes  in  explaining  not  just  asymmetries  in  judgments  about 
cases  of  pure  moral  and  non-moral  deference  (where  speakers  do  not  inform  hearers  of  any  of  the  reasons  for  the  truth 
of  their  belief)  but  also  in  explaining  asymmetries  in  judgments  about  cases  of  impure  moral  and  non-moral  deference 
(where  hearers  come  to  adopt  not  only  the  speaker’s  belief,  but  also  their  reasons  in  support  of  the  truth  of  their  belief). 
The  worry  is  that  since  my  account  explains  the  asymmetry  in  terms  of  being  in  a  position  to  rule  out  possibilities,  in 
cases  of  impure  moral  deference  the  hearer  would  be  able  to  rule  out  all  of  the  same  possibilities  as  the  speaker,  since 
they  possess  the  same  reasons  for  the  belief;  but,  the  asymmetry  remains  even  in  these  cases,  as  we  still  judge  that  the 
hearer  lacks  justification  or  knowledge  while  the  speaker  does  not.  However,  my  Higher  Standards  view  is  amenable  to 
preserving  this  asymmetry  of  impure  testimony:  it  can  do  so  by  adopting  a  more  robust  interpretation  of  what  “ruling 
out”  requires.  For  example,  on  some  contextualist  views,  ruling  out  would  require  more  than  just  possessing  evidence 
that  makes  certain  propositions  improbable  to  a  certain  degree.  Rather,  it  requires  that  one  is  able  to  engage  with  others 
in  a  certain  way,  for  example  by  appeasing  any  objections  they  may  have  about  the  truth  of  your  belief.  For  this  more 
robust  understanding  of  “ruling  out”,  see  Annis  (1978)  and  Wellman  (1971)  on  the  Challenge-Response  Model.  I’m 
grateful  to  Kieran  Setiya  for  posing  this  question  about  the  flexibility  of  my  view. 
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skepticism by making more possibilities relevant, and thus by making the epistemic standard more                           
stringent.   
Now that we’re clear on how my Higher Standards account explains these problematic                         
asymmetries, we should look to see how alternative unified accounts would explain the                         
asymmetries. Since in this paper I am seeking an explanation of the apparent oddity of moral                               
epistemology that would vindicate our commonsense judgments about moral testimony, moral                     
expertise, and moral disagreement, I will not be considering debunking explanations of that oddity.                           
As alternative explanations, the accounts to consider are those that posit a mechanism other than                             
the one I appeal to, namely epistemic standards. In the next section, I will consider such rival                                 
accounts.   
 
3.  Alternative  Explanations 
3.1.  Morality  is  Hard 
One explanation that moral epistemology in general is more problematic than non-moral                       
epistemology is that moral matters are just so exceedingly difficult to figure out. It’s just so much                                 
more difficult, the thought goes, to determine moral matters such as whether abortion or eating                             
meat is morally permissible than whether the bus runs on Saturdays. It’s a very difficult task to do                                   
the work that is necessary to adequately settle moral questions: one must consider arguments for                             
and against, checking for falsities, fallacies, counterexamples, and more. Both the kind of reasoning                           
and  time  required  to  consider  such  questions  is  large  and  looming.  Morality  is  hard. 
Of course, I agree that morality is hard: this is something that my Higher Standards account                               
explains. In order for this view to be a real competitor, it can’t simply amount to the view that                                     
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moral matters are difficult, since the Higher Standards account may admit this, and then just explain                               
this fact in terms of a more rigorous epistemic standard for morality. Instead, this account must                               
explain what makes moral matters epistemically difficult, but must do so by appeal to a mechanism                               
other  than  the  one  I’ve  identified  in  order  to  be  a  genuine  rival.   
There are two mechanisms that this rival account might point to. One way of thinking                             
about the “morality is hard” view is that settling moral questions requires a large amount of time;                                 
alternatively, one may think that the kind of reasoning required to settle moral questions is                             
exceedingly demanding. Using E to stand for the evidence base that’s required to have a justified                               
belief, the view might be either (a) that it is harder to obtain E, i.e. one generally needs to spend                                       
more time working in order to obtain E, or (b) that it is harder to draw a or the correct conclusion                                         
on the basis of E, i.e. that the kind of reasoning required to work through one’s evidence in order to                                       
arrive at a justified belief is of a high level or is quite complex (e.g. it involves the use of difficult                                         
mathematical  formulas),  or   both  (a)  and  (b).   
Let’s take option (a) first. Given this mechanism, one would say that the reason why moral                               
knowledge or justification is harder to obtain is that one needs more time working through or                               
thinking about moral issues in order to successfully arrive at knowledge. More specifically, many                           
agents considering moral questions just haven’t obtained E yet (or, more minimally, that they’ve                           
been able to obtain less of E than the amount of E they’re typically able to obtain within the same                                       
time for the E that corresponds to various non-moral beliefs). Taking option (b) instead, one                             22
would say that the reason why moral knowledge or justification is harder to obtain is that moral                                 
issues require one to engage in more demanding or complex forms of reasoning in order to                               
22  For  example,  one  could  think  that  one  needs  normative  evidence  to  justify  a  normative  belief,  and  it  is  generally 
harder  to  acquire  normative  evidence  (than  descriptive  evidence).  I’m  grateful  to  David  Sobel  for  bringing  this  point  to 
my  attention. 
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successfully arrive at knowledge. More specifically, many agents considering moral questions just                       
haven’t successfully used the kind of higher level reasoning required to adequately draw conclusions                           
on the basis of E. Lastly, if one held both (a) and (b), one would say that the reason why moral                                         
knowledge or justification is harder to obtain is that moral issues both require greater time and                               
more  complex  reasoning  in  order  to  successfully  arrive  at  a  justified  belief  or  knowledge.   
In general, this unified account could explain the initial asymmetries in the following way. If                             
moral beliefs are hard with respect to (a) and (b), and moral expertise requires one to have an high                                     
amount of evidence and evaluate it extremely well when reaching certain moral beliefs, then moral                             
expertise would be hard to come by. Likewise, given (a) and (b) reliable testifiers would be hard to                                   
come by. And, lastly, if it is difficult to assess moral claims in the ways (a) and (b) outline, moral                                       
disagreement can lead to skepticism by causing one to lose the evidence one may have had or                                 
undermining  one’s  ability  to  work  through  the  now-competing  evidence  one  has. 
Are either of these mechanisms a good explanation of the epistemic difficulty of morality? I                             
think that they are not. Remember here that in order for this rival explanation to explain why                                 
moral beliefs have certain epistemic puzzles that non-moral beliefs don’t, the mechanisms it points                           
to need to be distinctive of moral beliefs. This is because the explanation we are seeking is one that                                     
explains how there are certain  diÚferences between issues in moral and non-moral epistemology. The                           
reason why this rival account fails is simply because the mechanisms it picks out are not distinctive.                                 
To  see  why,  we  can  consider  the  following  pair  of  moral  and  non-moral  beliefs:   
(NM2): Kyrie is a college freshman taking an applied ethics course and after one                           
month in the course has just been told that many animals were killed last year for                               
their meat, as well as the fact that many animals (e.g. mice, rabbits, and moles) are                               
killed each year in producing and maintaining crops for food that all vegetarians                         
depend on. Kyrie considers the question of whether being vegetarian kills more                       
animals than being a meat-eater does. After consulting a few reliable yet neutral                         
sources (e.g. peer-reviewed scientific journals,  not PETA) on each side of the debate                         
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and crunching the numbers, Kyrie forms the belief that being vegetarian kills more                         
animals  than  being  a  meat-eater.   
(M2): Kyrie is a college freshman taking an applied ethics course and after one                           
month in the course has learnt about arguments both for and against eating meat,                           
considering only arguments for its permissibility and impermissibility (not its                   
obligatoriness), and considering the same quantity (e.g. one each) and quality (e.g.                       
both valid, with plausible premises) of arguments for each side, from a credible yet                           
neutral source (e.g. the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy). Kyrie considers the                     
question of whether eating meat is morally permissible or morally impermissible.                     
Without consulting anyone else, and after carefully considering the arguments,                   
Kyrie  forms  the  belief  that  eating  meat  is  morally  permissible. 
In these cases, it’s clear that the non-moral belief is difficult with respect to (a): Kyrie would                                 
need to spend a lot of time working collecting the relevant data about the statistics of animal deaths                                   
in crop cultivation and meat farms. It’s also the case that each belief is difficult with respect to (b):                                     
Kyrie would need to engage in some high-level reasoning such as higher-level math to work                             
through all of the information on statistics he had gathered. And, as this account stipulates, the                               
moral belief is likewise difficult with respect to (a) and (b). Yet, it seems that the moral belief still                                     
lacks the same kind of epistemic credit that their non-moral belief has (for example, it appears to be                                   
less justified). Moreover, upon reflection is it simply not true that morality is the only domain of                                 23
inquiry that requires a great amount of time or complex reasoning to arrive at knowledge or                               
justified beliefs within that domain: various complex scientific questions also require these. So, even                           
though this account is unified, it does not succeed in accounting for the  asymmetries of moral and                                 
non-moral  epistemology. 
23  At  this  point  one  may  object  that  we  would  not  have  the  judgment  that  the  moral  belief  is  less  justified  here  if  the 
non-moral  belief  were  to  be  some  controversial  scientific  claim.  First,  notice  that  the  non-moral  belief  presented  is 
controversial:  Riggins  is  confronting  conflicting  accounts  of  the  number  of  animals  killed.  Second,  in  order  for  the  cases 
to  be  analogous,  if  the  controversial  scientific  claim  considered  is  abstract  and  general,  so  must  the  moral  claim,  which 
would  force  us  to  consider  a  new  moral  case  as  well  (e.g.,  if  we  are  to  consider  a  controversial  scientific  theory  we  would 
need  to  consider  a  controversial  moral  theory);  here,  both  beliefs  are  controversial  and  concrete  in  nature. 
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However, defenders of this alternative account may object. They might insist that the kind                           
of reasoning required for moral beliefs is always going to be more demanding or complex than that                                 
required for any other domain of inquiry, as it’s of its own special kind, unlike any other type of                                     
reasoning used in any other domain. For example, perhaps moral knowledge requires a special kind                             
of sense that other domains don’t, which is itself extremely complex. But it’s terribly  ad hoc to posit a                                     
special kind of moral reasoning just to save this account. Moreover, this seems to just put a  name to                                     
the problem, rather than offering an  explanation of it. We started by observing that moral                             
knowledge is hard to come by. It won’t do to end simply by observing that the kind of reasoning                                     
that  leads  to  moral  knowledge  is  also  hard  to  come  by.  We  would  still  want  to  know  why  this  is. 
We’ve just seen why this Morality is Hard explanation fails. In the next section, I’ll explain                               
why  the  other  competing  explanation  won’t  work  either. 
3.2.  Morality’s  Many  Defeaters 
Another unified explanation for the issues in moral epistemology claims that the reason                         
why moral beliefs lack the kind of epistemic credit like knowledge and justification that non-moral                             
beliefs have is because moral beliefs typically come with more defeaters than non-moral beliefs do.                             
There are two ways of understanding this defeaters account. On one way of understanding it, the                               
accounts turns out not to be a genuine rival to my Higher Standards account. On another                               
understanding, although it is a genuine rival, it results in counterintuitive conclusions, and so ought                             
to  be  rejected.  First,  let  me  briefly  explain  the  relevant  notion  of  defeaters  in  play.   
Defeaters come in roughly two kinds:  rebutting and  undercutting defeaters. On an                       24
evidentialist picture,  rebutting defeaters  are those that serve as reason to believe a proposition that’s                             
24  See  Pollock  (1986). 
17 
incompatible with one’s conclusion from the evidence (e.g. d is a defeater that warrants not-p (on                               
the basis of E) when one was originally warranted in concluding p on the basis of E), while                                   
undercutting defeaters  serve as reason to believe that E does not actually itself warrant p, without                               
providing reason to believe the negation of p. Given this characterization, one way to understand                             
defeaters is as a kind of higher-order evidence, that is, evidence about the character of one’s                               
(first-order) evidence. For example, consider your belief that the apple is red that you formed on                               25
the basis of your perception of the apple appearing red to you. Your belief would be accompanied by                                   
the first type of defeater if you were told that you were given an inverted color spectrum drug: in                                     
this case, the fact that you were given such a drug means that you now have, on the basis of your                                         
perception, a reason to believe that the apple is green, not red. It is evidence that your original                                   
first-order evidence--your perception--actually does not warrant p (that the apple is red), but rather                           
warrants a proposition incompatible with p (that the apple is green). In this case we can say that                                   
your total evidence consisting of E+d warrants not-p. Your belief would be accompanied by the                             
second type of defeater if you were told that there’s a 50/50 chance that you were given an inverted                                     
color spectrum drug: in this case, your original evidence for your belief that the apple is red (your                                   
visual perception) would be insufficient evidence for your original belief, such that you ought to                             
abstain from believing what color the apple is. In this case we can say that your total evidence                                   
consisting  of  E+d  fails  to  warrant  p. 
Now, for the opponent who wants to claim that the grounds of the issues in moral                               
epistemology is that moral beliefs typically have more defeaters than non-moral beliefs, they must                           
not only point to defeaters that accompany moral beliefs, but also point to ones that are  speciÚic  to                                   
25  See  Christensen  (2010)  and  Lasonen-Aarnio  (2014).  Of  course,  this  doesn’t  automatically  bar  higher-order  evidence 
from  also  functioning  as  first-order  evidence.  See  Feldman  (2005)  for  an  articulation  of  this  view. 
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moral beliefs such that non-moral beliefs either don’t also typically have them or don’t typically                             
have them to the same degree. Otherwise such defeaters would not account for the  diÚference in                               
epistemic credit between moral and non-moral beliefs. Given this constraint, there are a few                           
considerations one might cite. One might point to the fact that there is a lot of disagreement                                 
surrounding moral claims, much more than what typically surrounds non-moral claims. Likewise,                       
one might argue that there are more counter-arguments to consider with respect to moral claims                             
than non-moral claims. With each of these options, one could claim that one’s (first-order)                           
evidence E doesn’t yield a justified moral belief or knowledge because any of these considerations                             
would serve as a kind of defeater for E, either in the sense that it makes E insufficient to warrant the                                         
belief that p, or that it makes E warrant the belief that not-p: either way, one’s total evidence                                   
consisting of E+d fails to make one epistemically justified in believing p or knowledge that p. For                                 
example, consider a case where I originally believe that eating meat is morally permissible, but then                               
come across another rational person (perhaps even with all the same non-moral evidence that I                             
have) who disagrees with me and who instead believes that eating meat is morally impermissible.                             
One could claim that that’s a reason to think that my original evidence E is not sufficient to justify                                     
me in believing that eating meat is morally permissible, such that I should abstain from believing it.                                 
In this case, the fact of this disagreement undercuts my (first-order) evidence E to believe that                               
eating meat is morally permissible; thus, my total evidence consisting of E+d would fail to make my                                 
belief that eating meat is morally permissible epistemically justified. In this way, even if an agent                               
had roughly the same amount of first-order evidence for both her moral and non-moral beliefs, her                               
moral belief would be less justified because there would be more defeaters present, and so more                               
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reasons that make it the case that E is not sufficient to warrant her moral belief. The total evidence                                     
the  agents  typically  have  for  moral  and  non-moral  beliefs  is  not  the  same. 
At this point we need to consider precisely how defeaters function to make one’s evidence                             
insufficient to warrant one’s belief that p. On one understanding, defeaters (or, more specifically,                           
the fact of disagreement in the moral case) function by raising a specific possibility that my belief is                                   
false. For example, maybe eating meat is morally impermissible after all, given that (so many)                             
reasonable others think so; perhaps I made a mistake in my reasoning, or succumbed to bias. On                                 
this understanding, while defeaters undermine my (first-order) evidence E for my belief that p such                             
that my total evidence of E+d is no longer sufficient to justify p, they do this by introducing                                   
additional ways in which my belief could be false, that is, possibilities. On this account, defeaters just                                 
introduce or make relevant certain kinds of epistemic possibilities, ones that are not ruled out by                               
one’s  evidence  (given  that,  if  it  could  be  ruled  out,  it  wouldn’t  render  E  insufficient  to  justify  p). 
For example, consider our previous example involving the belief that the apple is red, where                             
one’s evidence consists of the perception of the apple appearing red, and the defeater that’s present                               
is the fact that there’s a 50/50 chance one was given an inverted color-spectrum drug. On the                                 
proposed understanding of what defeaters are, the fact that there’s a 50/50 chance that one was                               
given an inverted color-spectrum drug introduces a new possibility that the apple is not red (more                               
specifically, that it’s green). However, since one’s evidence--namely, one’s perception--is not able to                         
rule  out  this  possibility,  one’s  belief  fails  to  be  justified  or  count  as  knowledge. 
At this point, talk of possibilities should sound familiar to the attentive reader. This is                             
because epistemic standards were originally understood as specifying epistemic possibilities that                     
must be ruled out in order for a subject’s belief to count as justified or knowledge. Remember again                                   
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that this is just to say that the more rigorous the standard, the greater the set of epistemic                                   
possibilities. So, if defeaters are just relevant epistemic possibilities--specifically, ones that one’s                       
evidence is unable to render sufficiently improbable--then one who holds that there are generally                           
more defeaters for moral beliefs than non-moral beliefs is committed to the view that moral beliefs                               
generally  have  higher  epistemic  standards.   
To further understand how this 'More Defeaters' view is not a rival view to my favored                               
'Higher  Standards'  view,  consider  the  following  model.   
 
On this model, let the box indicate the set of all epistemic possibilities. Let the ‘P’ circle indicate the                                     
possible worlds in which p is true, and the ‘E’ circle indicate the worlds that are compatible with                                   
one’s evidence; all of the space outside of these circles consists of not-p worlds. Using our case, we                                   
can understand the ‘t1’ line as indicating the epistemic standard at the time before the defeater was                                 
introduced (before you were told that there’s a 50/50 chance you were given an inverted color                               
spectrum drug), while the ‘t2’ line indicates the epistemic standard at the time after the defeater was                                 
introduced. The epistemic standard at t1 indicates all of the possible worlds one needs to rule out at                                   
t1 in order to count as having a justified belief that p (namely all of those worlds above the ‘standard                                       
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at t1’ line), while the epistemic standard at t2 indicates all of the possible worlds one needs to rule                                     
out at t2 in order to count as having a justified belief that p (all of the worlds above the ‘standard at                                           
t2’ line). The standard at t1 is pretty low: it indicates, roughly, that one can fail to rule out all of the                                           
not-p worlds that fall below it while still having a justified belief that p. However, at t2 the standard                                     
increases, becoming more stringent, thus indicating, roughly, that one can fail to rule out only those                               
not-p worlds that fall below it while still having a justified belief that p. Importantly, though, while                                 
at t1 (pre-defeater) there are no not-p worlds that are compatible with your evidence (that is, there                                 
are no worlds that are inside the E circle but outside the P circle), at t2 (post defeater) there are; this                                         
means that while your belief meets the epistemic standard at t1, it fails to meet it at t2, such that                                       
while you have a justified belief or know that p at t1, you have an unjustified belief or fail to know                                         
that p at t2. In the end, this particular interpretation of the More Defeaters view is not a rival                                     
account to my Higher Standards account. In this way, rather than denying that moral beliefs enjoy                               
higher epistemic standards than non-moral beliefs, this More Defeaters view is just specifying a                           
specific way in which the standard is higher, or how it is that the standard is higher for moral beliefs                                       
(or, more specifically, what makes a possibility one an agent must be able to rule out). But, again,                                   
they  are  not  disagreeing  about  the  fact  that  the  epistemic  standard  is  higher  for  moral  beliefs. 
However, there remains an interpretation of the More Defeaters view that is a genuine                           
competing alternative to my Higher Standards view. On this alternative understanding, defeaters                       
(or, more specifically, the fact of disagreement in the moral case) function to make one’s evidence                               
insufficient to warrant one’s belief that p by directly affecting one’s evidence. It is not that the                                 
standard becomes more rigorous, but just that one falls farther from it given the reduced strength of                                 
one’s evidence. On this account, the epistemic standards for moral and non-moral beliefs could be                             
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exactly the same and remain fixed, but yet moral beliefs are more epistemically problematic because                             
one’s  evidence  is  comparatively  worse  in  the  moral  domain. 
Importantly, for this view to capture cases of comparative lack of justification and not just                             
knowledge for moral beliefs, it would have to be the case that the relevant defeaters are recognized                                 
or possessed by the agent. This is because although some hold that the simple existence of                               
defeaters--in this case, the simple existence of moral disagreement--is enough to undermine                       
knowledge, it is widely held that in order to affect justification, the agent herself must be confronted                                 
with  the  defeater  or  made  aware  of  it.  26
The problem with this account is that while it seems correct to say that justification is                               
undermined by defeaters only when agents are cognizant of them for non-moral cases, in the moral                               
case lack of awareness of the defeater doesn’t make justification easier. This understanding of the                             
More Defeaters view would implausibly conclude that in cases where agents just aren’t aware of                             
such disagreement concerning a moral issue (for example, because they live in very isolated                           
homogeneous communities, or never bothered to ask anyone else their opinion on the matter),                           
their moral beliefs would not be suffer a loss of justification. Likewise, if all that is required to be a                                       
moral expert is to have a sufficiently high volume of justified moral beliefs, then one could become a                                   
moral expert quite easily. But this is very counterintuitive. So, while this understanding of defeaters                             
can  explain  some  cases,  it  cannot  explain  all  the  puzzles  that  would  need  to  be  explained. 
In the end, then, the More Defeaters view either is not a genuine rival to my Higher                                 
Standards  view,  or  is  rife  with  counterexamples,  and  so  ought  to  be  rejected. 
 
26  Defeaters  that  undermine  justification  are  commonly  referred  to  as  “mental  state  defeaters,”  as  opposed  to 
“propositional  defeaters”  which  are  not  believed  by  the  agent  and  only  undermine  knowledge.  See  Bergmann  (2006)  on 
mental  state  and  propositional  defeaters. 
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4.  Different  but  Equal? 
Even if the first understanding of the More Defeaters view is not incompatible with my                             
favored Higher Standards view, we might still wonder why one should favor my account. After all,                               
if both accounts explain initial puzzles about moral beliefs, and do so by appealing to epistemic                               
possibilities, then why should we say that what explains this difference is that moral beliefs have a                                 
higher  epistemic  standard,  rather  than  that  they  are  accompanied  by  more  defeaters? 
For example, some may think that my Higher Standards view sacrifices important intuitions                         
regarding the relation between evidence and defeaters by always viewing defeaters as relevant                         
possibilities. On my view, the relationship between evidence and defeaters involves the                       
introduction of new epistemic possibilities. This makes it seem as though while one’s epistemic                           
position worsens, one’s evidence doesn’t worsen at all--that is, one’s epistemic position worsens                         
despite one’s evidence not worsening at all. But this seems to sacrifice a very intuitive thought that                                 
one’s evidence gets worse with the presence of defeaters. Instead of raising epistemic standards,                           
defeaters are typically conceptualized under the second interpretation of the More Defeaters view,                         
wherein they render one’s belief insufficiently justified by just simply reducing the strength of what                             
serves as one’s justification, for example one’s evidence. Intuitively, we think that when one is told                               
that there’s a 50/50 chance that one was given an inverted color spectrum drug, it’s not just that                                   
one’s belief now fails to be justified, but that one’s evidence has gotten  worse , and fails to be justified                                     
because one’s evidence has gotten worse. On a probabilistic model of evidence, the thought is as                               
follows: while initially one’s evidence may have made p probable to degree .9, when a defeater is                                 
introduced one’s evidence now makes p probable to degree .5. However, as noted, this                           
understanding of how one’s evidence has gotten worse when a defeater is present is compatible                             
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with epistemic standards remaining at the same level. So, it might seem as though my Higher                               
Standards account cannot account for the commonsensical thought that when defeaters get                       
introduced  one’s  evidence  becomes  worse.   
While I agree that it would be problematic for my view if it was unable to account for this                                     
commonsensical thought, I don’t believe that it faces this problem. To see this, we should return to                                 
our model. On a standard probability model, a defeater just functions to make E smaller (in other                                 
words, by making the not-p space bigger), where a certain probability is specified for an epistemic                               
standard, and the probability that p is determined as follows (assuming for simplicity only finitely                             
many  possible  worlds): 
Pr  (p)  =  number  of  p-worlds  in  E  /  total  number  of  worlds  in  E 
There is, however, an alternative way to think of how defeaters affect probability. On my                             
model, it’s true that when a defeater is introduced, the degree to which one’s evidence makes p                                 
probable decreases. Rather than utilizing the above standard model of probability, though, my                         
fallibilist  view  amends  it  as  follows: 
Pr  (p)  =  number  of  p-worlds  in  E  above  tn  /  total  number  of  worlds  in  E  above  tn 
While on this model of probability it’s true that one’s evidence is  worse in the sense of yielding a                                     
lower probability of p at t2 (post-defeater) than at t1 (pre-defeater), it has gotten worse precisely                               
because the standard has gone up. So, this alternative model can show how the probability of p                                 
given one’s evidence has gotten worse when a defeater is present in a way that doesn’t make the                                   
raising of epistemic standards irrelevant. Since my proposed way of understanding defeaters in                         
terms of possibilities can accommodate the sense in which one’s evidence has gotten  worse when a                               
defeater  is  introduced,  it  ought  not  be  abandoned 
25 
Another reason to favor my Higher Standards account is if it explains some cases that this                               
interpretation of the More Defeaters account doesn’t. Some of this may turn on the precise                             
theoretical explanation for the higher epistemic standard; for example, if we endorse a kind of                             
impurist view wherein the practical stakes of holding a belief affects the degree of justification the                               
belief has, then the More Defeaters view would be an insufficient explanation of the degree of                               
justification. To see why this would be the case, take the classic bank cases as an example. Here, the                                     27
proposition that the bank could’ve changed its hours isn’t properly characterized as a defeater, since                             
it’s not properly characterized as higher-order evidence (that is, it’s not evidence that your first                             
order evidence (that you were at the bank last Saturday) does not warrant your belief (that the bank                                   
is open on Saturdays). Rather, something like the proposition that you were only dreaming that you                               
were at the bank last Saturday would be higher-order evidence. If we should conceive of the way                                 
justification is determined for moral beliefs as analogous to the bank cases (namely where the                             
possibilities an agent must be able to rule out in order to have a justified moral belief is partly                                     
determined by what’s practically at stake in holding the belief), then this More Defeaters view will                               
be  ruled  out  as  the  best  explanation. 
Moreover, it can also be said that in so far as defeaters introduce just  one  type of epistemic                                   
possibilities, or hold that epistemic possibilities can be introduced in just  one way, my Higher                             
Standards view will be able to explain more cases, and more diverse cases, as epistemic possibilities                               
are introduced in multiple ways (the presence of disagreement isn’t the only way to introduce a                               
possibility). These are all reasons to favor my Higher Standards account over the first interpretation                             
27  See  DeRose  (1992)  for  the  original  bank  cases. 
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of the More Defeaters account, even if the More Defeaters view is not a genuine rival to my favored                                     
Higher  Standards  view. 
 
6.  Conclusion 
Moral testimony, moral expertise, and moral disagreement have all been thought to be                         
distinctively problematic--that is, problematic in ways non-moral testimony, non-moral expertise,                   
and non-moral disagreement are not. Previous explanations of their problematic nature have been                         
piecemeal in nature, seeking to explain why each issue is problematic in isolation. In this paper, I’ve                                 
offered a unifying explanation of the problematic nature of these issues, the Higher Standards                           
account, thus departing from previous explanatory accounts of these phenomena. According to this                         
unified account, the relative epistemically problematic nature of moral testimony, moral expertise,                       
and moral disagreement is explained by the fact that moral beliefs typically enjoy a higher epistemic                               
standard than non-moral beliefs. After first explaining my Higher Standards account, I considered                         
two rival unified accounts that would explain the problematic nature of moral testimony, moral                           
expertise, and moral disagreement, namely the Morality is Hard view and the More Defeaters view.                             
I argued that these accounts were either rife with counterexamples, were ad hoc, or reduced to a                                 
variant of my view, concluding that my Higher Standards account is the best unifying explanation                             
on  offer.   
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Chapter  2 
“Moral  Stakes,  Higher  Standards” 
 
 
0.  Introduction 
How easy is it to have a justified moral belief? At first glance, one may feel inclined to                                   
answer that it is just as easy or difficult as holding any other kind of justified belief. However, this                                     
seems to be the minority view. Rather, there are commonly thought to be important asymmetries                             
between moral and non-moral beliefs, and moral and non-moral epistemology more generally.                       
Importantly, these asymmetries are often conceived of as kinds of epistemic obstacles, thus having a                             
detrimental effect on the epistemic credentials of our moral beliefs. In other words, moral beliefs are                               
commonly thought to be distinct in the way that epistemic values like justification and knowledge                             
are harder to gain. For example, while it’s commonly assumed that non-moral testimony is a                             
perfectly innocuous way to gain non-moral knowledge, moral testimony seems quite objectionable.                     
Likewise, while non-moral disagreement poses no serious threat to the possibility of non-moral                           28
knowledge, moral disagreement has been thought to entail moral skepticism. And, lastly, while it’s                           29
uncontroversial that there are all kinds of non-moral experts, the existence of moral experts  has                             
seemed  quite  dubious.  30
28  For  defenses  of  the  asymmetry  of  testimony  see  Crisp  (2014);  Hills  (2009);  Hopkins  (2007);  Howell  (2014);  McGrath 
(2009);  Mogensen  (2015);  and  Nickel  (2001).   
29  For  example,  Tolhurst  (1987)  argues  that  it  makes  our  moral  beliefs  never  justified,  while  McGrath  (2007)  and 
Vavova  (2014)  both  argue  that  disagreement  leads  to  skepticism  about  a  certain  subset  of  our  moral  beliefs. 
30  For  arguments  noting  issues  with  moral  expertise  see  Cholbi  (2007),  McGrath  (2011)  and  (2007),  and  Ryle  (1958). 
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Given the apparent way in which epistemic values like justification and knowledge are less                           
easy to come by for moral beliefs, one may wonder what explains this asymmetry. Perhaps the most                                 
intuitively plausible explanation, and the one that I favor, is that the epistemic standard for moral                               
beliefs is typically higher than that of non-moral beliefs. Put most generally, this means that                             
typically one must be in a better epistemic position to receive a certain kind of epistemic value or                                   
credit (knowledge, justification) for a moral belief than that that needed in order to receive the same                                 
epistemic value or credit for a non-moral belief. For example, on an evidentialist model this                             
amounts to saying that one generally needs stronger evidence to have a justified moral belief than to                                 
have a justified non-moral belief. Importantly, this explanation has the advantage of being the only                             
unified account of the aforementioned epistemic asymmetries on offer. The focus of this paper,                           
though, is not what best accounts for the widely noted apparent epistemic asymmetries between                           
moral and non-moral beliefs--that is, it is not whether moral beliefs typically have a higher                             
epistemic standard--for I argue for this claim elsewhere. Rather, the focus is on the question that                               31
remains once (or if) one accepts the claim that what explains these asymmetries is the fact that                                 
moral beliefs typically have a higher epistemic standard: namely, what functions to make the                           
epistemic standard for moral beliefs higher? In this paper, I will put forth a theoretical account of                                 
how the epistemic standard for moral beliefs is typically higher which vindicates the apparent                           
epistemic  asymmetries  between  moral  and  non-moral  beliefs.   
In seeking an explanation of how it is that moral beliefs standardly fail to be epistemically on                                 
a par with non-moral beliefs, investigating theories of justification that fundamentally hold that the                           
standard is not stable across all beliefs and all epistemic agents but rather changes depending on                               
31  More  specifically,  in  “Harder,  Better,  Faster,  Stronger:  Epistemic  Standards  and  Moral  Beliefs,”,  I  argue  that  a  higher 
standards  account  is  the  best  unifying  account  that  accommodates  this  data  about  the  asymmetry. 
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certain situational factors would be the most initially plausible place to look. Two of these views of                                 
knowledge and justification—namely contextualism and subject sensitive invariantism—hold that                 
knowing or having a justified belief is not solely a matter of the evidential position the agent is in,                                     
32
for two agents who are in the same position in regards to evidence can vary in terms of knowledge                                     
and justification. By looking at these two types of theories wherein epistemic standards change                           33
depending on certain non-evidential situational features, one can see how the epistemic standards                         
may be different for moral beliefs. Although these theories hold that non-evidential factors affect                           34
our claims about knowledge and justification generally, I will argue that there are specific                           
non-evidential factors that affect the justification of moral beliefs in particular. What I mean by this                               
is that what it is to be epistemically justified in holding a moral belief is not wholly a matter of                                       
evidential factors, and that the non-evidential factors that partly determine whether or not one is                             
justified in holding a moral belief are characteristic of moral beliefs. These non-evidential factors                           
make it such that the standard of justification for moral beliefs is different--standardly higher--than                           
that of other, non-moral beliefs, and that this is due to the fact that these non-evidential factors are                                   
32  Throughout  the  paper  I  will  focus  on  putting  epistemic  justification  in  terms  of  evidentialism,  since  putting  it  in  these 
terms  is  perhaps  the  most  straightforward  or  simple  way  of  making  the  points  I  want  to  make,  and  since  one  view  that  I 
discuss  at  length,  namely  subject  sensitive  invariantism,  is  put  in  a  way  that  directly  contrasts  with  a  simple  evidentialist 
picture.  However,  I  should  also  note  that  what  I  say  concerning  views  of  epistemic  justification  which  take  the  standards 
to  be  rigid  is  open  to  encompassing  certain  epistemic  states,  such  as  how  reliable  one  is,  as  being  what  determines 
whether  or  not  one  is  justified  instead  of  what  evidence  one  has. 
33  This  epistemic  position,  of  which  contextualism  and  subject  sensitive  invariantism  are  two  particular  views,  is  known 
as  Impurism.  It  contrasts  with  Purism,  which  holds  that  provided  that  two  agents  are  in  the  same  epistemic  position 
(e.g.  have  the  same  evidence),  they  are  in  the  same  position  to  know  (e.g.  both  know  that  p).  See  Fantl  and  McGrath 
(2009)  for  this  distinction. 
34  Since  my  arguments  will  not  focus  on  the  semantic  commitments  of  each  view,  I  will  not  be  considering  relativism. 
As  the  reader  will  see,  my  arguments  revolve  around  how  a  theory  can  encapsulate  the  right  kinds  of  and  persons’ 
practical  interests,  in  which  case  relativism  and  contextualism  would  be  on  a  par  (since,  setting  aside  semantic 
differences,  there  would  be  no  significant  differences  between  contextualism  and  relativism).  See  MacFarlane  (2014)  for 
a  relativist  view. 
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essentially moral in nature. Importantly, my focus and assessment in this paper will not be on                               35
which view is the best account of epistemic standards in general, but rather on which account can                                 
best answer this question in moral epistemology by accounting for data that is particular to the                               
moral domain. Surprisingly, these theories in particular and work on epistemic standards in general                           
have failed to be utilized by moral epistemologists interested in the apparent asymmetry between                           
moral  and  non-moral  beliefs.   I  seek  to  rectify  this  unfortunate  gap  in  this  paper. 36
This paper will proceed as follows: First, I will introduce contextualism and                       
subject-sensitive invariantism (SSI) as general accounts of how epistemic standards are fixed. I then                           
proceed to consider specific adaptations of each theory for the moral domain, examining ways in                             
which each theory can account for the higher standard of moral beliefs. Crucially, in order to                               
adequately account for the asymmetry in epistemic standards--that moral beliefs typically have a                         
higher epistemic standard than non-moral beliefs--the feature the theory locates as the                       
standard-fixing feature must be distinctive of moral beliefs. After rejecting a particular traditional                         37
contextualist view, I argue that what is key in accounting for the higher standard of moral beliefs is                                   
that the theory situates practical interests--specifically, those that are constitutive of morality as a                           
subject matter--as what functions to fix the epistemic standard. While this notion is typically                           
associated with SSI, I argue that there are certain shortcomings with it as typically formulated, and,                               
35  To  be  clear,  I  am  not  arguing  that  every  single  moral  belief  requires  more  evidence  to  be  justified  than  every  single 
non-moral  belief,  but  rather  just  that  the  standard  case  is  such  that  moral  beliefs  require  more  evidence  to  be  justified 
than  non-moral  beliefs. 
36  Although  Timmons  (2004)  puts  forth  a  contextualist  moral  epistemology,  he’s  largely  concerned  with  providing  an 
account  of  how  we  can  have  morally  basic  beliefs—that  is,  moral  beliefs  that  do  not  stand  in  need  of  justification,  rather 
than  in  providing  a  theoretical  account  of  the  higher  standard  of  moral  beliefs,  or  in  accounting  for  the  apparent 
asymmetries  between  moral  and  non-moral  beliefs  more  generally. 
37  It’s  important  to  note  that  the  constraint  is  not  that  the  theory  must  locate  a  feature  that  is  solely  had  by  moral  beliefs 
in  the  sense  that  it  is  in  principle  impossible  to  be  had  by  non-moral  beliefs.  For  one,  it  would  be  hard  to  specify  such  a 
feature  or  property  in  a  non-circular  way  (i.e.  other  than  the  feature  of  being  a  moral  belief).  Rather,  minimally,  it  must 
be  a  feature  that  is  had  to  a  greater  (or  lesser)  extent  by  moral  beliefs. 
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moreover, that the contextualist can also incorporate practical interests in her view. In the end, I                               
put forth versions of both SSI and contextualism that are plausible accounts of the higher standard                               
of justification for moral beliefs, arguing that there is a particular contextualist view that best                             
accounts for the distinctive features of moral beliefs. Importantly, given the practical interest                         
framework of both views that I put forth, it turns out that the higher standard of justification for                                   
moral  beliefs  is  due  to  essentially  moral  features  of  moral  beliefs.  38
 
1.  The  Contenders 
1.1.  Contextualism 
Contextualism is a theory of knowledge and justification that states that whether or not one                             
knows or is justified is partly determined by (non-evidential) situational factors. In the case of                             
contextualism, these factors are those in the context of utterance or use of a knowledge ascription:                               
whether or not a subject S knows that p is a matter of meeting certain epistemic standards that are                                     
fixed by the context in which a speaker makes a knowledge claim. Importantly, the situational                             
factors don’t determine whether or not one knows or is justified directly, but rather indirectly by                               
way of determining which epistemic standards are in play: different situational features, different                         
epistemic standards. Exactly which epistemic standards are the relevant ones, however, is not a                           
settled matter, for even while accepting that the epistemic standards change with context there is                             
disagreement as to what the content of these standards is, or what these standards amount to. In                                 
39
38  What  I  mean  by  this  is  that  it  is  due  to  features  of  morality  as  a  subject  matter,  instead  of  accidental  features  (e.g. 
merely  contextual  features). 
39  For  example,  Heller  (1995)  argues  that  how  reliable  one  must  be  to  know  is  fixed  by  the  context,  while  Cohen  (1986) 
argues  that  an  agent  must  be  able  to  rule  out  salient  counterpossibilities,  and  that  context  fixes  which  possibilities  are 
salient.   
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this way, contextualism generally speaking does not hold one to an internalist or externalist theory                             
of justification, and so can be held alongside or applied to whatever theory of justification one                               
subscribes  to. 
One of the main virtues of contextualism is its ability to handle our intuitions concerning                             
claims about knowledge and justification in skeptical scenarios. We normally think that we know                           
certain facts about the external world, at least on a general, everyday basis, even though we are not                                   
able to defeat the skeptic (at least not on her own grounds). However, many of us also have the                                     
thought that when engaged in a philosophical discussion about skepticism, we fall short of                           
knowledge. How can this be? The explanation offered by the contextualist is that the epistemic                             
standards that one must meet in order to qualify as knowing shift when the context shifts from that                                   
of an ordinary, everyday one to a philosophical one. In this way, even though one has the same                                   
evidence, is equally reliable, etc., in both scenarios, one has knowledge in one case while failing to                                 
have  knowledge  in  the  other.   
Importantly, contextualism is first and foremost a semantic theory about sentences with                       
epistemic terms like “know” or “justified”. Contextualists hold that these kinds of epistemic terms                           
function as context-sensitive expressions just as “I” and “tall” do. What proposition is expressed by                             
an utterance of “S knows that p” changes with a relevant change in context. Because of this, the                                   
truth value of the same utterance of “S knows that p” can change depending on the context in which                                     
it is uttered, which is what allows for the judgment that in the ordinary case one knows that one has                                       
hands  while  in  the  discussion  of  skepticism  one  does  not.  
40
40  An  attentive  reader  will  notice  that  this  is  a  sloppy  way  of  making  the  contextualist  point,  which  has  been  prone  to 
criticism:  strictly  speaking,  we  would  have  to  say  that  the  sentence  "S  knows  that  p"  is  true  in  the  ordinary  context  and 
33 
Before assessing whether or not contextualism can provide an adequate explanation of how                         
the standard of justification differs for moral beliefs as compared to non-moral beliefs, I will first                               
introduce another epistemic theory that takes non-evidential situational features to figure                     
essentially  into  claims  about  knowledge  and  justification:  subject  sensitive  invariantism.   
2.2.  Subject  Sensitive  Invariantism 
Like contextualism, subject sensitive invariantism (SSI) is a theory of knowledge and                       
justification which holds that whether or not one knows or is justified is partly determined by                               
non-evidential situational factors. In this way, both agree that whether or not one knows or is                               
41
justified in believing is not solely a matter of the evidential position an agent is in. Rather, two                                   
agents who are on evidentially equal grounds can nevertheless vary with respect to knowledge and                             
justification.   
More specifically, SSI holds that it is the subject’s practical interests, or what the subject of the                                 
knowledge/justification attribution has at stake practically speaking, that constrain whether or not                       
she knows/is justified in believing. The basic notion of SSI can be put in terms of the following                                   
principle: 
SSI:  S  is  justified  in  believing  that  p  only  if  S  is  rational  to  act  as  if  p.  
42
false  in  the  skeptical  one.   I  will  not  take  up  these  issues  here,  but  am  rather  just  following  Lewis’s  (1996)  explication  of 
contextualism. 
41  See  Fantl  and  McGrath  (2002),  (2007)  and  (2009),  and  Stanley  (2005).  Stanley  takes  his  account  to  only  concern 
knowledge  (see  pp.  88-9),  but  Fantl  and  McGrath  (2002)  put  the  theory  specifically  in  terms  of  justification.  Stanley 
refers  to  his  theory  as  “Interest  Relative  Invariantism,”  while  Fantl  and  McGrath  use  “pragmatic  encroachment”.  The 
label  of  “subject  sensitive  invariantism”  for  these  views  is  due  to  DeRose  (2004). 
42  This  formulation  of  SSI  is  taken  from  Fantl  and  McGrath  (2002)  p.  78.  To  clarify:  the  rationality  of  acting  as  if  p  is 
determined  relative  to  the  subject’s  preferences  and  the  actual  situation  they  are  presently  in  (that  is,  not  just  any 
situation  one  could  imagine).  See  also  Fantl  and  McGrath  (2009)  pp.59-60  for  similar  principles  connecting  knowledge 
to  action. 
34 
The arguments made on behalf of SSI usually appeal to particular cases in which two agents                               
stand in the same evidential position yet have different relevant practical interests, or differences in                             
what is at stake for them in being wrong (having a false belief), and we think that only one is                                       
43
justified or has knowledge, while the other lacks it. For example, in  Knowledge and Practical Interests ,                               
Jason Stanley presents a case where an agent is trying to determine whether they should deposit                               
their check today, a Friday, when the line at the bank is long, or tomorrow, a Saturday. In the first                                       44
case, the agent has no impending bills, and would rather not wait in line today but deposit their                                   
check tomorrow, and so they say to themselves, having been at the bank on Saturday two weeks                                 
ago, “I know the bank will be open tomorrow.” In the second case, the agent has a very important                                     
impending bill and very little money in their account currently, and so, even though they were at                                 
the bank on Saturday two weeks ago, thinks to themselves “I don’t know the bank is open                                 
tomorrow”—after  all,  banks  do  change  their  hours. 
We have the intuition that the agents in these cases attribute to themselves the correct                             
epistemic status concerning knowledge. If we stick to the belief that knowledge and justification are                             
invariable and only concern purely evidentially relevant factors, these intuitions will be puzzling                         
and inexplicable. For evidentialism holds that in so far as evidence E is sufficient to justify one in                                   
believing, or constitute one knowing, that p in one case, it is sufficient to justify or count as                                   
knowledge for anyone else who is similarly evidentially situated in the same kind of circumstance.                             
SSI offers a clean and principled way of explaining these intuitions, and why they are right: we                                 
43  Stanley  (2005)  puts  his  view  in  terms  of  the  threshold  of  knowledge  being  determined  with  respect  to  the  (practical) 
cost  of  being  wrong:  in  order  to  know,  the  probability  of  the  alternatives  to  p  must  be  sufficiently  low,  where  the  agent’s 
interests  determine  which  alternatives  are  in  play  and  the  threshold  of  being  sufficiently  improbable  is  determined  by 
the  practical  costs  of  being  wrong. 
44  This  bank  case  is  originally  from  DeRose  (1992)  which  he  used  to  argue  on  behalf  of  contextualism.  Stanley  offers 
several  varieties  of  the  bank  case,  some  of  which  he  argues  are  accommodated  on  SSI  but  not  contextualism. 
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think that it is rational for the low-stakes agent to act as if p, while we think it would be irrational                                         
for the high-stakes agent to do the same (again, even though they are in the same position in                                   
regards  to  their  evidence!),  which  indicates  that  in  one  case  S  knows  while  in  the  other  S  does  not.   
Importantly, there are some key differences between contextualism and SSI even though                       
they both agree that certain non-evidential contextual features at least partly determine whether or                           
not an agent knows. Perhaps the biggest difference concerns the semantic commitments of each.                           
Recall here that contextualism is a semantic thesis about knowledge attributions which holds that                           
the meaning of epistemic terms like “knowledge” and “justification” is determined by (certain                         
features of) the context of use, which makes it such that the same sentence of “S knows that p”                                     
actually expresses different propositions in different contexts. SSI, however, holds that the same                         
proposition is expressed by “S knows that p” relative to every context of use. Rather, it is just that                                     
there are additional non-evidential factors, i.e. a subject’s practical interests, which determine                       
whether or not one knows (namely, a subject’s practical interests determine whether or not the                             
truth conditions of the knowledge proposition are met (i.e. whether they make it rational to act as if                                   
p)). Secondly, the views differ with respect to who or which context knowledge attributions are                             
45
judged relative to: while for contextualism what matters is features in the context of utterance, for                               
SSI  it  is  the  subject’s  practical  interests. 
 
3.  How  Higher? 
45  Again,  for  Stanley  interests  determine  knowledge  all  the  way  down  (both  in  terms  of  the  alternatives  one  needs  to 
consider  and  the  threshold  of  probability  these  alternatives  must  meet).  In  so  far  as  an  agent’s  practical  interests  remain 
the  same  across  contexts,  then,  the  epistemic  standards  one  must  meet  do  not  change  (even  if,  say,  other  alternatives  are 
made  salient,  etc.). 
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Now that we have both contextualism and SSI in view we should turn to the question of                                 
what  could  function  to  raise  the  epistemic  standard  of  justification  for  moral  beliefs  on  each  model.   
3.1.  Contextualism  and  Relevant  Alternatives 
While contextualist views come in many shapes and stripes, the traditional and perhaps                         
most popular contextualist model is the  Relevant Alternatives model (RA). According to RA, whether                           
or not an agent knows (that p) is determined by whether they are able to rule out a certain set of                                         
relevant alternatives (of not-p). RA is a contextualist view because it holds that whether an                             46
alternative is relevant can vary from context (of utterance) to context (of utterance): it is not that                                 
the same alternatives are relevant for any and every knowledge attribution. Where contextualist RA                           
views vary is along what makes an alternative relevant in a context, for example whether it must be                                   
asserted or otherwise entered into the conversational score, whether it must be presupposed or part                             
of  the  common  ground  of  a  conversation,  or  whether  it  just  needs  to  be  attended  to  by  the  utterer.   47
If we were to adopt the RA model of contextualism to explain the higher standard of                               
justification for moral beliefs, we would have to meet several constraints: first, say what it is that                                 
makes an alternative to a moral belief relevant, and secondly, be sure that the phenomenon that we                                 
locate as making an alternative relevant for moral beliefs is had to a much greater extent by moral                                   
beliefs (such that counterpossibilities are typically made salient in the case of moral beliefs but not                               
46  See  Lewis  (1979)  and  (1996),  Goldman  (1976),  and  Dretske  (1970)  as  classic  papers  on  the  RA  approach.  Of  course, 
contextualists  have  differed  with  respect  to  what  is  required  by  ‘ruling  out’  a  certain  alternative  as  well,  whether  that  just 
requires  that  the  agent’s  evidence  rules  out  not-p,  or  whether  the  agent  must  actually  be  able  to  do  or  say  something 
against  the  particular  possibility  of  not-p  (for  the  latter,  see  Wellman  (1971)  and  Annis  (1978)  on  the 
Challenge-Response  Model). 
47  See  Blome-Tillman  (2009)  for  the  view  that  the  alternatives  that  are  relevant  are  those  that  are  pragmatically 
presupposed.  There  are  also  interest  models  of  relevance,  which  hold  that  what  makes  an  alternative  relevant  depends 
on  the  assessor’s  concerns  or  interests  (see  Heller  (1999)  for  an  early  model).  The  interest  RA  model  will  be  discussed  in 
section  3.4. 
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for non-moral beliefs). This is because (perhaps obviously) if the alternatives-raising phenomenon                       
we identify is also present to the same extent in non-moral belief contexts, then even though we                                 
would be able to account for the epistemic standard being high for moral beliefs, we wouldn’t be                                 
able to account for the  diÚference in the epistemic standard (since we would just have to conclude                                 
that the standard for non-moral beliefs is high as well). Importantly, though, the constraint is not                               
that the theory must locate a feature that is  solely had by moral beliefs in the sense that it is in                                         
principle impossible to be had by non-moral beliefs, for that would be much too demanding for the                                 
task  at  hand.   
One possible standards-raising phenomenon the RA contextualist can appeal to is the                       
oft-cited phenomenon of moral disagreement. First, moral disagreement would explain what makes                       
an alternative relevant: when an agent would come across others who disagree with them over a                               
moral matter, the disagreement would function to introduce an alternative into the conversational                         
score. Secondly, the fact that there is widespread disagreement about what is right and wrong, and                               
that there is more disagreement about morality than about, say, whether Syracuse is a city in New                                 
York, makes it so that the epistemic standards are typically raised for moral beliefs, since there are                                 
more alternatives or counterpossibilities that are made salient and made salient more often by the                             
fact of moral disagreement. This explanation would suffice to show how the standard of                           
justification for moral beliefs is higher than that for non-moral beliefs: it both stipulates what                             
functions to raise the standard, and locates a phenomenon of alternative-raising that is unique to                             
moral  beliefs  (or  at  least  more  common  with  moral  beliefs). 
In spite of its initial plausibility, this contextualist strategy is not a good explanation of why                               
and how it is that the standard of justification for moral beliefs is higher than that for non-moral                                   
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beliefs. The significant problem with this picture is that it generates the intuitively wrong extension                             
for justified beliefs: namely, it holds that agents who intuitively don’t have justified moral beliefs do.                               
Under the current model, it is the fact of disagreement that functions to raise the epistemic standard                                 
that one must meet in order to be justified: the more disagreement there is in the context of                                   
utterance, the more alternatives are made relevant, and so the higher the standard. Although it is                               
usually the case that given the plentitude of moral disagreement one would find oneself in the                               
relevant context where such counterpossibilities were made relevant, it surely isn’t the case that one                             
always  or  even  normally  would.  For  consider  the  following  case: 
 The Big Move : Riggins has recently moved to a community, SwingStateUSA, that                       
is very divided on the issue of the moral permissibility of homosexuality. While                         
Riggins believes that homosexuality is morally wrong, they are constantly met                     
with opposing views from others in their community. After several months of                       
heated debates, Riggins decides to move to a community that has similar beliefs.                         
Riggins moves to a community, RedStateUSA, where everyone believes that                   
homosexuality is morally wrong. In this very isolated community, Riggins never                     
faces disagreement from others about their beliefs about homosexuality. Riggins’                   
only reasons for believing that homosexuality is morally wrong both before and                       
after the move have not changed (for example, they are that their religious leaders                           
have  said  so). 
 
This contextualist picture is problematic because it would conclude that Riggins’ belief that                         
homosexuality is morally wrong is  signiÚicantly  more justified when they move to RedStateUSA                         
than when they lived in SwingStateUSA. In fact, depending on the precise view, some of these                               
contextualist views may even conclude that Riggins’ belief is epistemically justified while they are in                             
RedStateUSA, while epistemically unjustified while they are in SwingStateUSA: for so long as one                           
just  presently  isn’t in a context where there is moral disagreement—where the possibility of not-p is                               
made relevant—then one is justified in holding the moral beliefs one does, since no alternatives are                               
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made relevant. The problem is that we do not think that Riggins’ belief comes to be justified--or is                                   48
any better epistemically--just because they no longer face any disagreement. Riggins shouldn’t be                         
able to increase the epistemic status of their belief just by moving to a less confrontational                               
community. Since Riggins’ evidence or reasons for believing that homosexuality is wrong haven’t                         
improved (as they haven’t changed at all), their beliefs shouldn’t suddenly acquire a better epistemic                             
status. The agent isolated from others with conflicting moral beliefs doesn’t have a (significantly                           49
more) justified belief just because they are lucky enough to find themselves in circumstances where                             
there  is  no  disagreement.    50
At this point, the disagreement RA contextualist may say that the moral disagreement is still                             
salient when Riggins moves to RedStateUSA because, for example, Riggins would still remember                         
such disagreements, and so they would still be at their attention. But, if the moving situation had                                 
been reversed such that Riggins moved from the isolated community to the divided community, the                             
same would hold, only in reverse: Riggins’ belief would have become significantly less justified after                             
they moved, and Riggins’ belief would have been significantly more justified (or even outright                           
justified) before they moved, which is still counterintuitive. Moreover, if one is to insist that the                               51
disagreement present in one context follow agents into other contexts, the question arises of                           
48  Strictly  speaking,  this  contextualist  would  say  that  for  anyone  in  Riggins’s  context  of  RedStateUSA,  the  utterance 
“Riggins’s  belief  is  justified”  is  true. 
49  This  general  shiftiness  of  certain  models  of  contextualism  where  an  agent  can  go  from  knowing  to  not  knowing  and 
back  again  without  a  change  in  their  evidence  has  been  objected  to  by  Kompa  (2002).  Technically,  the  issue  is  that  an 
agent  like  Riggins  would  be  able  to  truly  say  something  like  “Had  I  said  ‘I  know  that  p’  in  SwingStateUSA  I  would  have 
spoken  falsely,  but  now  I  do  know  that  p”  (see  p.  15). 
50  A  Lewisian  RA  Contextualist  may  resist  here,  claiming  that  there  are  other  features  that  determine  relevancy, 
specifically  ones  that  would  entail  safety,  and  clearly  Riggins’  beliefs  wouldn’t  be  safe  in  The  Big  Move .  However,  since 
moral  truths  are  commonly  accepted  as  necessary  truths,  these  modal  epistemic  conditions  like  safety  wouldn’t  do  any 
work  here  for  allowing  the  disagreement  RA  contextualist  to  resist  the  case. 
51  To  be  clear,  my  argument  here  against  the  disagreement  model  of  RA  contextualism  isn’t  laying  claim  to  the  position 
that  standards  aren’t  shifty--that  they  don’t  or  can’t  ever  vary  between  contexts--but  rather  that  this  specific  model  has 
standards  shift  in  counterintuitive  ways. 
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whether we want contexts to be sticky in this way in general. For insisting on this comes at a cost of                                         
losing  the  flexibility  of  the  contextualist  view,  its  prime  advantage. 
Since the disagreement model of RA contextualism has proven to be an inadequate                         
theoretical account of the difference in the standard of justification between moral and non-moral                           
beliefs,  we  should  now  turn  to  SSI  to  see  whether  it  can  provide  a  better  account.    52
3.2.  SSI  and  Practical  Interests 
Recall that SSI holds that whether or not one is epistemically justified is a matter of meeting                                 
a certain epistemic standard which is fixed by the subject’s practical interests. So, if we are to use                                   53
SSI as an analysis of how it is that the epistemic standards of justification is  higher for moral beliefs                                     
than for other, non-moral, beliefs, we would also have to say that there is more at stake practically                                   
speaking in the case of moral beliefs—that it would be very bad, practically speaking, for us to have                                   
false  moral  beliefs—than  in  the  case  of  other  kinds  of  beliefs. 
Is this a plausible account of the differences in the standard of justification between moral                             
and other non-moral beliefs? I believe that it is. The heightened practical import of moral beliefs is                                 
clear when we consider that morality is concerned with how we live our practical lives (e.g. our well                                   
being and what we owe to others). Moreover, the practical dimension of morality concerns not just                               
how  I , as a single agent, live, but how I live with and amongst others: our moral decisions and                                     
actions not only affect ourselves but also others, and our relationships with others. This is because                               
moral beliefs also typically motivate one to act accordingly: holding a moral belief usually results in                               
52  Of  course,  I  have  here  only  considered  one  variation  of  the  RA  model  of  contextualism,  and  so  don’t  take  myself  to 
have  ruled  out  every  possible  RA  model  for  moral  beliefs.  In  section  3.3.  I  consider  an  alternative  model  of  the  RA  view 
that  picks  out  practical  interests  as  the  phenomena  that  functions  to  raise  the  standard,  which  I  argue  fares  quite  well. 
53  Particularly,  it  is  the  the  subject  of  the  attribution’s  practical  interests  that  are  relevant.  Certain  problems  arise  with 
this  strict  formulation  of  SSI,  which  I  address  in  section  4. 
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action that reflects one’s belief. Moreover, the reactive attitudes characteristic of morality as                         54
expressions of holding others morally responsible that agents take up towards one another affect                           
agents practically, as it affects how they feel and what they choose to do or not do, as well as                                       
(obviously) how others treat them. And, lastly, the matter and abundance of moral disagreement is                             55
relevant in so far as the actions that result from holding certain moral beliefs affect those with                                 
whom  we  disagree.  56
If being epistemically justified in believing that p is a matter of being rational in acting as if                                   
p, we can see how moral beliefs in general require us to meet higher epistemic standards than                                 
non-moral beliefs: due to the breadth and depth to which our moral beliefs have practical import,                               
much is practically at stake in holding a moral belief. SSI can readily explain how it is that                                     57 58
holding a moral belief  in general , and in virtue of it being a  moral belief, requires a greater amount of                                       
justification than other beliefs typically do. Again, this is because: (1) moral beliefs typically                           
motivate, (2) the content of moral beliefs typically has practical import, i.e. morality is about how to                                 
54  That  is,  for  example,  that  if  one  believes  that  φ-ing  is  morally  obligatory  one  has  some  motivation  to  φ.  It  is  important 
to  note  here  that  I  am  not  committing  myself  to  a  view  concerning  motivational  internalism:  I’m  solely  holding  that 
moral  beliefs  typically  motivate,  not  that  they  necessarily  do  so  all  time,  or  all  the  time  for  rational  agents.  There  is  an 
empirical  question  here  concerning  the  claim  that  I  am  making,  but  it  can  be  set  aside  since  I  don’t  hold  that  the 
standard  of  justification  solely  depends  upon  this  claim  being  true;  rather,  it  is  one  (plausible)  feature  amongst  four 
others  that  I  list  that  account  for  the  heightened  practical  stakes  of  moral  beliefs  generally.  In  fact,  provided  that  we 
accept  Fantl  and  McGrath’s  principle  stated  beforehand,  a  belief  need  not  actually  result  in  action  in  order  for  it  to  have 
heightened  practical  import  (since  we’d  only  need  to  consider  what’s  practically  at  stake  in  acting  or  preferring  as  if  p). 
55  See  Strawson  (2003).  To  clarify:  reactive  attitudes  make  it  the  case  that  moral  beliefs  typically  have  higher  practical 
stakes  because  they  (the  reactive  attitudes)  apply  to  moral  agents  who  commit  moral  actions,  and  so  would  count  as 
what’s  partly  at  stake  in  acting  as  if  p  (or  preferring  as  if  p)  or  as  one  of  the  potential  costs  of  being  wrong  about  p, 
where  p  is  a  moral  proposition. 
56  I’m  imagining  here  that  those  who  we  disagree  with  would  especially  raise  the  practical  stakes  as  compared  to  those 
with  whom  we  agree,  since  they  would  prefer  that  we  not  act  as  if  our  moral  belief  were  true. 
57  Driver  (2006)  also  points  out  the  practical  import  of  moral  beliefs  (or,  as  she  calls  it,  the  “seriousness”  of  moral  beliefs) 
when  arguing  that  it,  when  combined  with  epistemic  worries  about  identifying  moral  experts,  yield  a  justification  of  our 
reluctance  to  accept  moral  testimony. 
58  Again,  this  is  not  to  say  that  there  are  no  moral  beliefs  that  are  seemingly  low-stakes,  but  rather  that  the  moral 
questions  that  we  focus  on  and  that  are  traditional  moral  questions  are  high-stakes.  I  address  how  an  SSI  theorist  may 
handle  seemingly  low-stakes  moral  beliefs  later  in  this  section. 
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live, especially with one another, and so (3) moral beliefs’ practical import concerns acting in a way                                 
that affects our own and others’ practical lives (4) moral beliefs make one vulnerable to reactive                               
attitudes, which affect how one feels, what one does, and how others treat you, and (5) they affect                                   
others  with  whom  we  disagree.    59
To clarify how this account would work, consider some examples. Take, for instance, the                           
belief that eating meat is morally permissible. One can see that this belief has a high practical import                                   
in terms of how one lives one’s everyday life, how others’ lives go for them (granting that animals                                   
are of a morally significant standing, or, alternatively, that the meat industry has a high negative                               
impact on the environment and so also our lives), and our choices of whether to eat meat or not                                     
affects those with whom we disagree and make us vulnerable to reactive attitudes. So, on this                               
account, the standard of justification for this belief would be rather high due to it having these                                 
features. 
However, one may think that the standard of justification is rather low for beliefs of                             
wrongness when compared to beliefs of permissibility. In assessing whether the standard should be                           
high or not, one might say that we ought to think in terms of how Stanley conceives of it as a                                         
matter of the costs of being wrong. The costs of being wrong about a belief of moral wrongness                                   
may not be so bad, since a belief that something was wrong would, hopefully, keep one from doing                                   
possibly bad things: if one were wrong about ϕ-ing being wrong such that ϕ-ing were permissible,                               
one  wouldn’t  be  doing  anything  wrong  by  abstaining  from  ϕ-ing. 
Yet, it’s easy to see that this surely isn’t true of all, or most, beliefs about moral wrongness.                                   
For one, this objection would fail in cases where instead of ϕ-ing in fact being morally permissible it                                   
59  To  be  clear:  I  am  not  claiming  that  these  are  non-evidential  features  are  exclusive  to  morality. 
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were instead morally obligatory. One must consider not only the possibility that ϕ-ing is actually                             
morally permissible but also the possibility that ϕ-ing is morally obligatory in considering the costs                             
of being wrong about one’s belief of moral wrongness. In the case where ϕ-ing were actually                               
morally obligatory the cost of being wrong in one’s belief that ϕ-ing is morally wrong would be                                 
quite  high,  since,  by  failing  to  ϕ,  one  would  be  doing  something  morally  wrong. 
It is also not the case that the standard of justification for all beliefs of moral wrongness is                                   
lower than beliefs of permissibility or obligation even if we were just to consider cases where the                                 
only reasonable possibilities were either that ϕ-ing is wrong or ϕ-ing is permissible. The case of                               
abortion serves as a nice example of why this is not the case: supposing that abortion is in fact                                     
morally permissible, one can see how the costs of being wrong about abortion being morally wrong                               
are actually quite high, since it would plausibly result in taking actions that would keep oneself and                                 
others  from  doing  something  that  drastically  affects  the  way  their  life  goes  for  them. 
Even if one accepts that beliefs of moral wrongness do not as such have a low(er) standard                                 
of justification one may still think that the SSI account that I have laid out gives the wrong verdict                                     
in cases of obvious moral beliefs, such as the belief that torturing innocent others for fun is wrong.                                   
Intuitively, we think that one actually doesn’t need a lot, epistemically speaking, to be justified in                               
holding this belief. Yet, as a moral belief, my account seems to give the verdict that in this case the                                       
standard of justification should still be high given the fact that it is a moral belief. However, my                                   
account  can  not  only  accommodate  but  also  explain  this  judgment.   
To see this, we ought to return to Stanley’s full account of SSI. According to his view, a                                   
subject,  x,   knows  that  p  at  a  time  t  and  a  world  w  if  and  only  if: 
(1)  p  is  true  at  w  (2)  ~p  is   not  a  serious  epistemic  possibility  for  x  at  t  (3)  If  p 
is  a  serious  practical  question  for  x  at  t,  then  ~p  has  a  sufficiently  low 
epistemic  probability,  given  x’s  total  evidence  (4)  x  believes  at  t  that  p  on  the 
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basis  of  non-inferential  evidence,  or  believes  that  p  on  the  basis  of  a 
competent  inference  from  propositions  that  are  known  by  x  at  t.  60
 
To understand this account, we should first consider what make a proposition a “serious practical                             
question.” The general thought is as follows: an agent has a number of actions that they could take;                                   
an agent will then order these actions according to what they would prefer to do, but conditional on                                   
certain things being the case. For example, if it’s raining outside I would prefer to take the umbrella                                   
because I would like to stay dry, but if it’s not raining I would prefer to leave the umbrella at home                                         
since I would like to carry as little as possible. A proposition is a “serious practical question,” then,                                   
just in case its being true or false would have more than a minimal or insignificant effect on the                                     
preference ordering of the actions at the agent’s disposal. In this particular case, we can assume that                                 
whether torturing innocent others for fun is wrong or not (i.e. permissible or even obligatory) is a                                 
serious practical question. Although Stanley doesn’t say much to elucidate the concept of a serious                             61
epistemic possibility, it seems that the possibility that it is not the case that torturing innocent                               62
others for fun is wrong--that it’s either permissible or obligatory to torture innocent others for                             
fun--is quite slim. Given this, the proposition in question--that torturing innocent others for fun                           63
is wrong--would meet condition (2) (and so also (3)). Since the negation of the proposition is not a                                   
serious epistemic possibility, the epistemic standard would not be raised, and so would be quite low                               
given  this  great  improbability.   
60  Stanley  (2005)  pp.  89-90. 
61  It  seems  that  we  can  also  utilize  the  notion  of  a  serious  practical  question  to  explain  another  type  of  moral  question: 
theoretical  moral  questions  like  which  first-order  moral  theory  is  correct  (e.g.  Utilitarianism  or  Kantianism).  We  could 
do  so  by  considering  whether  and  the  extent  to  which  the  answer  to  the  question  being  true  or  false  would  affect  the 
preference  ordering  of  the  possible  actions  available  to  the  agent  to  determine  the  standard.  It  seems  that  this  type  of 
moral  questions  could  very  well  have  high  standards,  as  they  very  well  could  affect  which  actions  individuals  decide  to 
take  (e.g.  whether  to  lie  or  break  promises). 
62  He  states  simply  that  there  is  a  “vague  though  relatively  situation-invariant  level  of  objective  probability”  and  that  a 
probability  of  50%  or  more  are  definitely  cases  of  serious  epistemic  possibility.  See  p.  91. 
63  Although  I  haven’t  given  an  account  of  how  evidence  supports  moral  beliefs,  I  say  that  this  possibility  seems  to  be 
quite  slim  because  it  is  forbidden  on  any  plausible  moral  theory. 
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One way object that identifying the standards-raising feature for moral beliefs as practical                         
interests or stakes would not be sufficient to account for the  asymmetry between moral and                             
non-moral beliefs, or the way in which moral beliefs typically have a  higher epistemic standard than                               
non-moral beliefs. For, one might say, non-moral beliefs can likewise have high practical stakes.                           
Importantly, though, even though the feature that SSI appeals to in accounting for the mechanism                             
which raises epistemic standards for moral beliefs can aso in principle be had by non-moral beliefs,                               
it can still explain the asymmetry in standards between typical moral and non-moral beliefs. This is                               
because, remember, the constraint for adequacy is not that the account must locate a feature that is                                 
only  had by moral beliefs. Interestingly, though, although non-moral beliefs can also in principle                           
have some of the practically-relevant features of moral beliefs just cited, there is one feature that is                                 
still particular to the moral domain: reactive attitudes. So, while on this SSI account some                             
non-moral beliefs may also have high practical stakes, the typical moral belief will have greater                             
practical stakes than the typical non-moral belief, due to features of morality as a subject-matter that                               
are either typically had to a greater extent or exclusively for moral beliefs and actions based on                                 
them. Since these practical upshots are special to moral beliefs, non-moral beliefs would not                           
typically   have  these,  and  so  their  standards  would  typically  be  lower. 
As we’ve just seen, this account is advantageous in so far as it is able to generate the right                                     
judgments on a series of types of cases. The previous case shows why, although the  standard  for                                 
moral beliefs will be a high epistemic standard, not  every single moral belief will have a high                                 
epistemic standard. However, in so far as moral beliefs typically have these five features to a high                                 
degree due to their moral content, and that SSI would acknowledge those features as relevant to                               
fixing the standard of epistemic justification, then it’s the case that the standard of justification for                               
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moral beliefs is typically high, and high due to the fact that it’s a moral belief. For these reasons, SSI                                       
seems  like  a  promising  account  of  the  higher  epistemic  standard  of  moral  beliefs.   
But are there any additional accounts of the higher standard? If having practical interests                           
function to fix the epistemic standard is a successful approach, a question remains whether the                             
contextualist  can  also  adopt  this  strategy.  I  will  consider  this  strategy  in  the  next  section. 
3.3.  Contextualism  Redux 
An alternative version of RA contextualism has recently been advanced which situates                       
practical interests as that which determines whether an alternative is relevant. More specifically, if                           64
an alternative is important given the utterer’s practical interests or project(s), then it is relevant.                             
One of the advantages that this particular model of the RA contextualist view boasts of is its ability                                   
to accommodate a variety of cases of knowledge ascriptions that proponents of SSI typically cite as                               
evidence in favor of their view over contextualism. Importantly, the view is able to achieve these                               
results because of its co-opting the same broad phenomena of practical interests that the SSI                             
theorist uses to fix epistemic standards. Since we have already seen that SSI is a promising                               
theoretical account of the higher standard of justification for moral beliefs, in assessing the strength                             
of this model of RA contextualism--interest-contextualism--we ought to determine whether or not                       
it would be able to adopt the same phenomena  of moral beliefs as the SSI theorist does in accounting                                     
for  the  higher  epistemic  standard  of  moral  beliefs. 
It seems quite straightforward that the interest-contextualist can do this. That is, it seems                           
that the interest-contextualist can also adopt the five features of moral beliefs cited to explain the                               
64  See  McKenna  (2013)  and  (2011). 
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higher epistemic standard--that moral beliefs typically motivate, that the content of moral beliefs                         
typically has practical import, i.e. morality is about how to live, especially with one another, and so                                 
moral beliefs’ practical import concerns acting in a way that affects our own and others’ practical                               
lives, that moral beliefs make one vulnerable to the reactive attitudes, which affect how one feels,                               
what one does, and how others treat you, and that they affect others with whom we disagree--that                                 
the SSI theorist does in accounting for the higher epistemic standard of moral beliefs. Importantly,                             
unlike the disagreement model of RA contextualism, the interest-contextualist seems to sidestep                       
extensional worries by locating a phenomenon connected to features of morality as a subject matter,                             
thus being able to hold that moral beliefs  in general require us to meet higher epistemic standards                                 
than  other  beliefs  due  to  the  fact  that  it  is  a  moral  belief. 
 
4.  Whose  Interests? 
4.1.  The  Problem  of  Apathy 
Although I have said that both SSI and interest-contextualism are promising accounts of the                           
higher epistemic standard of moral beliefs, each view requires a closer look at its exact mechanics.                               
For while each view stipulates that practical interests or stakes determine the stringency of the                             
epsitemic standard, one large question looms:  whose practical interests are relevant in fixing the                           
standard? 
This question is extremely important for our analysis for two reasons: (1) one main                           
difference between each view is precisely who or which context the standard is fixed relative to, and                                 
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(2) it’s imperative that each view not face the kind of extensional problems that the disagreement                               
model of RA contextualism did by fixing the standard relative to the wrong agent or agents’                               
interests. A problem seems to arise along (2) for each view as they currently stand by paying closer                                   
attention to (1). The issue is that each view, while both being able to feature practical interests or                                   
stakes in their view, strictly speaking fix epistemic standards relative to a particular person or                             
context. This means that for each view, strictly speaking it’s not just that practical interests are                               
factored into the theory, but that a particular person’s practical interests are factored into the                             
theory, and fix the epistemic standard. For the contextualist, this would be the practical interests or                               
stakes of the context of utterance or attributor, while for the SSI it would be those of the subject of                                       
the knowledge/belief attribution. The problem with respect to (2) arises when the respective                         
agent--whether the subject or attributor of the knowledge/belief attribution--happens to be a kind                         
of amoralist, and just have absolutely no interests in morality and its practical upshots. For it seems                                 
that, as these views are currently formulated in the literature, the fact that the relevant agent just                                 
doesn’t have anything practically at stake herself in holding the moral beliefs that she does makes                               
moral knowledge too easy for them, or those their utterances are about, to come by. Moreover, the                                 
ways in which these views are currently formulated would fail to explain the asymmetry in                             
justification in the initial pairs of cases if we were to conceive of Riggins as such an amoralist:                                   
according to SSI, Amoralist Riggins has no additional particular moral interests, and so would be                             
just as justified in their moral belief as their non-moral belief; likewise, for the Contextualist: this                               
problem would arise for those knowledge- or justification-ascribing utterances that amoralists                     
would make of Riggins in the initial pairs of cases. It seems that serious problems arise for these                                   
views, as standardly formulated, precisely because their focus on interests is too narrow. The                           
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problem, really, is that it’s not just any  one  individual’s interests in morality that makes morality                               
have high practical stakes, and so the epistemic standard of justification shouldn’t vary so easily with                               
any  one  individual.    65
As damning as this may seem to each view, I believe that each deserves further attention                               
before we throw in the towel. In what remains of this paper, I will argue that while SSI has                                     
something that can be said on its behalf to appease this worry, the interest-contextualist view can be                                 
amended  to  accommodate  this  worry  quite  well,  and  so  in  the  end  is  the  more  promising  view. 
4.2.  All  Non-Isolated  Subjects 
There are two ways the SSI theorist could accommodate the extensional worry that moral                           
knowledge would be too easy to come by for amoralist subjects who just don’t care about morality.                                 
One way would be to adjust the interests that epistemic standards are fixed relative to. Another way                                 
would be to challenge the assumption that because the subject doesn’t care about doing the right                               
thing or being moral, they have no practical interests that attach to their having the moral beliefs                                 
that they do. In these ways, the SSI theorist could maintain that even in these amoralist cases the                                   
epistemic  standard  is  comparatively  high  for  moral  beliefs.   
Take the first option. One straightforward way to escape this extensional worry would be                           
say that it’s not  just the subject’s interests that fix the epistemic standard, but  also others’ interests.                                 66
65  As  I  note,  McKenna  (2013)  puts  forth  a  contextualist  view  that  takes  multiple  agents’  interests  as  relevant  for  fixing 
the  standard.  Likewise,  Pace  (2011)  puts  forth  a  kind  of  SSI  that  he  calls  “the  moral  encroachment  theory  of 
justification,”  which  holds  that  epistemic  standards  (for  all  kinds  of  beliefs,  not  just  moral  ones)  are  affected  by  the 
preferences  a  subject  morally  should  have.  However,  as  I  argue,  what’s  important  here  is  not  just  that  the  view  is  able  to 
take  into  account  multiple  agents’  interests,  nor  the  interests  that  any  one  agent  should  have,  but  the  interests  of  all 
those  agents  relevant  for  morality  itself. 
66   I’m  grateful  to  Hille  Paakkunainen  for  bringing  this  SSI  theorist  option  to  my  attention. 
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In this way, even if it is the amoralist’s belief that’s under evaluation, we would still think that                                   
there’s much at stake in holding the belief--it’s just that the costs of being wrong would concern the                                   
costs to these other's interests, instead of just the costs to the amoralist’s interests. Since, then, for                                 
any typical moral proposition many agents would have serious interests involved, the epistemic                         
standard  would  still  typically  be  quite  high.  67
Although this strategy has the advantage of being a very direct and straightforward way for                             
the SSI theorist to accommodate the amoralist, it also seems to face some disadvantages. The first,                               
and perhaps most obvious, is that it’s perplexing why another agent’s interests would affect whether                             
a subject knows or is justified in believing. That is, it seems quite counterintuitive to say, for                                 
example, that  your  interest in staying dry should affect whether  I’m  epistemically justified in                           
believing that it’s not going to rain (that is, why it would determine how low the probability of it                                     
going to rain needs to be for me, or whether I’m rational in acting as if it’s not going to rain), when                                           
I  have  no  interests  myself  in  staying  dry.   
Relatedly, it seems that although traditional SSI (which holds that it’s  just  the subject’s                           
interests that determine the epistemic standard) has a theoretical explanation for why it’s the                           
subject’s interests that determine the epistemic standard, there does not seem to be a similar                             
explanation for why other’s interests are included on this amended version of SSI. Although both                             68
67  Although  one  initial  thought  may  be  that  this  proposed  view  is  no  longer  a  version  of  SSI  (since  the  truth  of 
knowledge  ascriptions  would  no  longer  be  relative  to  the  subject’s  interests),  I  believe  this  worry  can  be  set  aside,  and  is 
not  central  to  the  issue  at  hand.  Rather,  I  aim  to  raise  issues  to  this  account,  whether  it  be  called  SSI  or  something  else. 
Moreover,  the  second  revisionary  option  I  outline  is  consistent  with  this  strict  way  of  understanding  SSI,  so  if  the 
reader  does  not  find  this  first  strategy  to  be  available  to  the  SSI  theorist,  they  may  read  ahead  to  consider  the  second 
option. 
68  Of  course,  contextualists  have  motivated  an  explanation  of  ‘epistemic  gatekeeping’  for  why  it’s  the  attributor’s 
interests  that  determine  the  epistemic  standard.  See  Henderson  (2009).  However,  unlike  contextualism  the  proposal 
here  doesn’t  hold  that  it’s  just  the  attributor,  but  rather  others  in  general  in  addition  to  the  subject.  Additionally,  this 
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Stanley and Fantl & McGrath seem to assume a kind of decision-theoretic framework in motivating                             
their respective SSI views (wherein agents rationally ought to do that which would maximize good                             
consequences for them), I believe that there is an additional explanation the SSI theorist can give for                                 
why it is the subject’s preferences that determine what’s rational for her to do, and so the subject’s                                   
interests that are relevant for determining the epistemic standard. According to this, what explains                           
that it is the subject’s interests that are relevant is that the hypothetical imperative is a (generally                                 
uncontroversial) rule of rationality: it says that in order to be rational, an agent ought to take the                                   
(best) means to their ends. In this way, acting as if p, when p’s being false is a serious possibility,                                       69
and where if p were false it would cost one a lot, would be a bad way to achieve one’s ends. In                                           
general, taking on large risks is not a good way to achieve one’s ends, and so is irrational; it only                                       
seems rational if one is very sure that the risk is going to turn out in one’s favor. This, though, is                                         
just what SSI holds: when the costs of being wrong are high, an agent needs a lot of evidence to rule                                         
out the possibility of not-p being true. Importantly, the hypothetical imperative does not say that in                               
order to be rational an agent ought to take the best means to  other’s ends. In this way, it would be                                         70
quite controversial to hold that it is a rule of rationality to take into account others’ interests. So,                                   
this amended SSI that holds that it’s not just the subject’s interests that determine the epistemic                               
standard  seems  to  have  some  explanatory  disadvantages. 
approach  seems  to  be  distinct  from  contextualism  as  it  is  still  not  a  semantic  thesis  about  epistemic  terms,  holding  that 
the  same  proposition  is  expressed  across  contexts  of  use. 
69  I  say  ‘generally  uncontroversial’  since  some  hold  that  there  are  additional  rules  of  rationality,  like  the  categorical 
imperative,  which  are  quite  contentious  as  rules  of  rationality. 
70  Interestingly,  it  seems  that  if  this  is  the  correct  explanation  the  SSI  theorist  ought  to  appeal  to--namely,  rules  of 
rationality--then  the  Kantian,  who  holds  that  the  categorical  imperative  is  a  rule  of  rationality,  has  the  same  principled 
reasoning  to  explain  why  it  is  other’s  interests  (and  not  just  the  subject’s)  that  determine  what  it’s  rational  to  do,  and  so 
the  epistemic  standard.  Unfortunately,  this  proposal  is  outside  the  scope  of  the  current  paper,  but  I  flag  it  here  for 
further  development. 
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The second way the SSI theorist could revise their theory, remember, would be to challenge                             
the assumption that if the subject is an amoralist, they have no practical interests in such moral                                 
beliefs. For example, one may take up a non-subjectivist theory of well-being. Additionally, the                           71
SSI theorist could do this by looking at those practical features of morality initially picked out and                                 
cited as what raises the epistemic standard for moral beliefs. One thing that could be said is that                                   
whatever the subject’s particular cares about being moral, they would at least always be one of the                                 
agents who is made vulnerable to such reactive attitudes by holding a moral belief. Provided that the                                 
agent cares not to be the subject of such unpleasant attitudes as indignation and resentment, she has                                 
a practical stake in coming to have the right moral beliefs. In general, it seems that provided that                                   
this agent is not completely isolated, the fact that she personally doesn’t care about morality doesn’t                               
make the fact that others care about her moral beliefs irrelevant: for these others could either help                                 
or hurt her ability to achieve the ends of her own personal non-moral projects. In these ways, even                                   
if the subject doesn’t care about morality, provided that they are not totally isolated from others the                                 
SSI theorist could still say that they have significant stakes in their moral beliefs. At the same time,                                   
though, this understanding of how others’ interests are relevant for fixing the standard is still                             
subject to a kind of contingency that some may find objectionable, for this account does not                               
guarantee that  every  moral context would generate a higher epistemic standard. Although on this                           
way of absolving the initial extensional worry SSI still strictly speaking holds that it is just one                                 
individual’s interests that are relevant for fixing the epistemic standard, they are able to maintain                             
that the epistemic standard would be high even for even for most of those individuals who are                                 
apathetic to morality, and high due to features of morality as a subject matter. Overall, while SSI is                                   
71   I’m  grateful  to  David  Sobel  for  bringing  this  option  to  my  attention. 
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still a promising account of the higher epistemic standard of moral beliefs, it does raise some                               
worries. 
4.3.  Moral  Contexts 
One thing to note about interest-contextualism is that it can in principle select for more                             
than just the utterer’s interests when selecting for the interests that function to make alternatives                             
relevant. Although as a contextualist the interest-contextualist must hold that the standard is fixed                           
relative to the context of utterance, exactly what the context of utterance selects for and how are                                 
open questions. More specifically, interest-contextualist views can be analyzed across two                     
dimensions: (a) the means by which the context of utterance selects for certain interests, and (b)                               
whose  interests  are  selected.  72
On a simple interest-contextualist view, the answer to (a) would be whoever is making the                             
knowledge attribution, and (b) would be the current speaker’s interests. However, as we’ve seen,                           
this is not a good account of the higher epistemic standard of moral beliefs. A more complex                                 
interest-contextualist can, however, incorporate additional agents’ interests such that the interests                     
selected for are those of a group. The interest-contextualist can do this by stipulating that with                               
respect to (a), the context of utterance selects for the interests relevant or attached to the project or                                   
question that’s salient in the context of utterance. So, for example, if the project that’s salient in the                                   
context of utterance is seeing the Cavs game tonight, and the utterance is “I know the game starts at                                     
6,” the interests selected are those that agents attach to the project (e.g. your and my interests in                                   
72  One  can  think  of  these  dimensions  as  mirroring  the  character  and  content  dimensions  of  demonstratives.  See  Kaplan 
(1989). 
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seeing the game). Under this variation of interest-contextualism, the greater the group’s interests in                           
the  contextually  salient  project,  the  higher  the  standard.    73
But the interest-contextualist does not need to settle for even this expansion of interests.                           
One interesting option available to the contextualist is to point to the kind of context one is in                                   
when making ascriptions of the epistemic status of moral beliefs: specifically, it is a  moral context.                               
Along this line, the interest-contextualist could claim that given the moral context, a particular                           
project or question is immediately made salient, namely the moral status of some action (e.g. that                               
φ-ing is morally permissible). In this case, in response to (a) the context would select for the                                 74
interests of those that are relevant for settling this moral question and general questions in the                               
moral domain. For (b) the interest-contextualist can say a number of things, but will ultimately                             
depend upon their first order moral theory. This is because whose interests are relevant in moral                               
contexts is a question about which agents or beings are relevant for settling moral questions, or the                                 
subject of moral obligations, which is just the question that first-order moral theories concern                           
themselves  with  as  theories  of  value  and  obligation.   
To see this, consider some examples. A consequentialist who takes happiness as of primary                           
value takes all beings that are capable of experiencing that value, namely sentient beings, as the                               
beings which are relevant for settling moral questions like what is right and wrong to do. Given                                 
this, a consequentialist would say for (b) that it is the interests of all sentient creatures. For a                                   
Kantian who held that it is rationality, or the ability to set and pursue ends, that is of ultimate value,                                       
the beings which are relevant for settling moral questions will be those who have this rational                               
73  See  McKenna  (2013)  for  this  view. 
74  This  feature  would  make  the  view  a  kind  of  flexible  contextualism.  See  Dowell  (2013)  and  (2011)  for  flexible 
contextualist  accounts  of  both  deontic  and  epistemic  modals  respectively. 
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capacity. Consequently, for (b) the Kantian would hold that it is the interests of rational agents. One                                 
interesting upshot of this account is that moral epistemology is strongly tied to first-order moral                             
theory, as how high the standard is set is ultimately a function of which beings are taken as morally                                     
relevant.   
In the end, this interest-contextualism variation seems extremely promising, for not only                       
would it be able to explain why the epistemic standard is higher for moral beliefs and avoid                                 
extensional worries, but it would be able to say that the higher epistemic standard is due to features                                   
of morality as a subject matter. As it faces less problems than the aforementioned variations of SSI,                                 75
it  is  the  more  promising  view. 
 
5.  Conclusion 
Many have noted an apparent asymmetry between moral and non-moral beliefs in several                         
epistemic domains, like testimony, disagreement, and expertise, wherein it seems harder for moral                         
beliefs to achieve the same kind of epistemic value or credit (justification, knowledge), that                           
non-moral beliefs seem to easily achieve in these domains. The only unifying account of this                             
asymmetry across these domains, and perhaps the most intuitively plausible explanation of them, is                           
that moral beliefs typically have a higher epistemic standard. However, even if we were to adopt                               
this explanation of the asymmetry, one large question remains: what functions to make the                           
epistemic  standard  higher  for  moral  beliefs? 
75   I’m  grateful  to  Janice  Dowell  for  bringing  this  contextualist  option  to  my  attention. 
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In this paper I’ve addressed just this question, searching for a theoretical account of the                             
higher epistemic standard for moral beliefs. In the end, I’ve put forth two promising theoretical                             
accounts of the higher epistemic standard of moral beliefs. After identifying several key practical                           
features of morality, I’ve argued that what is vital to providing such an account is having the                                 
practical interests tied to these features play a crucial role in fixing the epistemic standard. This                               
being said, I’ve shown that there are variations of both SSI and contextualism which can make these                                 
moral practical interests central to their views, arguing that there is one particular kind of                             
contextualist view that is the most promising. The views put forth are quite promising in their                               
ability to explain the higher epistemic standard of moral beliefs, attribute the higher standard to                             
features  of  morality  as  a  subject  matter,  and  meet  extensional  worries. 
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Chapter  3 
“Constructivism’s  Own  Epistemology” 
 
 
 
0.  Introduction 
Generally speaking, moral epistemology revolves around a realist metaethics. This may                     
seem obvious: after all, it is the realist who holds that there are moral facts, and so also the glimmer                                       
of hope of moral knowledge. Indeed, how we could ever come to have moral knowledge has been a                                   
concern for all realists, as one’s moral epistemology has been a prime site of objections to realist                                 
views, both naturalist and non-naturalist alike. For example, a non-skeptical moral epistemology                       76
has been thought of as problematic for non-naturalists who hold not only that the moral facts are                                 
mind-independent, but that they concern properties that are not natural: for how could we possibly                             
come  to  epistemically  grasp  these  facts  if  moral  properties  aren’t  causal?   
One metaethical position that has oddly received little attention from moral epistemologists,                       
and the one that will be of focus here, is constructivism. One reason it has received little attention is                                     
because it, like other mind-dependent views, seems to avoid epistemic problems that the realist                           
doesn’t. This, in fact, is one of the most attractive features of the view: given its account of the                                     
nature of moral facts, knowledge of them seems both readily attainable and straightforward. If,                           
though, the advantage mind-dependent views like constructivism have is epistemic, one needs to                         
have a moral epistemology on offer in order to make good on this enticing promise. In this paper, I                                     
76  See  Joyce  (2006),  Street  (2006),  Tropman  (2012). 
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will consider the epistemic prospects of the constructivist. I will argue that the constructivist’s                           
traditional moral epistemology, Reflective Equilibrium, is not the best moral epistemology on offer                         
for them. But, this should not dissuade one from constructivism, for I offer an alternative moral                               
epistemology that I argue avoids the specific issues of Reflective Equilibrium. Interestingly, on this                           
new model, moral epistemology is fundamentally social, in the sense that agents’ social                         
relations--namely, their interactions with other agents--directly determines the epistemic standing                   
of  their  moral  beliefs. 
The paper will proceed as follows: in section 1, I outline a broad characterization of                             
constructivism. In section 2, I survey the current favorite moral epistemology of constructivists,                         
Reflective Equilibrium, and the traditional issues it faces. Moreover, though, I argue that it faces an                               
unnoticed issue that should push constructivists towards a more fundamentally social moral                       
epistemology. In section 3 I provide such an alternative account, the Challenge-Response Model.                         77
After offering a few variations of the model, I argue that it avoids the problems that plague                                 
Reflective Equilibrium and offers a better account of how agents can come to have justified beliefs                               
of  the  moral  facts  as  the  constructivist  conceives  of  them. 
 
1.  Constructivism  and  Epistemic  Justification 
Most generally, constructivism is defined as the view that holds that certain normative                         
truths are not independent of a certain process or procedure: rather, they are the result of such a                                   
77 To be clear: my argument here is not that Reflective Equilibrium has insurmountable problems, and I do not take                                       
myself to be giving a definitive argument against it. Rather, my claim is that there is an alternative, unexplored moral                                       
epistemology on offer to the constructivist that should be more attractive to them, as it avoids the traditional problems                                     
Reflective  Equilibrium  faces. 
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process or procedure. More specifically, constructivism is often characterized as the view that holds                           
that certain normative truths are determined relative to what agents would decide on or agree to                               
under certain hypothetical choice situations. As a first order moral theory, the constructivist holds                           
that it is moral truths that are determined by this hypothetical choice scenario; as a metaethical                               
theory, the constructivist holds that it is all normative truths, including an agent’s reasons, that are                               
determined  by  such  a  hypothetical  choice  scenario.  
78
Of course, just how to characterize constructivism in ethics and metaethics is itself rife with                             
controversy. Sharon Street prefers an alternative characterization, arguing for a “practical                     
79
standpoint” characterization of constructivism over its proceduralist characterization. She holds                   
80
that constructivism is the view, broadly, that a certain set of normative judgments are true because                               
and only in so far as they withstand scrutiny from the standpoint of some other specified set of                                   
normative judgments. According to her, the difference between ethical (“restricted”) and                     
81
metaethical (“thoroughgoing”) constructivism is in the second the set of normative judgments: for                         
the ethical constructivist this is a particular subset of all of the agent's normative judgments,                             
whereas  for  the  metaethical  constructivist  it  is  all  of  the  agent’s  normative  judgments.     
82
For the purposes of this paper, I will be focusing on “restricted” constructivism--that is,                           
constructivism about moral facts only--and the more traditional proceduralist characterization.                   83
78  Here  I  am  following  Bagnoli  (2014)  in  her  initial  characterization  of  constructivism  in  ethics  and  metaethics. 
79  There is also the controversy of whether there is even a difference between ethical and metaethical constructivism, as                                     
some  hold  that  constructivism  is  not  a  legitimate  metaethical  view.  I  do  not  take  up  this  issue  here. 
80  Street  (2010). 
81  Street  (2008). 
82  Ibid. 
83 One reason I adopt the proceduralist characterization is that it is more commonplace, but, also, because the main                                     
reason Street cites for re-conceiving of constructivism though the practical-standpoint characterization is because the                           
latter characterization solves certain issues with constructivism as a distinct metaethical position; since I am focusing on                                 
60 
This view can generally be characterized as the view that certain moral truths are determined as the                                 
outputs of a certain hypothetical choice procedure. This constructivist view of the nature of                           84
morality opposes the realist by holding that the moral facts are not antecedently given to be                               
‘discovered’, but are rather the  result  of a certain procedure. At the same time, the view opposes the                                   
relativist by maintaining a sense of objectivity: it holds that the moral facts are those that all relevant                                   
rational  agents  would  settle  on  or  accept  through  the  procedure.  85
One notable constructivist view is Scanlon’s. According to his view, moral rightness and                         86
wrongness and determined by principles of conduct adopted by agents given certain constraints on                           
their procedure of choice of the principles itself. Put more simply, an action is wrong if it violates a                                     
principle of conduct that no one could reasonably reject. In this way, what we are ultimately seeking                                 
is justifiability to others (more particularly, that our actions are justifiable to others on grounds they                               
could not reasonably reject). Importantly, the agents who must not reasonably reject the principles                           
which determine the moral status of our actions are also constrained: these aren’t just any agents,                               
but rather those who antecedently take certain things as reasons, specifically those who take there                             
to be reason to live with others on grounds that they couldn’t reasonably reject, and who are,                                 
themselves, reasonable. In this way, the particular principles which determine the moral facts                         
(what’s right and what’s wrong) are selected through a choice procedure that’s constrained by (1)                             
who’s involved in the choosing (agents who take there to be reason to live with others and are                                   
constructivism as an first-order ethical position, there’s no particular reason to adopt the practical standpoint                             
characterization. 
84 I say “certain moral truths” because not all moral constructivists take themselves to be providing an account of all                                       
moral truths, but rather a subset of them. For example, Scanlon (1998) takes himself to be providing an account of the                                         
class  of  moral  truths  that  concern  “what  we  owe  to  each  other”. 
85 I say all relevant agents because, as we will see, the class of agents who are appropriate for conducting the procedure                                           
typically  picks  out  agents  with  certain  normative  commitments,  and  so  differs  amongst  constructivist  views. 
86  Scanlon  (1998). 
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themselves reasonable) and (2) the basis of the choice of principles (they must be ones no one of (1)                                     
could  reasonably  reject). 
On this picture of what the moral facts are like, how do we come to be epistemically justified                                   
in holding certain moral beliefs? This question is difficult and interesting for the moral                           
epistemologist for a few reasons. First, unlike subjectivist mind-dependent views, the moral facts                         
aren’t relative to an  individual’s  own moral outlook or point of view, and, as such, wouldn’t be                                 
accessible by internal reflection. This is because the moral facts are determined by a certain group of                                 
agents’ joint agreement or decision. Secondly, unlike conventionalist or relativist mind-dependent                     
views, the moral facts aren’t relative to any  actual groups’ direct outlook or practical point of view,                                 
and so wouldn’t be available by group data-gathering methods like censuses or polls (that is, we                               
could not just conglomerate individuals’ reports). This is because, remember, the moral facts are the                             
output of a certain constrained or idealized procedure run by a certain group of idealized agents, not                                 
just the summation or average of a group of individual’s opinions. Lastly, unlike the realist, the                               
constructivist doesn’t think that the moral facts are robustly mind-independent, antecedently given                       
and therefore there to be discovered, but rather are the result of this hypothetical joint choice                               
procedure. Given this, realist accounts wherein we intuit or perceive the moral truth wouldn’t seem                             
to grant us the kind of access we need to these facts. But, at the same time, the constructivist does                                       
think  that  there  are  moral  facts  that  thus  moral  knowledge  to  be  had.   
One moral epistemology that is supposed to make knowledge of the moral facts and justified                             
moral beliefs given their constructivist characterization available is Reflective Equilibrium. In the                       
next section, I will argue that Reflective Equilibrium faces several significant issues, the most trying                             
62 
of which should leave the constructivist wanting for a different, more fundamentally social, moral                           
epistemology. 
 
2.  Reflective  Equilibrium 
Reflective Equilibrium is perhaps the most popular alternative to foundationalist moral                     
epistemologies. As such an alternative, Reflective Equilibrium rejects the foundationalist’s claim                     
that some moral beliefs are automatically justified, and therefore serve as the basis of justification                             
for other beliefs. Instead, Reflective Equilibrium holds that all moral beliefs are justified in virtue of                               
their standing or relation to other moral (and non-moral) beliefs, namely whether they cohere with                             
them. One of Reflective Equilibrium’s main advantages is its ability to avoid having to posit some                               
sort of special sense or faculty with which we can come to grasp these self-evident and directly                                 
justified foundational beliefs, thus providing a simple epistemology for domains where we seem to                           
lack perceptual access to the facts. As a process, Reflective Equilibrium describes the way such                             
justification is gained, by working back and forth between our judgment or intuition on a particular                               
case and a principle that’s appealed to in support of the particular judgment. In this way, the                                 
ultimate goal is stability through mutual revision of particular moral judgments or intuitions on                           
concrete cases and overarching moral principles until coherence is reached. Overall, then, Reflective                         
Equilibrium serves as both an account by which to assess whether moral beliefs are justified (when                               
coherency is reached), and as an outline for a process by which to come to have justified moral                                   
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beliefs (work back and forth between revising your initial judgments and principles until coherency                           
is  reached).    87
There are two forms of Reflective Equilibrium: narrow and wide. On the narrow view, S is                               
justified in holding a moral belief p just in case p coheres with S’s other moral beliefs (q, r, s), where                                         
the process is that of mutual revision of one’s particular moral judgments and the moral principles                               
one appeals to in making such judgments until coherency amongst all of the agent’s moral                             
judgments and principles is reached. On the wide view, S is justified in holding a moral belief p just                                     
in case p coheres with not just the principles the agent endorses (q, r, s), but also with leading                                     
alternative moral principles (x, y, z); the process, then, is that of mutual revision of one’s particular                                 
moral judgments and the leading moral principles, including those that one does not antecedently                           
endorse,  until  coherency  is  reached  amongst  this  wide  set  of  beliefs.  88
This model of epistemic justification is perhaps most widely endorsed by constructivists.                       89
The question remains, though, how Reflective Equilibrium would secure epistemic justification for                       
the constructivist. First, given the constructivist characterization of the moral facts, they are                         
non-perceptual, and so not available via perception. But, remember here that Reflective                       
Equilibrium has traditionally been hailed as an uncomplicated epistemology that gives us access to                           
facts that aren’t perceptually accessible. On this picture, we don’t need any special sense or faculty,                               
but can rather get in touch with the facts by using our powers of reflection and rational capacities to                                     
resolve inconsistencies amongst our beliefs and bring them into coherence with one another. And,                           
87 Of course, there are controversies about how to cash out the details of the method of Reflective Equilibrium (see Cath                                         
(2016)).  I  will  not  address  these  here,  since  my  objections  to  the  method  are  general. 
88  Here  I  am  following  Rawls’  (1974)  notion  of  Wide  Reflective  Equilibrium. 
89 See, for example, Rawls (1971), and Scanlon (2003), who goes so far as to say that it is the only viable method for                                               
coming  to  have  justified  moral  beliefs. 
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by using wide Reflective Equilibrium and considering alternative moral viewpoints, we thereby                       
come to partially represent the constructivist procedure that determines the moral facts itself.                         
Considering viewpoints that differ from our own and seeking agreement amongst them mimics the                           
way in which a multitude of agents with different starting values and moral points of view come to                                   
agree on a set of moral principles, and thus could be said to reliably track them. So, Reflective                                   
Equilibrium seems to provide a metaphysically uncomplicated and unmysterious procedure that                     
tracks  the  moral  truth  by  resembling  the  hypothetical  procedure  that  constructs  it.   
But one may wonder whether, although Reflective Equilibrium has been widely endorsed, it                         
really is the best epistemic methodology for the constructivist. For example, one may doubt that the                               
process itself would be able to serve as an adequately reliable guide to the moral truth. As a species                                     
of a traditional objection against coherency accounts of justification, this objection argues that given                           
our initial starting points, mutual revision and coherency constraints can only bring us so far: if we                                 
start with outlandish particular judgments and principles that run very far afield from the moral                             
truth it’s doubtful that merely seeking stability between these judgments will deliver us as far as we                                 
need to go. Rather, it seems quite possible to have a set of moral beliefs that are in complete                                     
coherence  with  one  another,  but  yet  where  they  are  all  false.  Garbage  in,  garbage  out.    90
In a similar vein, one may object to the weight--small and initial though it may be--that’s                               
given to our initial judgments or intuitions: that is, that insofar as the goal of Reflective Equilibrium                                 
is coherency, there’s some reason to bring the set of principles into coherence with one’s initial                               
90 See Klein and Warfield (1994) for an initial article on this objection. Kelly and McGrath (2010) pose a version of this                                           
objection given an interpretation of what qualifies as an initial judgment, only in reverse: they argue that the problem                                     
with Reflective Equilibrium is that one could fall too far from one’s initial starting point, i.e., that one could start with a                                           
relatively  on  track  or  reasonable  judgment  but  arrive  at  a  judgment  that  is  unreasonable  by  the  end  of  the  process. 
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judgment. One may think that our initial unexamined intuitions should be granted no weight, given                             
that they are most likely the result and reflection of particular cultural upbringings and biases.                             
Given these reasons to doubt their epistemic credibility, simply bringing these judgments which                         
lack credibility into coherence with others doesn’t somehow suddenly make any of these beliefs                           
themselves credible. Rather, if these initial judgments or intuitions are corrupt, we shouldn’t seek to                             
cohere any of our other beliefs or principles--which may not be corrupt--to them. Rather, it seems                               
we’d be epistemically better off and closer to the truth giving these initial judgments or intuitions                               
no  weight.  91
Although these are all issues with Reflective Equilibrium that pertain to it as a species of a                                 
coherentist account of justification, there is another issue that’s gone unnoticed that concerns the                           
constructivist’s endorsement of Reflective Equilibrium in particular. Remember here that one of the                         
issues that constructivists faced in securing epistemic justification is that internal reflection seemed                         
to be an unavailable epistemic procedure for getting in touch with the moral facts given the                               
constructivist’s commitments of the metaphysical basis of these facts: namely, that they aren’t                         
relative to an  individual’s  own outlook or moral point of view, but are rather determined by the                                 
agreement of a certain  group  of hypothetical agents who have differing moral perspectives and                           
values. But, the methodology of Reflective Equilibrium just is internal reflection: individual agents                         
are to internally reflect on their own beliefs, inspecting them for inconsistencies and revising them                             
91 See Brandt (1979) and Hare (1973) for early versions of this objection. Some proponents of the view have since                                       
argued that Reflective Equilibrium is best understood as holding that one’s initial set of beliefs are already somewhat                                   
justified in light of this objection; however, this makes Reflective Equilibrium a kind of moderate foundationalism (see                                 
Cath (2016)). My objections here concern the traditional understanding of Reflective Equilibrium as a coherentist                             
model  of  epistemic  justification,  and  so  I  won’t  consider  this  variation  of  the  model  here. 
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to reach optimal coherency. The problem, to put it simply, is this: Reflective Equilibrium ignores                             
the  social  dimension  of  the  metaphysical  procedure  and  its  epistemic  importance.   
Now, to be fair, Reflective Equilibrium does try to account for the social aspect of the                               
constructivist’s procedure in its wide version, where individual agents must bring their judgments                         
into coherence with not just their own but also alternative moral principles. However, we should                             
doubt whether considering alternative moral viewpoints that could possibly be upheld by others in                           
the way wide Reflective Equilibrium conceives of it adequately represents this social dimension of                           
the constructivist procedure, and thereby sufficiently puts agents in a position for their moral                           
beliefs  to  gain  justification  or  knowledge.   
One reason to doubt this is by considering whether representing others’ alternative moral                         
viewpoints from one’s own perspective is really an accurate way to capture these alternative                           
viewpoints. In general, it seems that one should worry that agents will be uncharitable,                           
unsympathetic or biased in these representations of alternative viewpoints given that one disagrees                         
with them, or that one will misrepresent them given one’s lack of understanding of that moral                               
perspective. But this concern goes beyond the issue of general human fallibility and finds deep roots                               
in  non-ideal  facts  about  the  actual  world. 
Elizabeth Anderson has recently argued that this phenomenon of misrepresenting the moral                       
outlooks and perspectives of others is very real, especially in circumstances of power imbalances                           
between social groups. In her essay “The Social Epistemology of Morality: Learning from the                           
Forgotten History of the Abolition of Slavery,” she notes actual historical cases where groups                           
misunderstood and therefore misrepresented other groups’ conception and meaning of certain                     
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shared moral concepts. One example she focuses on is that of “freedom”. In her analysis, Anderson                               92
explains that during emancipation whites and former slaves had very different understandings of                         
what freedom for former slaves meant and entailed. For whites, it meant opting in for wage labor                                 
that produced surplus value and working long hours so as to maximize profit. However, former                             
slaves conceptualized what it was to be free quite differently: they prioritized self-direction and                           
self-government wherein one could decide for oneself how long and hard one worked, and to what                               
end, where the end valued most was typically subsistence that allowed for leisure time over profit.                               
Given this difference in conceptualization of freedom and its value, most whites concluded that                           
former  slaves  were  lazy  and  didn’t  properly  understand  or  value  freedom.  93
This actual case of misrepresenting others’ moral outlooks should cast serious doubt on                         
actual agents’ general abilities to accurately represent alternative moral outlooks. This is especially                         
true when determining the epistemic status of actual agents’ moral beliefs, since it is in the actual                                 
non-ideal world that social hierarchies exist. As Anderson notes, her examination of these cases                           
show  that  “power  makes  people  morally  blind.  It  stunts  their  moral  imagination  .  .  .”.    94
Insofar as wide Reflective Equilibrium falsely assumes agents’ abilities to accurately                     
represent alternative moral viewpoints, it’s a faulty method for agents to secure epistemic                         
justification. The exact way in which it is faulty depends on whether or not Reflective Equilibrium                               
requires the agent’s representation of alternative leading moral principles needs to be accurate or                           
not. If there is no accuracy constraint on the alternative moral principles the agent is representing,                               
then the method of Reflective Equilibrium is too weak: it would be the case that the agent could                                   
92  Anderson  (2016). 
93  Ibid.,  pp.  11-12. 
94  Ibid.,  p.15. 
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successfully complete the process, reaching a state of equilibrium between her initial starting beliefs                           
and these alternative principles, but yet the beliefs that she ends up with would intuitively lack                               
justification. Alternatively, the proponent of Reflective Equilibrium might want to embrace an                       
accuracy constraint on the representation of the alternative principles so as to avoid this issue of                               
generating false positive judgments of justification. If so, though, the process does not even get off                               
the ground: for, given the lesson learned from Anderson’s work, agents will be hard pressed to                               
accurately represent others’ moral viewpoints, nevertheless bring their own beliefs into equilibrium                       
with them. Either way, then, Reflective Equilibrium faces significant issues in securing epistemic                         
justification  for  the  constructivist. 
Given the general problems Reflective Equilibrium faces as an account of epistemic                       
justification for moral beliefs, and the particular issue it faces in securing epistemic justification for                             
the constructivist, it seems as though the constructivist has failed to secure one of its biggest                               
strengths: namely, a straightforward and uncomplicated moral epistemology. But, constructivism                   
shouldn’t be abandoned yet, provided that there is an alternative moral epistemology on offer to the                               
constructivist that avoids the problems Reflective Equilibrium faces and better secures the promise                         
of epistemic justification. One lesson to draw from the issue Anderson shows with representing                           
others’ moral viewpoints is that the best way to get an accurate representation of these viewpoints is                                 
to go straight to the source: to have those who actually take up those alternative viewpoints                               
represent their position themselves. With regards to building an account of epistemic justification                         
for the constructivist, this would amount to building in a criteria of engaging with actual others                               
who have moral viewpoints which differ from one’s own. In the next section, I will provide such an                                   
alternative account for the constructivist that takes this dimension of social engagement as                         
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foundational for securing epistemic justification for moral beliefs, and thus, I will argue, better                           
secures  epistemic  justification  for  the  constructivist.  95
 
3.  Constructivism’s  Own  Epistemology:  The  Challenge-Response  Model 
3.1.  Overview 
If one were to survey views of epistemic justification one likely wouldn’t come across the                             
Challenge-Response model. Introduced in 1971 by Carl Wellman, the view has unfortunately                       
dropped out of conversations in epistemology regarding justification. Although it may be debatable                         
how promising it is as an account of epistemic justification in general, I will argue that it is a                                     
promising account of epistemic justification for moral beliefs in particular, given the constructivist’s                         
moral  metaphysics. 
Very generally, the view holds that what determines whether an agent has an epistemically                           
justified belief depends on whether they can adequately respond to or meet challenges or objections                             
made to their belief by others. According to Wellman, challenges are claims that are taken to be                                 
threatening or upsetting by the agent to her belief, and are “necessarily directed at someone on                               
some occasion . . . [and so are] relative to the person for whom it is a challenge and the occasion on                                           
which it is a challenge”. Wellman characterizes responses as claims that would reassure and thus                             96
be accepted by the person who issued the challenge; a response is adequate just in case anyone who                                   
95 Again, to be clear, my claim is not that I have provided a thorough refutation of Reflective Equilibrium, or that                                         
epistemic justification is made impossible on Reflective Equilibrium, but rather that it faces serious issues and should                                 
leave us wanting for a better account that circumvents these problems. In what follows, my claim is that the alternative                                       
account  I  provide,  the  Challenge-Response  Model,  is  a  better  epistemology  for  the  constructivist. 
96  Wellman  (1971,  pp.122-3). 
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understood both the challenge and response and is thinking rationally would withhold the                         
challenge. Although Wellman puts forth his particular Challenge-Response model as a model of                         97
epistemic justification for moral beliefs, David Annis also put forth a version of a                           
Challenge-Response model, but for epistemic justification in general. On his particular model, an                         
agent has an epistemically justified belief just in case they are able to meet certain objections, where                                 
these objects are relative to and determined by certain epistemic goals. Objections must be                           
expressions of real doubt issued by a certain objector-group on an actual occasion, which is                             
determined by the epistemic goals in the context. In order to adequately meet an objection, the                               98
agent must respond in a way that the members of the objector group withdraw their original claim                                 
as a challenge (that is, they no longer maintain their expression of doubt regarding the agent’s                               
belief).   
Overall, the view can be characterized as a kind of social contextualism. It is a kind of                                 
contextualism because the challenges or objections that an agent needs to respond to aren’t                           
invariant but rather relative to particular contexts. It is social because whether or not one’s belief                               
comes to have a certain epistemic status (being justified) directly depends on how one interacts with                               
other agents: objections don’t exist in abstraction but are issued by particular agents on particular                             
occasions, and responses are assessed by what states they would bring about in other agents                             
(whether  they  assuage  the  doubt  of  other  agents). 
3.2.  Filling  in  the  Details 
97  Ibid.,  122. 
98  Annis  (1978),  pp.213-4. 
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In adopting a variation of the Challenge-Response model of epistemic justification for the                         
constructivist we want to keep in mind the issue that Reflective Equilibrium faced with respect to                               
representing others’ differing moral viewpoints. One way to address this issue would be to adopt a                               
version that most closely resembles the metaphysical basis of the moral facts for the constructivist,                             
taking quite seriously the aspects of the view that are most procedural. In other words, if the moral                                   
facts are determined by idealized agents jointly deliberating by exchanging considerations for and                         
against certain moral principles, then our Challenge-Response model of epistemic justification for                       
moral beliefs would require that actual agents engage in issuing and responding to challenges made                             
to their belief in order to have a justified belief. On this model, it would only be the case that actual                                         
agents have justified moral beliefs if they have  actually  received objections and successfully                         
responded to them, as this challenge-response process would be the way by which we come to gain                                 
justification. 
At this point, the picture of epistemic justification put forth begins to sound a bit                             
implausible. For it seems that one’s belief having a certain epistemic status--being justified--should                         
at least theoretically be distinct from the  act of justifying one’s belief. In fact, this is a common                                   
objection against the Challenge-Response model as an account of epistemic justification: it confuses                         
being justified with the  act of justifying. Even if this weren’t to trouble one too much, though, other                                   
problems follow: for it seems as though it would easily be the case that although one hasn’t ever                                   
actually been challenged by others in holding the moral beliefs that one does, one could still be                                 
epistemically justified in holding them. That is, it seems that if an agent could successfully respond                               
to challenges made by others, but just happens not to come across any others that do in fact                                   
challenge her belief, we shouldn’t hold it against her--we shouldn’t deny her beliefs the status of                               
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being epistemically justified. Maintaining that agents must actually go through the                     
challenge-response process in order to have epistemically justified moral beliefs would lead us into                           
an  implausible  or  undesirable  kind  of  skepticism. 
This thought about what agents  could  do suggests a variation of the Challenge-Response                         
Model that less directly resembles the constructivist’s metaphysical process, but nevertheless takes                       
seriously the lesson learned from how wide Reflective Equilibrium fails. On this variation, it’s not                             
that an agent must actually go through the process of receiving challenges and adequately                           
responding to others for every one of their moral beliefs to be justified, but rather that they just                                   
have the  ability to do so. More specifically, in order to determine whether an agent in the actual                                   
world had a justified moral belief, we would look to possible worlds in which the agent is                                 
challenged, and determine whether or not she is able to adequately respond to the challenges made                               
to  her  in  those  possible  worlds.   
In this way, in assessing whether agents currently have justified moral beliefs the                         
constructivist should adopt a counterfactual variation of the Challenge-Response Model which is                       
available: 
Counterfactual Challenge-Response Model: an agent S is epistemically justified in                   
believing some moral belief p just in case they have the ability to successfully                           
undergo the challenge-response process (that is, that in the nearest by possible                       
world  where  they  are  challenged  by  others  they  adequately  respond  to  them). 
 
As a constructivist we shouldn’t yet be satisfied with this account of epistemic justification,                           
though. This is because as the Counterfactual Model is currently spelled out, it is vastly                             
underdescribed. We still need to say what this ability consists in or requires, which challenges or                               
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objections are those that must be adequately responded to (for obviously requiring that an agent be                               
able to respond to every challenge imaginable is much too strict to avoid skepticism), as well as                                 
what an adequate response consists in and which agents one must adequately respond to in order to                                 
have an epistemically justified moral belief. The aim of this section is to clarify these parameters of                                 
the  account. 
Let’s start with filling in the notion of this ability. How are we to understand what this                                 
ability to respond to the challenges of others amounts to? What needs to be true of the agent in                                     
order for it to be the case that they have this ability? Even though what is important in determining                                     
whether an agent’s moral belief is epistemically justified is what is going on in nearby possible                               
worlds (whether the agent successfully responds to the challenges presented to her there), it seems                             
that the agent will nevertheless need to have certain features or meet certain conditions in the                               
actual world in order to plausibly be said to have this ability and thereby achieve these                               
challenge-response tasks in nearby possible worlds. For example, in order to truly say that I have                               
the ability to make a half court shot in basketball--that in some nearby possible world I do so--when                                   
I’ve never done so in the actual world, certain things need to be the case about me in the actual                                       
world. Plausibly, it would need to be that I have good aim and have thrown the basketball long                                   
distances, that I’ve practiced and succeeded at making other long-distance shots. It would be quite                             
implausible to say that I have the ability to make a half-court shot when in the actual world I can’t                                       
even make a three-point shot. Without having practiced and developed in the actual world the                             
constitutive skills required to make a half-court shot, one cannot truly say that one has the ability to                                   
make a half-court shot (that in some nearby possible world one makes such a shot). Abilities don’t                                 
just appear out of nowhere, but need to be trained up. Likewise, in order to truly say that one has                                       
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the ability to adequately respond to the challenges of others--that in nearby possible worlds one                             
actually does this--it would plausibly have to be the case that the agent has already exercised and                                 
trained up her response muscles in the actual world. Put more literally: it would have to be the case                                     
that the agent has practiced engaging with and responded to the challenges of objecting others in                               
the actual world. So, while the counterfactual Challenge-Response model doesn’t hold agents                       
captive to having to run through the challenge and response process for every belief in order for                                 
that belief to be epistemically justified (focusing on the ability instead), it nevertheless would seem                             
to  require  that  actual  agents  directly  engage  with  others  in  the  actual  world  to  a  certain  degree. 
This way of understanding the ability involved in the Counterfactual Challenge-Response                     
Model shows how, like Reflective Equilibrium, it is an account both for epistemic assessment (for                             
determining when moral beliefs are justified) and of a process (how to go about making one’s moral                                 
beliefs justified). As an account of epistemic assessment, it holds that agents’ moral beliefs are                             
epistemically justified just in case in the nearest by possible world where they are challenged by                               
others they are able to adequately respond to them. As an account of the process by which to gain                                     
justification, it holds that an agent should go about engaging with actual others with alternative                             
moral  viewpoints,  running  through  the  challenge-response  procedure  itself. 
We should now try to get clearer on what exactly a challenge or objection is. Most                               
minimally, a challenge or objection is a claim that disputes the truth of the belief, or is an expression                                     
of doubt of the truth of the belief. A more theoretically robust way to characterize a challenge or                                   
object is as a certain kind of epistemic possibility, or, more specifically, a way the world could be                                   
where one’s belief would be false. To use a non-moral example: if my belief was that I had hands                                     
because I perceive myself having hands, a challenge would be that I am being deceived by an evil                                   
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demon. As a moral example, if my belief was that abortion is morally permissible because fetuses                               
aren’t persons, a challenge would be that fetuses are persons. This way of characterizing challenges                             
stays true to the heart of the Challenge-Response model, as talk of these kinds of epistemic                               
possibilities  is  central  to  contextualist  views  in  epistemology.    99
The next question is what an adequate response consists in. Both Wellman and Annis have                             
explicitly put forth answers to this question. For Wellman, it involves the attitudes of the agents in                                 
the objector group when they are suitably idealized: that is, that if these agents were rational, they                                 
would rescind their challenge, or, in other words, no longer find the possibility to be a serious                                 
threat to one’s belief. Likewise, for Annis, it requires having the agents in the objector group                               100
reject the challenge as a challenge or otherwise recognize “the diminished status of [the objection]                             
as an objection.” One more theoretically robust way to think about this is just that the ideally                                 101
rational agents in the objector group need to assign a sufficiently low probability to the epistemic                               
possibility  that  serves  as  the  challenge  or  objection. 
Having clarified what the ability requires, what a challenge is, and what an adequate                           
response is, the fundamental question is which possibilities are relevant--in other words, which                         
challenges must one respond to in order to have an epistemically justified moral belief? Fortunately,                             
a lot of work has been devoted to determining a related question in contemporary epistemology                             
that utilizes talk of epistemic standards, like contextualism. Contextualists hold that the epistemic                         
status an agent’s belief has (e.g. justified) is determined by features of the context. They have offered                                 
various accounts of relevancy: on some, a possibility is made relevant if it is attended to by the utter;                                     
99  See  especially  Timmons’  (2004)  contextualist  moral  epistemology,  as  well  as  Dular  (unpublished  manuscript). 
100  Wellman  (1971),  p.  126. 
101  Annis  (1978),  p.  214. 
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on others, relevancy is a matter of being entered into the conversational score. For one variation,                               102
the Challenge-Response model can take its cue from a contextualist model wherein relevancy is a                             
matter of common ground. Common ground is just what is mutually believed or accepted by                             
multiple agents. One way of filling in the details of relevancy of objections is to start by                                 103
considering what’s part of the moral common ground between subjects and speakers: that is, what                             
the shared or accepted values or value systems are between the agent justification is or isn’t being                                 
attributed to, and the agent doing the attributing. This then determines which objector group is                             
relevant: it is whatever group of people either have or lack common ground (i.e. accepted value or                                 
value systems) with the subject. Once the relevant objector group is determined, the most simple                             
picture of relevant objections would hold that these are whatever objections are issued from the                             
relevant objector group. Put more simply, on this common ground variation we would stipulate                           
how similar or different the value systems of objectors need to be from the subject, and then hold                                   
that in order to have a justified moral belief, the subject must adequately respond to whatever                               
objections  this  objector  group  would  put  forth. 
When determining how similar or different the value systems of the objectors need to be                             
from the subject using a common ground framework, one plausible constraint would be to say that                               
those values or value systems that are mutually denied between subject and speaker do  not need to                                 
be responded to. This constraint mimics the commonsensical contextualist motivation against                     
skepticism, which is that if neither subject nor speaker are considering skeptical scenarios, these                           
scenarios aren’t relevant, and so a subject need not be able to rule them out in order for their belief                                       
102  See  Lewis  (1979)  and  (1996),  Goldman  (1976),  and  Dretske  (1970)  as  examples  of  these  general  contextualist 
approaches. 
103 See Stalnaker (2002). I’m grateful to Matthias Jenny for suggesting such a way of understanding relevancy within the                                     
Challenge-Response  model. 
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to gain the relevant kind of epistemic credit. Given this constraint, this variation would secure the                               
commonsensical thought that when both the subject and speaker are, for example, anti-racist, the                           
subject need not respond to objections from white supremacists. At the same time, it seems that                               
when subject and speaker diverge on their shared values, justification should become more difficult                           
to achieve, as the objections should broaden. Given this, another constraint can be added: the                             
subject must respond to values or value systems that are upheld by the speaker, including those                               
shared by the subject (which will usually be easily met), and those not shared by the subject. This                                   
means that when, for example, an animals rights activist is being assessed by a non-animal rights                               
activist, the animals rights activist would need to be able to respond to objections from non-animal                               
rights activists. So, for example, if the animal rights activist had the moral belief that eating meat is                                   
morally impermissible, they would need to be able to respond to the objection from the non-animal                               
rights  activist  that  animals  aren’t  a  part  of  the  moral  community. 
But there is another alternative variation of the Challenge-Response model one could                       
choose. On this model, which possibilities are relevant are determined by the practical stakes                           
involved in holding the belief. More particularly, if the epistemic possibility, if true, would affect the                               
relevant subject’s or subjects’ preference ordering of actions to do, then it is relevant, or, on this                                 
model, is a claim that the agent must adequately respond to. If we adopt this account of how                                   104
epistemic possibilities are determined as relevant, then the question of who the relevant objectors                           
or objector group is becomes the question of whose practical interests are relevant. Here the                             
constructivist has a number of options: for example, they can say all sentient creatures, or all agents,                                 
104  For  such  stakes  models  regarding  epistemic  justification  and  knowledge  within  non-moral  epistemology,  see  Fantl  & 
McGrath  (2002),  (2007)  and  (2009),  and  Stanley  (2005).  For  a  stakes  model  for  moral  beliefs  specifically,  see  Dular 
(unpublished  manuscript). 
78 
or those agents who whose lives would be affected by the belief if it were acted on, or the agents                                       
who are included in the constructivist procedure itself (e.g. agents who take there to be reason to                                 
live  with  others  and  are  themselves  reasonable),  etc. 
Having answered these questions, we can now sketch each version of the                       
Challenge-Response  Model: 
Counterfactual Common Ground Challenge-Response Model: an agent S is                 
epistemically justified in believing some moral belief p just in case in the closest                           
possible world where S is presented with a set of alternative possibilities issued by an                             
objector group which includes the speaker and whose values partially but not                       
completely overlap with S, S responds in such a way as to make the agents in the                                 
objector group assign a sufficiently low probability to these alternative possibilities.                   
 105
Counterfactual Stakes Challenge-Response Model: an agent S is epistemically                 
justified in believing some moral belief p just in case in the closest possible world                             
where S is presented with a set of alternative possibilities issued by some agent(s)                           
wherein if these counterpossibilities were to be true, it would affect the preference                         
orderings of any or all these agents, S responds in such a way as to make these agents                                   
that presented S with these alternative possibilities assign a sufficiently low                     
probability  to  them. 
 
3.3.  A  Better  Model 
Now equipped with an understanding of the Challenge-Response Model, we should                     
evaluate it against Reflective Equilibrium. It is not my purpose here to defend the                           
Challenge-Response Model as the correct model of epistemic justification in general, nor the                         
correct model of epistemic justification for moral beliefs in general, although it does have my                             
sympathies. Rather, the question that we now face is why this account of epistemic justification                             
105 There are, of course, more details to be worked out on this model, e.g. what determines closeness of worlds, and thus                                           
the exact degree of similarity between the subject’s and speaker’s/objector group’s moral viewpoints. I am not going to                                   
address  these  questions  here,  but  rather  leave  them  for  further  development. 
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would be fitting for the constructivist’s moral epistemology in particular. Does it face the same                             
epistemic objections? Does it better secure epistemic justification given the constructivist’s moral                       
metaphysics? 
First, let’s consider how the model fares against the traditional objections to Reflective                         
Equilibrium. Remember that the two classic objections to Reflective Equilibrium are given in virtue                           
of Reflective Equilibrium being a coherentist view. First, there’s the “garbage in, garbage out”                           
objection, which holds that the procedure can’t secure that our beliefs will come to be any closer to                                   
the truth by merely bringing them into coherence with the rest of our beliefs. Second, there is the                                   
objection that our initial judgments or intuitions should be given no weight given that they are                               
most likely the product and reflection of our particular upbringing and biases, and thus that there’s                               
no reason to bring our beliefs into coherence with them. Given that these are traditional objections                               
against coherentist accounts, the Challenge-Response model does not face them, as it is a                           
contextualist account. More particularly, coherency is not a constraint or marker of success on the                             
Challenge-Response Model. One’s moral beliefs aren’t any more justified because they are in                         
coherence with one’s other moral beliefs: rather, the justification of one’s moral beliefs is                           
determined based on the adequacy of one’s responses (or, more particularly, the ability for one to                               
give such responses). In this way, the Challenge-Response model embraces external--not just                       
internal--constraints on epistemic justification. Additionally, talk of initial judgments hold no place                       
on the Challenge-Response Model: if one is unable to respond to the relevant objections, then one’s                               
moral belief is not justified, and one has no reason to bring one’s other moral beliefs into                                 
conformity with it. Moreover, this model importantly maintains one of the main advantages of                           
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Reflective Equilibrium: namely, it provides an uncomplicated and straightforward method, not                     
positing  any  kind  of  special  faculty  or  sense. 
However, even if the Challenge-Response Model avoids the classic coherentist objections                     
against Reflective Equilibrium, it remains indeterminate whether it secures epistemic justification                     
given the constructivist’s characterization of the moral facts. Remember here that Reflective                       
Equilibrium’s attempt to secure epistemic justification didn’t adequately represent the social                     
dimension of the constructivist procedure, as it is, in the end, a form of internal reflection. More                                 
particularly, the issue was that its process of individual agents considering alternative moral                         
viewpoints that could possibly be upheld by others by representing these alternative viewpoints                         
themselves  appears  to  be  prone  to  errors  of  misrepresentation,  and  thus  non-truth  tracking. 
The Challenge-Response Model, though, appears to do much better on this front, for the                           
model is fundamentally social, in the sense that one’s social relations directly determine the                           
epistemic standing of one’s moral beliefs. More particularly, the Challenge-Response Model doesn’t                       
require that an agent represent others’ moral perspectives, but instead has these others represent                           
their own moral perspectives, where the epistemic standing of an agent’s moral beliefs is                           
determined with respect to whether they adequately respond to these others in nearby possible                           
worlds. Since it does not require that agents represent others’ moral viewpoints, there is no risk of                                 
misrepresentation  of  the  kind  Reflective  Equilibrium  is  prone  to.   
However, one may think that although the Challenge-Response Model doesn’t explicitly                     
require representing others’ moral viewpoints, it nevertheless entails it given its outline of the                           
process by which to come to have justified moral beliefs. This is because, one may think, in order                                   
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for agents to have the ability to adequately respond to the challenges of others, they would need to                                   
represent the objections and moral viewpoints of these others, since these others will many times be                               
merely possible or hypothetical. But this is not the case. Remember here that this ability contained                               
within the Challenge-Response Model plausibly requires that agents actually engage with others                       
who occupy alternative moral viewpoints, thus practicing giving responses to objections and                       
training up this skill. So even with regards to gaining this ability and completing this process of the                                   
model, agents are not representing others’ moral viewpoints, and so there is no risk of                             
misrepresentation. 
Yet, even if one agrees that the Challenge-Response Model is not vulnerable to the risk of                               
misrepresenting others’ moral viewpoints, one may now wonder whether Reflective Equilibrium                     
really is either. For if the Challenge-Response Model holds that the process by which agents come                               
to secure epistemic justification for their moral beliefs is by giving responses to objections by                             
actually engaging with others in the actual world who represent their moral viewpoints themselves,                           
why can’t the proponent of Reflective Equilibrium say just that as well? Why can’t they say that in                                   
order for an agent to bring her moral beliefs into equilibrium with alternative moral principles and                               
thus gain justification she must engage with actual others who hold those alternative moral                           
principles in order to accurately represent them in her process of bringing her moral beliefs into                               
equilibrium  with  them?  
The issue here isn’t so much that the proponent of Reflective Equilibrium is barred from                             
utilizing this strategy, but rather that doing so is ad-hoc and no longer in the spirit of the view. For                                       
while actually engaging with others who occupy alternative moral perspectives is a constitutive                         
element of the moral epistemology of the Challenge-Response theorist (by being what the ability                           
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amounts to)--namely, it is the process the model outlines by which to gain justified moral beliefs--it                               
would merely be tacked on to what the Reflective Equilibrium theorist antecedently requires for                           
epistemic justification. What Reflective Equilibrium requires and takes as the focus of securing                         
epistemic goods like justification is equilibrium or coherency, whereas what the                     
Challenge-Response Model requires is that one have a certain ability, which itself requires actually                           
engaging with others. Remember here that both views outline a process which agents can follow in                               
order to make their moral beliefs justified, and that these processes  diÚfer  from one another. The                               
problem is that Reflective Equilibrium  already has  specified a process for agents to use to come to                                 
have justified moral beliefs: namely, work back and forth between your particular moral judgments                           
and moral principles until coherency is reached. Although it is not inconsistent for the proponent of                               
Reflective Equilibrium to adopt the process of the Challenge-Response Model, they would either                         
have to replace this equilibrium process they originally specified with that outlined by the                           
Challenge-Response Model, or, come to have a disunified account, embracing two processes.                       
Although the way in which the Challenge-Response theorist avoids the issue of misrepresentation                         
is in principle available to the proponent of Reflective Equilibrium, it would be terribly                           
unmotivated  and  ad-hoc  for  them  to  adopt,  and  thus  the  Challenge-Response  Model  fares  better.  106
In order to have a justified belief, one must be able to adequately engage with                             
others--including those with opposing moral viewpoints. The Challenge-Response Model’s                 
epistemic constraint that agents have the ability to adequately engage with others, and thus practice                             
and use their ability to respond to other’s objections in the actual world, highlights another point of                                 
106 Remember here that my goal in this paper is not to provide a knock-down argument against Reflective Equilibrium.                                     
Rather, I am pointing to a set of shortcomings for its suitability as a model of epistemic justification for moral beliefs                                         
given  a  constructivist  moral  metaphysics,  and  providing  a  sketch  of  what  I  take  to  be  a  better  model. 
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attractiveness of the model. Namely, it more closely represents the metaphysical procedure that                         
determines the moral facts for the constructivist. Since the moral facts are fixed by a multitude of                                 
agents, instead of engaging in a kind of internal reflection wherein agents themselves represent                           
others’ moral viewpoints, in seeking moral knowledge agents must instead be able to interact with                             
other agents in ways that resemble the kind of process or procedure utilized in the idealized                               
normative-fact generating world. Provided that it’s best to have an epistemic procedure that is                           
isomorphic with respect to the metaphysical nature of the facts, the Challenge-Response Model                         
better accounts for how agents are in a position to receive the kind of epistemic justification needed                                 
for  the  constructivist.   
In the end, the Challenge-Response Model provides us with a picture of epistemic                         
justification wherein the way in which we come to have epistemically justified moral beliefs                           
resembles the way in which the moral facts themselves are fixed. Being epistemically justified in                             
holding a moral belief requires having the ability to engage in an adequate way with others. This                                 
necessary condition of epistemic justification is due to the moral subject matter of these beliefs,                             
given our constructivist assumptions about morality. While for other kinds of beliefs it may not be                               
the case that one’s failing to engage with others affects the epistemic status of one’s belief at all, it is                                       
the  case  for  moral  beliefs  precisely  because  of  what  they  are  like,  according  to  the  constructivist.   
 
4.  Conclusion 
In this paper, I have outlined an alternative moral epistemology for the moral constructivist.                           
After putting forth an understanding of moral constructivism, I argued that the traditional                         
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epistemic model for the constructivist--Reflective Equilibrium--faces several issues, most notably                   
that it fails to adequately account for the social nature of the metaphysical basis of the moral facts.                                   
Given these issues, and the fact that having a commonsensical account of moral knowledge is one of                                 
constructivism’s greatest strengths, the constructivist should seek alternative epistemic accounts. I                     
then put forth such an alternative account, the Challenge-Response Model, according to which an                           
agent has a justified moral belief just in case they are able to adequately respond to all relevant                                   
objections from a relevant objector group. I concluded by arguing that the Challenge-Response                         
Model is a better epistemic model for the constructivist, as it avoids the problems faced by                               
Reflective  Equilibrium  and  is  fundamentally  social,  thus  better  securing  epistemic  justification. 
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Chapter  4 
“Social-based  Theories  of  Reasons  and  the  Limits  of  Oppression” 
 
 
 
0.  Introduction 
A new kind of non-objectivist theory of practical reasons has recently come to attention:                           
social-based views, which hold that an agent’s practical reasons are a function of the social                             
institutions, practices, and relations (IPRs) she takes part in. More particularly, for a reason to be                               107
social-based it must stem from features of the IPR itself, rather than the individual. For example, it                                 
seems as though you have reasons to keep your friend’s secrets just in virtue of being a friend, rather                                     
than because it would be personally advantages for yourself to do so or because you have any kinds                                   
of pro-attitudes towards doing so. Social-based views are able to make sense of these                           
commonsensical judgments. Moreover, others have argued that social-based views carry additional                     
advantages as a theory of practical reasons: they can make sense of partial reasons, provide an apt                                 
explanation of agents’ moral psychology, can account for the motivational character of normative                         
reasons, and can account for how we are beholden to others. Furthermore, as a kind of                               108
non-objectivist theory, social-based views are able to provide these benefits without taking on the                           
burdens objectivist theories are faced with, as they are able to maintain a straightforward and simple                               
account  of  the  metaphysics  and  epistemology  of  normative  reasons. 
107 There is nothing in the nature of social-based views that in principle bars them from being objectivist views. I                                       
introduce the view this way since the social-based views previously put forth, and the one I ultimately advance, are                                     
non-objectivist. 
108 Manne (2013) argues for the first three particular advantages of a social-based view; Walden (2012) cites the last                                     
consideration  as  an  advantage  of  social-based  views. 
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However, social-based views aren’t without their own obstacles. For just as obvious as it                           
seems that agents have reasons to keep their friends’ secrets in virtue of taking part in the practice                                   
of friendship, it seems that agents don’t have reasons to do just as  any social IPR would have them                                     
do. To take an obvious case: just because one happens to take part in the practice of slavery, this                                     
doesn’t entail that one has reasons to act as a slave. In this way, the biggest problem a social-based                                     
view faces is ensuring that only some, and not all, social IPRs generate genuine practical reasons for                                 
agents. The task that the social-based view is set with is determining what it is about these                                 
intuitively bad cases makes it the case that they are not reason generating. To solve this problem,                                 
social-based views must specify certain conditions a social IPR must meet in order for it to be                                 
genuinely  normative  and  generate  practical  reasons  for  agents  who  take  part  in  them.  
This paper focuses on one particularly worrisome type of intuitively bad and intuitively                         
non-normative IPRs: oppressive IPRs. I start in section 1 by first further introducing the concept of                               
a social-based view of normative reasons, comparing it to individualistic non-objectivist accounts of                         
normative reasons and motivating the need for a general constraint that such views rule out                             
oppressive IPRs as genuinely normative and so as generating practical reasons for agents. After                           
becoming clear on this task for social-based views, in section 2 I consider two contemporary                             
social-based views, Kenneth Walden’s “Social Constitutivism” and Kate Manne’s “Social Teleology”.                     
After arguing that each fails to meet this constraint, in section 3 I put forth a new social-based view                                     
that I argue is able to meet the constraint, Looping Social Constructivism. To do so, I utilize a novel                                     
employment of the idealization strategy commonly used in non-objectivist metaethical theories,                     
wherein the social IPRs that generate genuine reasons for agents are those that are idealized  at the                                 
social level . On my view, the IPRs which are reason generating are those that are idealized such that                                   
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each position within the IPR has equal power in constituting the IPR itself. After putting forth the                                 
view I consider several seemingly problematic cases, where I argue that the view has the resources                               
to rule out even complicated cases of oppressive IPRs.. I close by arguing that one important upshot                                 
Looping  Social  Constructivism  has  is  that  it  provides  a  much  needed  feminist  metaethics. 
 
1. Social-Based  Views:  An  Introduction 
Most generally, objectivist views are those that hold that the source of normative truths, like                             
what reasons an an agent has, lies outside of her desires, projects, or values. Contrarily,                             109
non-objectivist views of practical reason hold that the source of an agent’s practical reasons is her                               
preferences, desires, values, attitudes, projects, or evaluative point of view. One such familiar                         110
non-objectivist view is Subjectivism. Importantly, non-objectivist views like Subjectivism must                   
have some way to ensure that not just  any desire that an agent happens to have--no matter how                                   
bizarre or ill-informed--generates reasons for her. Given this overgeneration worry, these                     
non-objectivist views have appealed to various strategies or conditions under which an agent’s                         
evaluative point of view generates reasons. Some, like Bernard Williams, utilize idealization,                       
wherein an agent’s reasons are a function of her idealized self who has no false beliefs and all                                   
relevant true beliefs; others have appealed to consistency and coherency, holding that an agent’s                           
reasons are a function of her desires and values after they are brought to be consistent and coherent.                                 
 111
109 See, for example, Scanlon (2014), Enoch (2011), and Parfit (2011). Of course, there is always much disagreement over                                     
what counts as an objectivist view and what doesn’t. For the sake of this paper I will be understanding objectivist views                                         
in this way. For the sake of simplicity the brief discussion of non-objectivist views that follows does not address more                                       
complicated  views  like  Constitutivism  or  Kantian  Constructivism. 
110  See  for  example  Williams  (1980),  Schroeder  (2007),  and  Street  (2009),  amongst  many  others. 
111  For  the  former,  see  Williams  (1980);  for  the  latter  see  Street  (2009). 
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Social-based theories of practical reasons differ from individualistic views like Subjectivism                     
by holding that an agent’s reasons are a function of some kind of the social institutions, practices, or                                   
relations (IPRs) that they find themselves in. Although both individualistic views and social-based                         
views can be non-objectivist theories, they differ in holding whether an agent’s reasons are                           
dependent solely on her own beliefs, values and norms, or on her social group’s/IPR’s (broadly                             
construed) beliefs, values and norms. Just as individualistic non-objectivist theories can differ from                         
each other by holding that an agent’s reasons are a function of different or differently idealized                               
cognitive or affective mental states, social-based views can differ from each other by holding that an                               
agent’s reasons are a function of different or differently idealized IPRs. This is important because                             
just as individualistic non-objectivist theories like Subjectivism don’t say that an agent’s reasons are                           
a function of  whatever  desires she happens to currently have, a social-based view also shouldn’t hold                               
that  whatever  social IPRs agents happen to find themselves in, all of them are genuinely normative                               
and generate reasons for all of those agents. For there are many problematic social IPRs that are                                 
noxious for the agents embedded within them. It would be a transparently fatal defect in such a                                 
theory if it were to have the consequence that, for example, the institution of slavery was normative                                 
and generated genuine reasons for agents who take part in the institution, including those who are                               
slaves.    112
The institution of slavery represents one type of particularly noxious social IPR, namely                         
oppressive ones. Social-based views should be mindful of oppressive IPRs and be sure to rule them                               
out as genuinely normative for two reasons. First, oppressive IPRs like slavery are especially                           
112 I am relying on an incontrovertible first-order judgment or intuition, not any kind of theory of the good, to make                                         
this objection. Additionally, I am not ruling out that agents may have genuine practical reasons to take part in or                                       
otherwise abide by the constitutive norms of those practices, but just that the source of their reasons to do so is not the                                             
institution itself, but rather, for example, their own self-interest. I’m grateful to Hille Paakkunainen for bringing this                                 
point  to  my  attention. 
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abhorrent, and, as such, may be grounds to reject any theory that determines them as genuinely                               
normative for agents. This is because one major complaint against non-objectivist views like                         
Humean Constructivism or Subjectivism is that they entail that certain lamentable individual                       
conditions are genuinely normative and reason-generating for agents who have them (e.g. that                         
those suffering from anorexia have reasons not to eat because of their desire to be thin). Provided                                 113
that we should take these complaints as serious grounds for rejection for individualistic                         
non-objectivist theories, we should likewise take complaints about the normativity of oppressive                       
IPRs as genuine grounds for rejection for social-based theories. Moreover, though, oppression is a                           
group phenomenon: it does not operate on the individual level, but rather affects groups, and                             
individuals only in so far as they are members of certain social groups. Just as some might                                 114
conceive of mental conditions like anorexia or depression as a defect within the individual,                           
oppression could in this way be viewed as a defect within social IPRs, or on the social-level. Because                                   
social-based theorists locate practical normativity on the social level, this pernicious phenomenon                       
pertains  particularly  to  them,  and  should  demand  any  social-based  theorist’s  attention.   
Importantly, though, there are two versions of this challenge of ruling out oppressive IPRs                           
as normative. On the strongest version, the theorist must guarantee that it’s  impossible  on their                             
theory for oppressive IPRs to be normative; on the other, weaker version, they must only rule out                                 
oppressive IPRs as normative in ordinary circumstances (excluding from assessment implausible,                     
very unlikely, or merely possible circumstances). In what follows, I will focus on the latter version                               
of  the  challenge. 
113  See  Gibbard  (1990)  for  this  criticism,  and  Street  (2009)  and  and  Sobel  (2016)  for  a  defense. 
114  See,  for  example,  Frye  (1983)  and  Cudd  (2006). 
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Since social-based views are non-objectivist, in order to avoid the issue of oppressive IPRs                           
they must specify which IPRs are the ones that generate legitimately normative reasons by                           
specifying the conditions or criteria an IPR must meet in order to be reason-generating. Call these                               
reason-generating conditions or “RGC”s for short. In the next section, I will examine two                           
contemporary social-based views--Kenneth Walden’s “Social Constitutivism” and Kate Manne’s                 
“Social Teleology”--which specify different RGC’s, arguing that both fail to rule out oppressive IPRs                           
as  genuinely  normative.    115
 
2.  Contemporary  Social-Based  Views  
2.1.  Walden’s  Social  Constitutivism 
Constitutivist views hold that an agent’s reasons are a function of the constitutive norms of                             
agency as such. Kenneth Walden (2012) argues that one of the constitutive norms of agency is                               116
that one’s actions be appropriately explainable. More specifically, he holds that in order to be an                               
agent, one’s action needs to be interpretable by others under some laws of interpretation; otherwise,                             
one’s action is mere behavior. Walden’s view is  social  because the laws of interpretation which serve                               
as the constitutive norms of agency are themselves socially determined and constructed through a                           
mutual interpretation process, and as such can manifest not just in a one-off way--as laws that                               
govern isolated instances of single actions--but also as broad social organizations and structures. In                           
this process, agents try to explain others’ behavior under the best laws of agency at their disposal                                 
while at the same time trying to conform their own behavior to the same laws. Put more simply,                                   
115 Of course, this is not to say that these views fail to solve other overgeneration, or “too many reasons” problems. My                                           
point is that failing to rule out oppressive IPRs is especially bad, and thus that any social-based view that fails to do so is                                               
untenable. 
116  See,  for  example,   Korsgaard  (2009)  and  (2011)  for  such  a  view. 
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agents try to interpret others’ behavior in ways that makes it understandable to them, while at the                                 
same time trying to behave in ways that are understandable to others. This makes for a kind of                                   
mutual construction and revision wherein agents are constantly adjusting their behavior to fit the                           
socially-determined laws of interpretation, and the socially-determined laws of interpretation are                     
constantly  being  adjusted  to  fit  agents’  actions.   
The aim of such an interpretation process, Walden holds, is to reach a kind of equilibrium                               
or general stability between agents’ actions and their explanations of others’ actions. Given this,                           
Walden’s RGC is stability. An agent’s reasons, then, are a function of the relatively stable                             
socially-determined laws of interpretation: an agent has reasons to do that which is interpretable as                             
action under stable laws of interpretation set by this social process of mutual construction and                             
revision of such laws, including those manifested as social structures or practices. As Walden states,                             
“. . . any social organization that adequately approximated the equilibrium of the Mutual                           
Interpretation Process [has] normative force, and these constitutions qualify. So . . . the denizens of                               
these societies really ought to behave in conformity with their particular constitutions of agency                           
because that is what it takes for them to act.” In short: an agent has reasons to behave according                                     117
to, and thus maintain and perpetuate, the current laws of interpretation--the current social                         
structures  or  organizations--provided  that  they  are  stable  enough.  118
The problem with Walden’s view is one that he himself recognizes: that it seems possible                             
for there to be societies with relatively stable laws of interpretation which are nevertheless                           
“wicked”. For instance, it seems that a racially segregated society could have laws of interpretation                             
that are stable enough, such that by Walden’s account agents supposedly would have reasons to do                               
117  Walden  (2012),  p.75. 
118  Ibid.,  pp.  52,  69-75.   
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as those laws prescribe (engage in acts of segregation and generally uphold segregated institutions).                           
But, since Walden’s view is a form of constitutivism, we would be without the grounds to criticize                                 
the agent--in fact, in such a society, in  not  acting to as to maintain segregation an agent would be                                     
risking  not  acting  and  not  being  considered  an  agent  at  all. 
Walden’s response to such a challenge is that while such societies appear to have stable laws                               
of interpretation, they in fact aren’t stable. This is because, Walden claims, “the very features of                               
those societies that made wicked things permissible, even obligatory, were also sources of                         
instability.” In arguing for such a claim, Walden tells a few “just-so” stories: for example, he claims                                 119
that the Jim Crow South revolved around an ideology that held persons of color to be essentially                                 
and biologically different than whites, and that such an ideology was a source of instability, as the                                 
claims  about  race  that  were  central  to  the  ideology  were  undermined  by  new  scholarship  on  race.  120
Setting aside the weakness of “just-so” stories, several problems remain with Walden’s view.                       
First, even if Walden’s “just-so” story regarding the Jim Crow South were correct, it certainly                               121
would not undermine the initial charge made against Walden’s view that it’s quite possible for there                               
to be relatively stable yet wicked societies or laws of interpretation. For one, the catalyst of the                                 
instability of Jim Crow South that Walden cites--new scholarship on race and segregation--is not                           
necessary, nor even probable: it seems at least just as probable that no new scholarship would have                                 
emerged as that new scholarship on race did emerge under those conditions. In fact, it seems                               
119  Ibid.,  p.  76. 
120 For those who are not familiar with “just-so” stories, they are ad hoc and unverifiable explanations that are often put                                         
forth as suspiciously tailor-made to suit the broader project or theory (more precisely, an aspect of the theory that is                                       
crucial to its soundness is posited in the explanation of certain phenomena that seems directly opposed to the theory in a                                         
way that is prima facie doubtful and externally unverifiable). They are often used and criticized for their use in                                     
evolutionary  psychology. 
121 Just-so stories themselves have well-known weaknesses, which I won’t elaborate on here. Rather, I’m particularly                               
worried about Walden’s use of them to overcome the oppression overgeneration worry; that is, even setting aside these                                   
general  issues  with  just-so  stories,  there  are  particular  problems  with  Walden’s  use  of  them  here. 
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extraordinary that scholarship that flew in the face of such an extreme ideology even occurred. This                               
subversive scholarship should be viewed more as miraculous than expected given that one feature of                             
ideologies is that they are self-perpetuating. Moreover, Walden’s “just-so” story rests on the claim                           
that the source of the oppressive ideology’s instability was false empirical beliefs. However, plenty of                             
unjust ideologies are not based on false empirical beliefs (for example, it’s very possible to have one                                 
based on beliefs like “those in power ought to stay in power”). If all of this is right, then Walden’s                                       
ability to tell a “just-so” story to explain away the supposed stability of one oppressive society does                                 
not  yet  explain  how  such  oppressive  yet  stable  societies  are  unlikely. 
Furthermore, while Walden’s view makes societies and their laws of interpretation                     
revisable, the ways in which Walden states agents are able to change the laws is also objectionable.                                 
Walden pictures change (or as he calls it “normative revolutions”) as coming about through the                             
violation of the current norms, but not through just any kind of violation. The kind of behavior                                 
that demands adjustment in the current norms is that which “is at the margins of intelligibility.”                               
This is because “behavior that is too far out of step with the reigning constitution of agency will be                                     
dismissed as lunacy.” Taking the Jim Crow South case, this means that in order to change the                                 122
oppressive, racist norms of segregation, the kind of behavior that agents--specifically persons of                         
color--should engage in shouldn’t defy these norms  too  much; for example, these agents could                           
perhaps refuse to give up their seat on a segregated bus, but they shouldn’t engage in armed protests                                   
or marry whites, or simply demand equal civil rights across the board, for that’s just “lunacy,” as                                 
Walden would say. Walden’s views on normative change are so objectionable because they                         123
122  Ibid.,  p.  76. 
123 Walden cites Rosa Parks as a case where an agent’s behavior was at the ‘margins of intelligibility’ and thus was an                                           
appropriate inciting case of a ‘normative revolution’ and at the same time still action. Of course, it is going to be vague                                           
and a matter of degree what kinds of defiant behavior are too defiant to be considered action and those doing it agents; I                                             
cite the cases of the Black Panther movement and interracial marriage as plausible candidates of actions that would be                                     
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require those who are oppressed to be patient with their oppression and to appease their                             
oppressors, lest their behavior be deemed “lunacy” and they themselves not even counted as agents.                           
Not only is this offensive, but it also seems untrue: why can’t--and furthermore why                             124
shouldn’t--social revolutions happen in drastic sweeps rather than tiny chips? And shouldn’t those                         
at the front of the lines of such drastic overhauls be considered more of an agent, instead of less of                                       
one?  125
Given these considerations, Walden’s constitutivism fails to rule out oppressive institutions                     
as normative, such that there can still be oppressive societies where agents have reasons to maintain                               
and perpetuate its institutions--including the oppressed themselves. Furthermore, Walden’s view is                     
especially bad because it holds that agents have reason  not  to demand drastic social change (and that                                 
doing  so  would  disqualify  them  as  agents).   
2.2.  Manne’s  Social  Teleology 
Kate Manne’s (2013) social-based view holds that an agent’s reasons are grounded in social                           
practices that they participate in. Specifically, Manne claims that reasons are generated via the                           
constitutive norms of particular social practices. For instance, the social practice of  friendship  has                           
certain constitutive norms like to be loyal and trustworthy, which generate reasons for agents who                             
are in friendships; such reasons will be reasons to, for example, stand by one’s friend when they are                                   
in  need  and  keep  one’s  friend’s  secrets.   
considered ‘unintelligible’ to the majority of whites in the 1960s in the same way that the Mafioso’s violent outbursts are                                       
‘unintelligible’ to the majority of people now, as the ‘unintelligibility’ of the Mafioso case is supposed to set the                                     
parameters  of  intelligible  action  (see  pp.71-2).   
124 To be fair, since Walden is not clear on exactly what would qualify as “lunacy” he might reject these as such cases;                                             
however,  such  underspecification  would  then  be  a  failure  of  his  view. 
125 At worst, this constraint on normative revolutions would completely eliminate the possibility of such revolutions in                                 
certain contexts where individuals’ beliefs are extremely rigid, for example where their racial prejudices run so deep and                                   
are so dogmatic that any behavior that speaks in favor of racial equality would be considered “lunacy”. One advantage of                                       
the  positive  view  I  put  forth  in  section  3  is  that  it  accounts  for  reasons  to  resist  oppression. 
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At the same time, Manne readily admits that the challenge for the social-based theorist is to                               
specify the conditions under which social IPRs are normative, for surely not just any, or every,                               
social IPR generates genuine reasons for agents who are ingrained in them. On her broad sketch,                               
the RGC she endorses is that an IPR be conducive to human “flourishing at large”. Manne’s view is                                   
able to remain sufficiently non-objectivist because this constraint of being conducive to human                         
flourishing is not an objective normative requirement of valid social IPRs, but rather, Manne                           
claims, is part of the telos or aim of social IPRs themselves, given by their interpersonal nature:                                 
social  IPRs  just  are  the  kinds  of  things  that  aim  at  human  flourishing  at  large.  126
This is the general outline of her view. Unfortunately, though, since the focus of her work                               
on social-based views is on motivating social-based views in general rather than putting forth a                             
fully articulated version of such a view, the details of her view are underspecified. However, in                               
order to assess whether her view can adequately address the issue of oppressive IPRs, more details                               
are needed. What she does say, though--specifically, her commitment to non-objectivism and to                         
neither undergenerating nor overgenerating reasons--suggests the following more detailed picture.                 
   127
First, we can further understand her RGC in the (satisficing) consequentialist sense as                         
holding that a social IPR needs to produce a sufficient amount of flourishing for all of those who                                   
take part in it, such that we assess an IPR relative to the total amount of flourishing it produces for                                       
126  Manne  (2013),  pp.69-70. 
127 This is not to say that there aren’t additional ways to develop the view other than the one I consider here; I do not                                                 
consider all of these additional variations of the view, as I am interested in considering only the one that is most faithful                                           
to the text (that is, the one that most closely adheres to the commitments she takes on and what she does explicitly say                                             
about  her  view). 
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all of those who participate in instances of the IPR type. Manne clarifies that a social practice                                 128
“need only be  conducive  to human flourishing, rather than having to  actually  lead to it.” In other                                 129
words, provided that a social practice type, such as friendship, meets the consequentialist constraint                           
by creating enough total utility for all of those who participate in friendships, any particular token                               
of friendship is genuinely normative and generates reasons for all agents who take part in                             
friendships. This way, one has genuinely normative reasons to help out one’s friend when they’re in                               
need that one can’t escape merely because there are  some friendships that are toxic, and don’t                               
actually reach the satisficing level of utility for those who partake in them. This qualification saves                               
her theory from undergenerating reasons. At the other end, Manne’s theory is saved from                           
overgenerating reasons with its consequentialist constraint on flourishing: IPRs like slavery are                       
ruled out from generating reasons since they lead to severe suffering for some, thus making the                               
total utility produced for all of those who take part in it to be less than the amount required to be                                         
normative.    130
As an aside, we should first note that there’s a serious question about how her view is                                 
properly social-based, as it’s unclear how flourishing is a property of institutions (like Walden’s                           
chosen property of stability), rather than individuals. However, setting this issue aside, there                         131
remains a serious question about whether Manne can actually balance the under- and                         
overgenerating constraints against each other. I think that she cannot, due to a dilemma that she                               
faces given her teleological claim concerning social practices. Remember here that Manne claims                         
128 In footnote 48 Manne (2013) seems to endorse a satisficing consequentialist interpretation of her RGC. I spell out                                     
this aspect of the view in terms of those who take part in the IPR, as the cases Manne focuses on seem to track this set of                                                     
agents  in  assessing  the  validity  of  the  IPR. 
129  Ibid.,  section  4,  my  italics. 
130 Ibid., section 4. In this way, my argument is not that Manne’s view cannot avoid any problematic overgeneration, but                                       
rather  they  it  is  unable  to  avoid  overgeneration  with  respect  to  all  oppressive  IPRs. 
131   I’m  grateful  to  Jan  Dowell  for  bringing  this  issue  to  my  attention. 
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that social practices have a telos or aim of human flourishing at large; importantly, this is a claim                                   
about the nature of social practices as such. The initial problem, however, is that it seems like  many                                   
of our social practices--both current and past-- aren’t conducive to human flourishing at large: for                           
example, just consider slavery, sex trafficking, terrorism, segregation, arranged marriages, the                     
beauty industry, stop and frisk, the nuclear family, the fast food industry, witch trials, etc.. Given                               
that so many past and current social practices are defective by not achieving their aim or telos,                                 
Manne’s  teleological  claim  begins  to  look  quite  implausible. 
This, though, isn’t the main problem, for Manne doesn’t take herself to be burdened with                             
defending her teleological claim. However, the implausibility of her claim given the above                         
considerations leaves her with two options: either admit that social practices don’t have a telos of                               
human flourishing, which would be bad for her non-objectivist view, or hold that a social practice                               
can have many failings with respect to its telos while still having that telos. For example, we can                                   132
still maintain that a frog has a telos of catching flies, even though it misses many flies. To maintain                                     
her non-objectivist commitments, it seems like Manne would want to pick the second option, and                             
maintain her claim that all social practices have this telos of human flourishing at large. If the                                 
second option is chosen, we now face two more options: either (1) maintain that only those social                                 
practice types that meet the consequentialist constraint are valid, or (2) give up this consequentialist                             
constraint. If we pick option (1), then it seems that we fail to meet the undergeneration constraint,                                 
since, as stated, many of our social practices fail to achieve a decent amount of flourishing. Since                                 
Manne takes herself to be capturing a significant set of practical reasons in providing an account of                                 
132   I’m  grateful  to  Preston  Werner  for  making  this  second  option  clear  to  me. 
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the source of practical reasons (in addition to holding herself quite explicitly to an undergeneration                             
constraint),  accounting  for  a  small  set  of  reasons  would  be  a  serious  issue  for  her  account.    133
Faced with this undergeneration worry, Manne might wish to resist the claim that many                           
social practices don’t result in flourishing: she might want to say that some of the practices I cited                                   
above, while surely leading to the suffering of some, nevertheless reach the satisficing level of                             
utility; that is, that even though, for example, our criminal justice system leads to the suffering of                                 
racial minorities, it still produces enough utility, and so many of the social practices I cited above                                 
really do meet the consequentialist constraint and thereby generate enough reasons. However, in                         
this case her view would face common objections to consequentialism, since it would hold that                             
those racial minorities who take part in this racist criminal justice system and suffer from it still                                 
have reasons to participate in and maintain it (just as persons who are in abusive friendships would                                 
have reasons to participate in and maintain them, since the practice of friendship on the whole                               
produces a total sum of flourishing for all that meets the satisficing amount demanded). Likewise,                             
even if we want to allow Manne her claim that a social practice wouldn’t count as valid if it lead to                                         
the serious suffering of some--which I’m very hesitant to accept, given that her consequentialist                           
commitments wouldn’t necessarily rule out the extreme suffering of some, provided that it is                           
counterbalanced by the extreme flourishing of others--surely not all oppressive IPRs lead to the                           
kind of extreme suffering Manne has in mind when she mentions slavery and sex trafficking (the                               
other examples of oppressive institutions I cited above testify to this). In this case, some oppressive                               
institutions  would  still  be  ruled  as  valid  under  Manne’s  theory.   
133 Manne (2013) states at the onset of her paper that the question she is considering is what the source of practical                                           
reasons are, and that we should be optimistic about how many of such reasons her account can capture. See pp. 50 and                                           
70  respectively.   
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Remember here that Manne has two options when faced with the fact that many of our                               
actual social practices fail to achieve flourishing: either (1) maintain that only those social practice                             
types that meet the consequentialist constraint are valid, or (2) give up this consequentialist                           
constraint. We saw that option (1) won’t work, for two reasons. It either undergenerates reasons,                             
or, if in seeking to avoid this undergeneration worry Manne were to deny that many social practices                                 
don’t result in flourishing, the view faces consequentialist objections by ruling in as normative                           
oppressive IPRs which seem to produce enough flourishing at the expense of those they oppress. If,                               
then, seeking to avoid these consequentialist objections and generating too few reasons, we were to                             
take option (2), we fail to meet the overgeneration constraint: now a social practice can fail to reach                                   
the satisficing level of flourishing while still qualifying as valid. In this case, the oppressive                             134
practices that were supposed to be ruled out at the start like sex trafficking now count as valid.                                   135
So, no matter which option we take, Manne’s view fails to rule out oppressive IPRs as genuinely                                 
normative. 
 
3.  Looping  Social  Constructivism 
134  To  be  clear,  I  don’t  think  Manne  intends  to  take  option  (2),  but  rather  outline  it  as  a  possible  option  that  is  available. 
135 Another option would be to endorse some  additional  validity constraint. In fact, Manne seems to go in for this option                                         
when she states “I am inclined to think, moreover, that social practices must not be prone to bring serious suffering to                                         
anybody in the moral community, in order to count as valid” (2013), p.71. Unfortunately, Manne does not say anything                                     
more specific about this additional condition. Regardless of the details of this additional condition, I do not take it up                                       
here, as endorsing such a condition would seem to bring with it more problems than it solves. In addition to making the                                           
view disjointed and gerrymandered (as now the view would posit  another condition that is of an entirely different kind),                                     
this strategy seems ad hoc, and would push Manne into objectivism, as she must account for the nature of this                                       
constraint, and cannot appeal to teleological grounds (as a social practice can’t coherently both have the telos of                                   
flourishing  at large and not bringing serious suffering to anybody ). Since Manne leaves the satisficing dimension of her                                   
view undefined, she might also wish to appeal it, claiming that the level of utility rules in just enough social practices to                                           
not undergenerate reasons, while ruling out the oppressive ones. Even if finding such an exact level were possible,                                   
doing  so  would  seem  to  be  ad  hoc. 
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In the last section, we saw two contemporary social-based views fail to rule out oppressive                             
IPRs as genuinely normative. Note how each view attempted to meet this constraint: namely, by                             
putting forth certain RGC’s that a social IPR must meet in order to generate reasons. For Walden,                                 
the RGC was stability of the IPR. For Manne, it was that the IPR be conducive to human                                   
flourishing at large, in the satisficing consequentialist sense. Of note is that both RGC’s put forth                               
were properties of actual IPRs--that is, properties that IPRs of the actual world must instantiate in                               
order  to  generate  reasons. 
In this section, I’ll articulate an alternative social-based view that, I will argue, is able to rule                                 
out oppressive social IPRs as normative in a non-objectivist and content-neutral way. Moreover,                         136
not only does the view I put forth meet this overgeneration constraint, but it also provides an                                 
account of reasons for resistance of oppression. The way in which this view differs from the two                                 
previous views discussed is with respect to the validity conditions for social IPRs. Specifically, my                             
view endorses a strategy often utilized by individualistic non-objectivist views--idealization--in a                     
novel way: I argue that social IPRs need to be idealized  at the social level . On my view, the IPRs that                                         
generate reasons are those that are idealized such that each position within the IPR has equal power                                 
to  determine  the  constitution  of  the  IPR  itself. 
First, I will offer a further analysis of the structure of social IPRs. Then, I will show how                                   
idealizing at the social level would affect the mechanics of social IPRs, thereby ensuring that no                               
IPRs that are idealized in this way would be both oppressive and genuinely normative. As I do so, I                                     
will explore various ways the adherent to this view may fill in numerous details of the view and                                   
136 By “content-neutral” I mean that the view does not specify which particular IPR types (e.g. friendships, marriage,                                   
basketball, slavery) are genuinely normative by their being that type, nor by their upholding certain objective values                                 
(e.g. being just), but rather specifies which IPRs are genuinely normative by their having certain proceduralist or                                 
non-normative features or conditions (e.g. all of the agents who take part in them are fully-informed of all the                                     
non-normative  facts). 
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respond to some worries. Lastly, I will briefly show how my view fares well across several                               
constraints  for  a  feminist  metaethics. 
3.1.  The  Structure  of  Social  IPRs 
Social IPRs are structured in a particular way. First, IPRs consist of nodes, or positions                             137
that individuals occupy, which designate rights, responsibilities, privileges, duties, expectations, and                     
power. Take, as an innocuous toy example, the social practice of basketball. Within this practice,                             
different individuals occupy different nodes: the players occupy different nodes than the coach, and,                           
additionally, each player occupies a different node relative to the position they play. Given their                             
occupation of different nodes, they have different responsibilities, expectations, and power: while                       
the coach is responsible for calling the plays, the players are responsible for scoring points (or, more                                 
specifically, the point guard is responsible for handling and controlling the ball, the shooting guard                             
is responsible for taking perimeter shots, the center for getting offensive rebounds and scoring                           
inside the paint, and so on). These rights, responsibilities, privileges, duties, and power are                           
distributed according to constitutive norms: what it is to be a basketball coach is to call the plays,                                   
what  it  is  to  be  a  point  guard  is  to  control  the  ball,  etc. 
Secondly, the choices, options, and actions of individuals within a social IPR are defined                           
relationally. This means that individual choices and actions cannot be properly understood in                         138
isolation, but rather are determined relative to the relations that an individual stands in to others,                               
and their position within the structure of the practice as a whole (the node they occupy). For                                 
example, if we are to understand why Kyrie Irving drove to the hoop, it’s insufficient to say that it’s                                     
because he had an open lane. Rather, we should say that it’s because Kevin Love blocked Irving’s                                 
137  Much  of  what  I  say  in  this  section  follows  Haslanger’s  (2012a)  analysis  of  social  IPRs. 
138  See  Haslanger  (2012a)  and  (2014). 
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defender by setting a screen, thus opening up a lane for Irving. This feature of social IPRs can also                                     
be illustrated with less conventional examples. Concerning the social practice of (heterosexual and                         
binary) parenting: when trying to understand why women (rather than men) typically decide to exit                             
the workforce to take care of the child, it is insufficient to merely say that it’s because women prefer                                     
or simply choose to spend more time with their children. Rather, the optimal explanation makes                             
reference to the fact that maternal, but not paternal, leave is available, and that typically couples can                                 
afford  only  to  have  one  parent  stay  out  of  the  workforce.    139
Finally, social IPRs are structured by a looping eÚfect that obtains between the agents within                             
the IPR and the IPR and its norms. Ian Hacking explains the looping effect as a phenomenon that                                   
occurs when agents are classified in a certain way (e.g. as X’s), become aware of their classification                                 
as such (e.g. I am an X), behave differently in virtue of their awareness of such classification, and                                   
thus change the thing being classified (e.g. what it is to be an X). At the level of social IPRs,                                       140
looping can be understood as a kind of feedback mechanism wherein the norms of IPRs constrain                               
and govern the behavior of the agents who constitute it, but at the same time the agents that                                   
constitute the IPR are able to adjust the IPR and its constitutive norms through their behavior.                               141
To see how this works in practice, consider the social practice of parenting again. In the past, the                                   
constitutive norms of parenting designated that women stay home to raise the child and men stay in                                 
the workforce. However, as time passed and opportunities for employment increased, women                       
started joining the workforce, thus adjusting the constitutive norm of parenting that  women stay                           
139  This  case  is  taken  from  Haslanger  (2012a)  and  is  originally  due  to  Cudd  (2006). 
140  Hacking  (2001). 
141 A careful reader will notice similarities here between Walden’s “Mutual Interpretation Process” and the looping effect                                 
as discussed here. Walden takes inspiration from the looping effect as discussed by Hacking (2001), but applies it to the                                       
“laws of interpretation” or constitutive norms of agency that he posits; here, I keep more strictly to Hacking’s account of                                       
the  looping  effect,  noting  its  place  in  the  basic  structure  of  IPRs  themselves,  rather  than  any  norms  of  agency  as  such. 
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home to raise the child to the norm that it be ensured that the child is being cared for by  someone                                         
(e.g. child care workers) while the parents are at work, but not that the caring necessarily be done                                   
by either parent. In this way, IPRs aren’t totally rigid, but rather can change both their constitutive                                 
norms and the way in which they’re structured (the way in which rights, responsibilities, and power                               
are  distributed  across  the  particular  nodes  and  the  way  the  nodes  stand  to  one  another). 
3.2.  IPRs  Idealized 
As stated previously, social-based views must specify RGC’s an IPR must meet in order to                             
generate reasons. More particularly, the RGC’s that are set need to be able to rule out oppressive                                 
social IPRs as genuinely normative. Although idealizing has been widely employed by                       
non-objectivist theories of practical reasons, it has been applied to individual agents--at the                         
individual  level--rather  than  at  the  social  level.    142
I propose that the RGC social IPRs must meet is a condition of idealization, such that an                                 
agent’s reasons are a function of the suitably idealized social IPRs she takes part in. Importantly,                               
idealizing at the institutional or social level would be a matter of adjusting the way in which the                                   
practice or institution itself is structured. There are a few options one could take when considering                               
how  to  adjust  the  structure  of  the  IPR  so  as  to  rule  out  oppressive  IPRs. 
Initially, one might think that oppressive IPRs are noxious simply because individual                       
choices and options are relationally  constrained by other agents. Having one’s choices and options                           
142 Again, to be clear, neither Walden nor Manne utilize idealization strategies. Both look to the social IPRs in the actual                                         
world, and assess which of these in fact has some property (producing enough flourishing, being sufficiently stable); the                                   
source of an agent’s reasons is the IPRs in the actual world that in fact instantiate those properties. Very generally and                                         
abstractly, one way to understand this difference is that idealization strategies take something in the actual world, adjust                                   
it in certain ways, and then hold that the normative facts in the actual world are determined by this possible/non-actual                                       
adjustment of the thing in the actual world. So, for example, one sort of idealization strategy takes an agent’s actual                                       
mental states, adjusts them for consistency and coherency, and holds that the normative facts (e.g. an actual agent’s                                   
reasons)  are  determined  by  this  non-actual  adjustment  of  the  actual  agent’s  mental  states. 
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limited by others at all, one might think, is oppressive. So, one might think, suitably idealized social                                 
IPRs would be ones where individual options are not relationally constrained or defined at all: they                               
would be ones where individual agents are free to do whatever they please regardless of what other                                 
agents do. However, holding that a social IPR must be such that each agent’s choices and options are                                   
totally unaffected by others’ creates two problems: it would not only undergenerate reasons, but also                             
seems to be false as a diagnosis of what makes oppressive IPRs noxious. As we saw above, all social                                     
IPRs are structured so that an individual’s choices are at least in part determined by other                               
individuals within the IPR. And, having one’s options and choices relationally constrained in                         
general is not oppressive: as we saw with the use of the screen in the basketball case, having one’s                                     
options and choices be relationally determined is not always limiting, and can in fact sometimes be                               
liberating and empowering (e.g. it can make it that one has more ways to achieve one’s goals (to                                   
score)  rather  than  less). 
Another option is to say that oppressive IPRs are distinctive in virtue of their structures                             
being across the board unequal. More specifically, one could say that oppressive IPRs are noxious                             
because they distribute rights, responsibilities and expectations unequally amongst the                   
nodes/individual participants: for example, some individuals have the expectation of child-rearing,                     
while others have the expectation of having a career. In this way, one may think that suitably                                 
idealized social IPRs are structured by making everything equal across the board: every individual or                             
nodes has the same rights, responsibilities, expectations, power, etc. Yet, this criteria faces the same                             
problems as the last. For one, merely having generally unequal or different distribution of rights,                             
responsibilities, and expectations across individuals is not necessarily oppressive. We only need to                         
consider the basketball case again to see why that’s the case: just because the coach has different                                 
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rights than the players, and has power over the way the players play, this does not mean that the                                     
players are being oppressed by the coach, or that basketball is an oppressive social practice. For that                                 
matter, we do not think that basketball is an oppressive practice simply because Kyrie Irving has                               
different responsibilities than the coach. Similar remarks apply to the institution of parenting: just                           
because a parent has more power than a child does not mean that the child is oppressed (by the                                     
parent). 
At the same time, I do think that looking to the kind of power that individuals have within                                   
IPRs in virtue of occupying certain nodes is a promising place to look when seeking to idealize                                 
social IPRs so that they generate reasons--it’s just not that all kinds of power that individuals have                                 
in virtue of occupying nodes ought to be distributed equally. Remember here that one of the powers                                 
individuals have in virtue of occupying a node is with respect to the looping effect, or feedback                                 
mechanism in which agents can adjust the norms that govern them within the IPR. It’s important to                                 
note, though, that this mechanism is value neutral: that is, just as it can operate so as to bring about                                       
positive change (like lessening the restrictions on women’s roles in parenting), it can also work in                               
ways that are deleterious. Given this, the looping effect itself does not ensure that an IPR isn’t                                 
oppressive. In light of this, I propose that we idealize the looping effect itself in the following way:                                   
that every node have equal looping power--that is, that every node have the same ability to                               
determine the constitution of the IPR itself (the way in which rights, responsibilities, and power are                               
distributed across nodes). It is not that every node needs to have the  same choices or responsibilities,                                 
but that each node need to have the same power  to determine the choices and responsibilities that                                 
belong  to  each  node.  Call  this  view  Looping  Social  Constructivism. 
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We should now turn to consider versions of two real life institutions idealized for equal                             
looping power: basketball and democracy. Of course, as institutions which exist in the real world,                             
they currently stand as non-ideal. However, just as individualistic views that utilize idealization                         
require some imagination in considering the contours of their idealized individuals, the same will be                             
required here. What is important is to imagine the shape of the institution once every node has the                                   
same ability to determine the way in which rights, responsibility, and power are distributed across                             
the nodes. In what follows I will illustrate how equal looping power can manifest in institutions as                                 
different  as  these.   
Let’s start with our favorite institution, basketball. Within the institution of basketball,                       
there are rules that determine how many points each shot is worth. With the introduction of the                                 
three-point line in the NBA 1979, all shots were not equal: while all (non-penalty) shots inside of                                 
the three-point line counted as two points, all shots outside of the line counted as three. Over time,                                   
the distance of the perimeter three-point line has expanded and contracted. Having once been 22                             
feet 9 inches across from the basket and 22 feet at the corners, from 1994-1997 the arc was reduced                                     
to 22 feet all around; since the 1997-1998 season the arc returned to its former dimensions, where it                                   
currently stands today. One reason why it was reduced was to reduce the number of low scoring                                 143
games. Similarly, today some fans are calling for it to be moved back even more, one reason being                                   144
to  increase  the  diversity  of  shots  attempted  and  overall  excitement  of  the  game.  145
In this real life example, there are many roles in play that account for the change of one of                                     
the constitutive rules of NBA basketball, the three-point line/shot. It seemed to be a collective effort                               
amongst the players, coaches, fans, and officials: the players shooting better and worse from the line                               
143  Hand  (2014). 
144  Ibid. 
145  See,  for  example,  Goldsberry  (2014). 
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affected where it was placed (the better they got at making perimeter shots the further it was                                 
placed); the coaches calling certain plays over others affected where it was placed (the more                             
perimeter shots coaches call for the further it is placed); the fans enjoying the three-point line being                                 
in play in the first place and desiring an interesting and exciting game affected where it was placed                                   
(the less they enjoy it the further it is placed); and, finally, the NBA officials acted in light of all of                                         
the agents’ actions in these other roles in determining where to place the line as an official rule.                                   
Idealizing this case appropriately, it wouldn’t just be the NBA officials who decided that the                             
three-point line would be at one length at one time and another length at another time: rather, they                                   
would be using their final law-making role and power of deciding which rules to sign into the NBA                                   
by responding to the desires and actions of the other nodes (e.g., making it a certain length because                                   
the fans desire a most exciting game). This idealized case illustrates that even though different roles                               
or nodes of the institution of NBA basketball have different rights and responsibilities, and different                             
power with respect to different domains (coaches have more power than NBA officials with respect                             
to determining which plays are made), all of the roles or nodes of the institution have equal power                                   
with respect to the looping role, that is, with respect to the power to constitute and change the                                   
institution  as  a  whole. 
As illustrative as this idealized NBA case may be, one might think this is a case where such                                   
idealization isn’t crucial, as it’s an opt-in practice, and so it doesn’t matter much if this practice is                                   
genuinely normative. Turning our attention to a more important case, we can look to the simplified                               
case of an ideal political democracy. Considering only two of its roles or nodes of legislator and                                 
citizen/voter, it’s obvious that there are many ways in which there are differences in power between                               
these two roles. In order for this institution of democracy to be genuinely normative according to                               
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the idealization constraint of Looping Social Constructivism, it does not need to be the case that                               
these differences in domain-relative power need to be equalized. Indeed, as both of these cases                             
show, my account allows for social IPRs that have a unique legislative node. However, for such IPRs                                 
where one nodes has unique legislating power (that is, where one node uniquely determines the                             
constitutive laws of the IPR), in order for such legislating power to be legitimate, the legislative                               
node needs to be sensitive to the preferences of the other nodes in some way. That is, the only way                                       
for such IPRs to meet my proposed idealization constraint wherein all of the nodes have  equal                               
power when it comes to determining the structure of the IPR, the non-legislating nodes need to                               
either determine the legislating node (e.g. by determining its members in the case of democracy), or                               
the legislating node must legislate by being responsive to and legislating in light of the preferences                               
and  actions  of  the  other  non-legislating  nodes  (as  in  the  case  of  the  idealized  NBA). 
While these cases illustrate the ways in which equal looping power can manifest, questions                           
remain concerning the details of the procedure of idealization over actual non-ideal IPRs that actual                             
agents take part in. Again, as the form of idealization proposed takes place at the social or                                 
institutional level, this procedure would leave the individuals who are members of the IPRs                           
untouched. Rather, we are to take the actual social IPR that an agent is a member of, and then we                                       146
must consider what the constitution of the IPR would be if it were to be the case that every node                                       
within that IPR had equal looping power--that is, where each node has equal power with respect to                                 
determining the constitution of the IPR (how the rights, responsibilities, obligations, and power                         
were  assigned  across  nodes).   
146 Of course, this doesn’t bar the Looping Social Constructivist from  also utilizing some form of idealization at the                                     
individual-level.  See  section  3.3. 
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Interestingly, it seems that some thoroughgoingly oppressive IPRs, like slavery, simply                     
cannot survive such an idealization, since having equal looping power would undermine central                         
components of what it is to be a slave. If such idealization does not dissolve the IPR itself, we are to                                         
imagine the shape of the idealized IPR by imagining what the IPR would be like if every node had                                     
equal status with respect to their ability to bring the IPR into conformance with their preferences.                               147
This notion of equal status can be defined negatively: having equal looping power is to  not have                                 
one’s  ability  to  affect  the  constitution  of  the  IPR  depend  upon  with  node  one  occupies.   
Lastly, the preferences of a node should be conceived of as those preferences individual                           
agents have  as members of the node : for example, what IPR structure one would prefer  as a coach .                                   
Usually, these preferences will be largely clear, as given the constitutive role nodes have that                             
distinguish them from other nodes, some things would better satisfy it, and thus would be                             
preferred. In the case where the node’s preferences are clear, they can be conceptualized as a                               
consensus of individual preferences; however, if it is unclear what the node’s preferences are                           
because, for example, there is disagreement over what  as a member of the node one should prefer (e.g.                                   
disagreement over what, as a coach, one should prefer) such that a consensus is lacking, the node’s                                 
preferences  can  be  conceptualized  as  the  aggregate  or  average  of  individual  preferences.  148
147 Since this conception of equal looping power entails that each  node has equal status with respect to constituting the                                       
IPR in conformity with their preferences, the number of  individual agents  who occupy a single node does not affect the                                       
power a node has: it is not the case that just because many agents belong to one node, that node has greater chances of                                               
successfully  conforming  the  IPR  to  their  preferences.  This  guards  against  tyrannic  majority  issues. 
148 Of course, many questions and challenges remain concerning this idealization strategy. Many of these concerns are                                 
concerns for idealization strategies in general: some epistemic (how can we, actual agents, come to know what our                                   
reasons are?), some normative (doesn’t this make one alienated from one’s reasons?). Although it is outside the scope of                                     
the current paper to fully address these issues here, one thing to note is that insofar as these are concerns that afflict                                           
idealization strategies as such, this particular account is no worse: if one wasn’t against idealization strategies to begin                                   
with, the fact that these concerns follow my specific social account shouldn’t dissuade one from adopting it. Secondly, it                                     
initially seems as though my account faces these issues to a lesser extent, as individual agents aren’t themselves changed                                     
(so that there is no other version of themselves to be alienated from), and the epistemic access they have to the                                         
normative facts is more secure (they don’t have to imagine what they would be like if they were different (a very                                         
difficult  task  indeed),  but  rather  just  how  they  would  act  and  what  they  would  choose  if  they  had  the  power  to  do  so). 
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Having clarified these details, we can now fully specify Looping Social Constructivism in the                           
following  way: 
An agent’s reasons are determined by the resulting idealized versions of the IPRs she actually                             
takes part in after they are idealized for equal looping power such that each node in the IPR                                   
has the same ability to bring the constitution of the IPR (the way in which rights,                               
responsibilities, expectations, and power are distributed across nodes) into conformance with                     
their  node’s  preferences. 
3.3.  Some  Problematic  Cases 
Although basketball, democracy, and slavery offered straightforward cases that illustrated                   
the RGC of equal looping power and how its use as a RGC can rule out oppressive IPRs, not all                                       
cases are so simple. Given this, we should also look to some more complicated possible cases of                                 
oppressive IPRs where overgeneration concerns might lurk. Investigating these cases would allow                       
for further understanding of the extent of the view, as well as insight into the resources it has in                                     
ruling  out  oppressive  IPRs  as  normative. 
One type of potentially problematic cases are those where it seems like each node within an                               
IPR shouldn’t have equal looping power in the first place. First, consider various caretaking                           
practices like parenting. Not only does it seem constitutive of such practices that participants don’t                             
have equal power, but it also seems like it would be harmful for those in the cared-for role (e.g.                                     
children) to have equal looping power those in the caring-for role (e.g. parents). However, it’s                             
important to remember here that equal  looping  power does  not entail  node  powers or equal power                               
within an institution that’s provided by one’s role. This is to say that a practice can have equal                                   
looping power (equal power in determining the distribution of rights, responsibilities, and powers                         
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across nodes) without it being the case that each node has the same powers or rights to do the same                                       
things (that children also have the right to decide what insurance policy to adopt or to drive).                                 
Consequently, a practice of parenting can have equal looping power while the parents have more                             
power or rights to do things than children without it being the case that children lack equal looping                                   
power. 
Another kind of case where it seems counterintuitive to have equal looping power is the                             
institution of our prison system. Even if we might think that there should be drastic prison                               
reform--as our current prison system is certainly oppressive --it seems like we perhaps still                         149
wouldn’t want to go so far as to say that prisoners should have just as much power in the                                     
determination of the overall structure of the prison system as any other node within the institution.                               
The thought here is that if we were to allow prisoners equal looping power, the prison system that                                   
would  result  would  be  in  their  favor  to  an  intolerable  extent.   
Notice, though, that this doesn’t automatically follow from the idealization constraint put                       
forth: that is, just because every node has equal looping power, and thus equal status with respect to                                   
their ability to bring the IPR into conformance with their preferences, doesn’t mean that the IPR                               
will actually take on the shape of any one node’s preferences. This is akin to a direct democracy: just                                     
because every citizen has one vote--and thus every citizen has equal power in this sense--does not                               
entail that the law (or whatever is being voted on) automatically conforms to a specific citizen’s                               
preferences. So, in this case, even if we were to allow prisoners, as a node, equal looping power in                                     
the constitution of the prison system, this does not mean that the shape the idealized prison system                                 
ultimately takes would conform to the prisoners’ preferences. Many times, it seems as though there                             
149  See,  for  example,  Alexander  (2012). 
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will have to be some compromise between the preferences of the nodes when they conflict.                             
Additionally, we should be less worried about this case in particular, as this particular institution is                               
one where there are many nodes with varied interests, and thus the chances of the idealized                               
institution conforming to any one node’s preferences are substantially reduced. The prison system,                         
as an institution, consists of more than just prisoners and wardens: it also includes guards, police                               
officers which make original arrests, judges would make the sentencing, private owners who profit                           
from the prisons, government officials, and even medical staff. So, although under this idealization                           
constraint prisoners will have some chance of having the idealized institution conform to their                           
preferences,  the  chance  and  thus  power  they  have  is  not  to  an  objectionable  extent.  150
The case of the prison system brings up another important objection that highlights the                           
varied ways in which oppression can manifest: in ruling out oppressive IPRs we should not only                               
look to the relations between the nodes of the IPR, but also to how individual nodes are constituted.                                   
More specifically, the objection is that even if every node within an IPR has equal looping power,                                 
the IPR might still be oppressive in the way in which individual agents are slotted into certain                                 
nodes. For example, even if the prison system were idealized such that every node had equal looping                                 
power, the IPR may still be oppressive if all the individuals that come to inhabit the prisoner node                                   
are, for example, persons of color. One line of response for the Looping Social Constructivist                             
involves appealing to the interdependence of IPRs. That is, one can point to the fact that individual                                 
agents in the actual world belong to many different IPRs. Plausibly, if  all of the IPRs that an                                   
individual belonged in were idealized for equal looping power, then this issue of individuals being                             
slotted into nodes in seemingly oppressive ways would no longer hold. For example, if the prison                               
150 Of course, some may think that prisoners having  any power--that is, having their preferences have  any impact in the                                       
structure of the prison system--is objectionable. I take this position to be much too implausible, as prisoners are still                                     
persons,  deserving  of  basic  rights,  and  as  such  their  preferences  should  carry  some  weight. 
113 
system, judicial system, education system, housing system, etc. were all idealized for equal looping                           
power, it seems unlikely that all of the individuals that come to inhabit the prisoner node would be                                   
persons  of  color.  151
Another complicated case arises from the fact that oppression can manifest in social                         
structures by affecting not only whether all individuals have equal looping power but whether they                             
even exercise it at all. Most generally, this is the problem of internalized oppression. For example,                               
consider a possible religious practice where although women have equal looping power in the sense                             
that they  could change the IPR, women (seem to) voluntarily give up this power, and instead yield to                                   
their male partner’s every preference, including their sexist or misogynistic ones. Moreover, these                         152
women may prefer to use their power in a way that would match or defer to another node’s                                   
preferences. For example, women immersed in sexist IPRs may, even under this idealization at                           153
the social level, simply defer to men, matching their preferences to the preferences of the men. This                                 
is the problem of adaptive preferences: under conditions of oppression, agents come to adapt their                             
preferences to fit their oppressive conditions, typically preferring what their subordinate position                       
prescribes that they prefer. For example, if women’s subordinate role prescribes that women stay                           
out of public life (including the workforce) and raise children, women come to prefer to not work                                 
and instead raise children. As this kind of case illustrates, even if certain nodes (women) were given                                 
equal power of constituting the IPR according to their preferences, and actually used this power, the                               
151 Of course, the ways in which IPRs interact with and affect one another is an extremely rich topic unto itself, and I                                             
cannot do it justice here. Rather, I hoped to have pointed to a plausible avenue of response for the Looping Social                                         
Constructivist with respect to this specific issue. I’m grateful to Milo Phillips-Brown for both bringing this important                                 
issue  to  my  attention  and  suggesting  this  line  of  response. 
152  This  case  is  very  similar  to  that  of  the  “happy  slave”  that  may  be  more  familiar  to  some  readers. 
153 Similarly, the oppressed may lack certain non-oppressive imaginative possibilities (that is, they’d lack the ability to                                 
imagine certain non-oppressive configurations of the IPR and their node). I’d like to thank Emma Marija Atherton for                                   
bringing  this  point  to  my  attention. 
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node could end up conforming their preferences to the preferences of other nodes, and thus                             
nevertheless  result  in  an  oppressive  IPR. 
There are a number of things the Idealized Social Constructivist can say in response to this                               
issue. First, they could say that the problem with these cases of internalized oppression is not a                                 
structural problem of the kind focused on here, but, rather, the problem concerns bad  individual                             
starting points. In other words, what makes these cases problematic doesn’t have anything to do                             
with the IPR itself or the way it is structured, but rather with the fact that some individuals which                                     
occupy the IPR have internalized oppressive values. Nevertheless, more can be said to assuage                           
worries about these cases. Here, one can appeal once again to the web of IPRs that individuals                                 
inhabit. Plausibly, if all of these IPRs were to be properly idealized, this bad starting point of                                 
internalized oppression would also be revised, as it itself is due to noxious social circumstances and                               
influences. Secondly, one could simply bite the bullet, and admit that in these cases, the idealization                               
constraint is met, and the IPR is normative. But, one could go on to say that there’s good reason to                                       
believe that these cases where adaptive preferences would persist even after having equal looping                           
power would be quite rare: for the attitudes and beliefs of the individual agents are likely to change                                   
in light of having such equal power. For example, once women were given the opportunity to join                                 
the workforce, their preferences and values changed as they no longer believed that their “place”                             
was  in  the  home.   
However, one might be unpersuaded that these cases of persistent adaptive preferences lie                         
outside of the concern of the Looping Social Constructivist, or are quite rare; or, one might think                                 
that, as rare as they may be, they are highly unacceptable. This brings us to the last strategy available                                     
to the Looping Social Constructivist. Although the main strategy and hallmark of Looping Social                           
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Constructivism is idealization  at the social level , there is nothing in principle barring the view from                               
also utilizing idealizing  at the individual level . So, in addition to idealizing for equal looping power,                               
the view could also idealize for false beliefs of individuals within the nodes, especially those that                               
concern the IPR itself, like the belief that she has such equal looping power and that she’s not                                   
vulnerable  to  penalties  for  using  it. 
Lastly, one type of problematic case falls out of a fundamental criticism of ideal theory by                               
non-ideal theorists. The criticism is that if the norms or principles ideal theorists put forth were to                                 
actually be instituted and followed in the actual world, the world would fall further from the ideal                                 
rather than come to more closely conform to it; as a result, this makes the norms proposed by the                                     
ideal theorist illegitimate. To take a simple example: if under ideal conditions it seems that the fair                                 
or just distribution of goods would be to distribute them equally, implementing this distribution in                             
the actual world given its injustices in distribution of wealth would only serve to exacerbate these                               
injustices, instead of bringing about conformity to an actual equal distribution of goods. Since                           
Idealized Social Constructivism is a view that uses idealization, one may think that similar problems                             
would arise regarding IPRs that take oppressive forms in the actual world. For example, one might                               
think that if agents actually acted on the norms and reasons that hold for agents in the idealized                                   
form of the IPR they take part in, this would only make the IPR more oppressive. Similarly, one                                   
might think that certain practices that are essential for undoing the injustices of our actual,                             
non-ideal world, like affirmative action or unions, would be ruled out at the outset as the                               
constitution of IPRs are determined under idealized conditions; the thought here is that if every                             
node had equal looping power none would prefer practices like affirmative action or unions, since                             
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the rationale for these practices depends on the fact that the actual world and IPRs in it are                                   
imperfect. 
Let’s take the second non-ideal theory criticism first. Here, even though Idealized Social                         
Constructivism uses idealization at the social level, one can expect the imperfect status of the actual                               
world to naturally enter into nodes’ preferences. This is because the process of idealizing at the                               
social level does not wipe the memory of knowledge that agents have about the injustices and                               
imperfections of the actual world. In this way, nodes’ preferences would be a matter of what shape                                 
they would want the IPR to take for the actual, non-ideal world, instead of what constitution they                                 
would want the IPR to have if no injustices existed and the world were ideal. So these practices                                   
would not be ruled out at the outset, and would plausibly even be determined as the form of the                                     
practice  that  results  when  every  node  has  equal  looping  power.  154
With respect to the first non-ideal criticism, it’s important to note that my account is not an                                 
account of what agents should do, all things considered, or what they have most reason to do;                                 
rather, it is only an account of what reasons agents have, including those that may be overridden.                                 
Even so, one may still think that as an ideal theory, it’s worrisome that my account may entail that                                     
agents have  any  reason to do actions that, if performed, would either further exacerbate their                             
oppression or make them worse off. For example, consider the institution of public transit during                             
segregation. Idealizing this IPR would, intuitively, make it such that riders who were persons of                             
color had reasons to sit wherever they wanted, including at the front of the bus. But, some might                                   
154 I say “plausibly” here as I believe it is plausible to assume that a sufficient amount of the individuals who occupy the                                             
nodes within the practice both have knowledge of such injustices and prefer that they not persist. Of course, it is                                       
possible that one of these features does not hold. In this case, if one is significantly bothered by the possibility that, for                                           
example, affirmative action would not be the shape of admissions practices determined after idealizing for equal looping                                 
power, one can always utilize a form of idealization at the individual level previously discussed, where one could thereby                                     
ensure  that  individuals  at  least  have  knowledge  of  the  imperfections  of  the  actual  world. 
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think it sounds counterintuitive to say that these riders, in the actual world at the time of                                 
segregation, had any reason to defy the current laws and sit at the front of the bus, for this would                                       
make them vulnerable to penalties. However, I think that it’s right to say these riders have  some                                 
reason to defy these laws, for this is merely to say that under conditions of oppression, oppressed                                 
agents have some reason to rebel and resist their oppression. Provided that any account of reasons                               
should be able to account for the fact that the oppressed have  some  reason to not simply succumb to                                     
their  oppression,  I  welcome  this  consequence  of  my  view.    155
Idealizing IPRs in the way I’ve advanced makes sense of what’s noxious about oppressive                           
IPRs without ruling out any particular IPRs in virtue of their content. In this way, it’s a                                 
non-question begging and content-neutral way for a non-objectivist social-based view to ensure                       
that no oppressive IPRs are genuinely normative. First, it seems that an IPR is oppressive when                               
certain individuals or nodes have greater power of constitution via the looping role than other                             
individuals or nodes. Looking at the classic case of slavery, we can see that certain individuals (white                                 
slave owners) had greater powers with respect to fixing the rights afforded to the nodes in the                                 
practice (slave owners and slaves) through their behavior (voting so as to pass certain laws, using                               
weapons, refusing to help slaves or acknowledge them as human beings, etc.). Secondly, having                           
equal powers of constitution relative to the looping role as a RGC isn’t packing in any value-laden                                 
content: it isn’t saying that individuals ought to have  these particular  kinds of responsibilities and                             
rights or  those particular choices and options. It also remains sufficiently non-objectivist: my account                           
still holds that an agent’s reasons are a function of the values and (constitutive) norms of the social                                   
IPRs that she takes part in. It does not say that some relevant evaluative notion of ‘equality’ is                                   
155 Importantly, this is not to say that the oppressed have obligations to resist their oppression, or all things considered                                       
ought to rebel. On the obligation of the oppressed to resist their oppression, see Boxill (2010), Buss (2010), Card (2006)                                       
and  Hay  (2011). 
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objectively valuable and the condition under which IPRs are genuinely normative--rather, just as                         
individualistic social-based views idealizes certain  individual  cognitive (evidence, drunkenness) and                   
affective (weakness of will, depression) powers or capacities agents have, my Looping Social                         
Constructivism idealizes certain  social powers and capacities agents have, as the power of                         
constitution of an IPR with respect to the looping role is a power one has as a social agent. ,                                       156 157
For these reasons, my Looping Social Constructivism is able to meet one of the biggest challenges                               
to social-based views of ruling out oppressive IPRs as genuinely normative while remaining                         
content-neutral  and  non-objectivist. 
 
4.  Concluding  Remarks  
While Looping Social Constructivism may not ensure that no agent ever has any reasons to                             
act in ways that seemingly conform to oppressive practices (e.g. that no agent ever has a reason to                                   
be a housewife), I’ve argued that it does ensure that these reasons don’t have their source in, or                                   
aren’t in virtue of, the valid IPR itself. Now, I want to take a step back from this specific challenge                                       
that is the focus of this paper and look to some upshots of this work, particularly how the picture of                                       
Looping Social Constructivism presented here fits with some issues that are important and                         
underappreciated.   
156 To be clear, on my view it is that the IPR itself is idealized at the social level (at the level of the nodes), and that as a                                                         
result this affects individuals’ (which occupy the nodes) social powers; through idealization, individuals cease being                             
powerless and come to have this social power, but it is only in virtue of occupying the node that their social power                                           
changes  through  idealization. 
157 One question related to the mind-dependency of my view is whether agents’s reasons could be a function of IPRs that                                         
don’t have equal looping power, provided that these agents opt into or choose to have IPRs where some nodes are                                       
deprived of this equal power. In the same way as individualistic non-objectivist theorists like Subjectivism wouldn’t say                                 
that an agent’s reasons could be a function of their state of drunkenness even if that the agent choose to be in this state, I                                                 
would like to rule out the idea that an agent’s reasons could be a function of IPRs that don’t have equal looping power                                             
amongst  the  nodes  provided  that  an  agent  chooses  to  be  in  such  an  IPR. 
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One important issue this work speaks to is the role and importance of feminist                           
considerations when constructing philosophical theories, especially normative ones. Aims, values,                   
issues, and strategies held by feminist philosophers are often underappreciated; here, they are                         
widely and seriously incorporated. This incorporation is noteworthy since, unlike other areas in                         
contemporary analytic philosophy, there’s been an unfortunate dearth of explicit feminist                     
approaches  to  metaethics.    158
More particularly, the social-based view I put forth here fares very well across several                           
feminist constraints, and so looks to be a good candidate as a kind of feminist metaethics. First, the                                   
account is not overly “masculinist” by putting forth a view of agency where agents are completely                               
independent, isolated, calculating, and free of any social ties. Rather, the view of agency                           159
developed in this view looks at agents through their social context, taking the social seriously by                               
having the relations that agents bear to others take primary focus. Additionally, the view takes most                               
seriously a great feminist concern: oppression. By holding that theories ought, minimally,  not  entail                           
that agents have reasons to participate in, perpetuate, and maintain oppressive practices and norms                           
that are sourced in the oppressive practice itself, the constraint on theories of normative reasons                             
that no oppressive IPRs be ruled as genuinely normative honors feminist concerns; by meeting this                             
constraint,  my  view  is  deemed  successful  by  feminist  lights.   
Lastly, through the kind of idealizing constraint put forth, this view also makes possible the                             
evaluation and critique of “social structures, social roles, role-obligations, access to power, and the                           
formation of selves to fit the structures” that feminists are urging our ethics and metaethics make                               
158  Some  exceptions  being  Driver  (2012)  and  Superson  (2012). 
159 This is a classic feminist criticism that has been put forth against theories of autonomy, ethical theories, and theories                                       
of  justice. 
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possible. By gaining a picture of what idealized social IPRs look like, we gain a better picture of                                   160
what is wrong with our current social IPRs, and a direction of where to go and what to change to                                       
make  the  kinds  of  improvements  to  our  social  world  that  feminists  demand.    161
 
5.  Summary 
There are many considerations that speak in favor of locating reasons on the social level.                             
However, those that do are faced with a pressing task: ensure that some, but not all, social                                 
institutions, practices, and relations (IPRs) are genuinely normative and generate reasons. More                       
particularly, I’ve argued that what’s most important is that social-based views ensure that no                           
oppressive IPRs are genuinely normative and generate reasons. In this paper, I have argued that two                               
contemporary social-based views fail to do so, and proposed a new social-based view--Looping                         
Social Constructivism--which is both able to rule out oppressive IPRs as normative and remain                           
non-objectivist and content-neutral. In doing so, I put forth a novel use of idealization that occurs                               
at the social or institutional level, rather than the level of individual agents. On my view, the                                 
reasons an agent has are a function of the social IPRs they are actually a part of when they are                                       
idealized  such  that  every  node  within  the  IPR  has  equal  power  in  constituting  the  IPR  itself. 
 
 
 
160  See  Haslanger  (2012b). 
161 Although one may be concerned with general issues non-ideal theorists point out with ideal theories, this is one way                                       
in which I think my theory, although it endorses an idealizing strategy, does not face similar problems: namely that                                     
configuring the ideal is often the first step to understanding what direction to head in when setting out to change our                                         
current non-ideal circumstances. Moreover, I take my theory to side-step other traditional non-ideal theory objections,                             
like those lodged against Rawls. For example, the problem many non-ideal and feminist theorists take with Rawls’                                 
original position is that it abstracts away from and in this way completely erases the social positions and relations an                                       
agent has. However, my theory does not idealize by abstracting away from agents’ social features. See also section 3.3.                                     
for  my  resolution  of  other  traditional  objections  from  non-ideal  theory.   
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Philosophy  of  Social  Science  (Kenneth  Baynes),  Fall  2012 
Metaphysics  and  Epistemology 
*Epistemic  Value  and  Normativity  (Nathaniel  Sharadin),  Fall  2016 
Language,  Epistemology,  Mind  and  Metaphysics  Proseminar  (Andre  Gallois  and  Michael  Caie), 
Spring  2013 
Testimony  and  Disagreement  (Brett  Sherman),  Spring  2012 
The  Truth  about  Fiction  (Palle  Yourgrau),  Spring  2011 
Personal  Identity  (Robert  Greenberg),  Spring  2011 
Graduate  Proseminar  (Eli  Hirsch),  Fall  2010 
Logic  and  Language 
Deontic  Modals  (J.L.  Dowell),  Spring  2014 
Logic  and  Language  Proseminar  (Michael  Caie),  Fall  2012 
Language  and  Context  (Brett  Sherman),  Spring  2012 
Intermediate  Logic  (Alan  Berger),  Fall  2010 
Continental  Philosophy 
Heidegger’s  Being  and  Time  (Simon  Critchley),  Spring  2009 
History 
History  Proseminar  (Frederick  C.  Beiser),  Fall  2013 
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